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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On 23 September 2008, a school shooting took place in Kauhajoki when a student in 
the local polytechnic entered his school, shot nine students in his study group, a 
teacher, and finally himself. The perpetrator carried fuel with him which he used to 
start several fires in the building. Of the students who were in the classroom when the 
incident took place, three survived, one of whom received a gunshot wound in the 
head. The psychosocial damage caused by the incident was considerable. 
An investigation commission was appointed to look into the incident and its back-
ground, as well as the activities of the authorities, other operators involved in the inci-
dent, and the media. The main results of the investigation are presented in the 28 
conclusions and 9 recommendations included in the report. The purpose of the rec-
ommendations and the entire investigation process was to enhance general security 
by learning from the incident.  
The fact that the perpetrator ended up committing this act was the result of a long 
process involving many factors. He had been suffering from mental health problems 
for approximately ten years and his condition had taken a turn for the worse. Several 
factors were involved during the course of the perpetrator’s life which contributed to 
his problems. With hindsight, it seems probable that the perpetrator would have bene-
fited from being examined by a specialist in psychiatry. In the light of the information 
currently available, it is impossible to establish beyond any doubt why the young 
man’s mental health problems were channelled into an admiration for school shoot-
ings and, eventually, led to him committing the deed, which was clearly modelled on 
earlier school shootings.  
The perpetrator used a self-loading or semi-automatic firearm, which was small-calibre 
but still capable of inflicting serious damage. The investigation commission recom-
mends that firearms capable of firing multiple shots in a very short period of time be 
made illegal, and that only guns that do not allow the easy infliction of such carnage 
be available for hobby purposes. With respect to other types of firearms, the investiga-
tion commission recommends that a stricter licensing policy be implemented. A dis-
senting opinion on firearm recommendations has been recorded, however. 
To enhance the mental health care services available for young people, the committee 
also recommends that antidepressants not be prescribed for persons younger than 23 
years of age without a thorough examination by a specialist doctor. Other recommen-
dations presented in the report concern the enhancement of student health care, par-
ticularly mental health care; the enhancement of interaction between generations in 
educational institutions; comprehensive security planning in educational institutions; 
shared command responsibility between authorities in operational situations; coopera-
tion between authorities in preventive work; and the coordination of psychosocial sup-
port. 
 
 
FOREWORD 
On 23 September 2008, a school shooting took place in Kauhajoki, with a student 
shooting 10 others and then himself in a school building. In this investigation report, the 
incident will be referred to by the everyday-language term ‘school shooting’ regardless 
of the definition of that phrase in criminal law. The crimes investigated by the police 
were 10 murders, 12 attempted murders, and an aggravated act of destruction. 
On the basis of the Act on the Investigation of Certain Fatal Incidents (662/2008), the 
Government appointed on 27 November 2008 an investigation commission to investi-
gate the incident.  
The composition of the investigation commission was as follows:  
Chairman Pekka Sauri, chairman of the Finnish Central Association for Mental 
Health 
Members Pekka Aho, Inspector General of the Police, Ministry of the Interior, Se-
curity Sector Supervision Unit (currently Chief Inspector for the Central 
Finland Police Department) 
Mirjam Kalland, Secretary General of the Mannerheim League for Child 
Welfare 
Esko Kaukonen, Special Research Officer of the Emergency Services 
College 
 Ullamaija Kivikuru, Professor, University of Helsinki 
Pauli Niemelä, Professor, University of Kuopio (now the University of 
Eastern Finland) 
 Leena Suurpää, Research Director at the Finnish Youth Research Society 
 Kai Valonen, Chief Accident Investigator, Accident Investigation Board 
Secretary Sini Järvi, Assistant, Accident Investigation Board 
The expert for the investigation commission in structural fire safety and management of 
rescue activities was Rescue Director Jorma Westerholm of the Rescue Department of 
Northern Savonia. The psychiatry expert was Jari Sinkkonen, MD, Docent. 
On the basis of the police investigation, the investigation commission drew up this investi-
gation report, wherein the approach is similar to that of an accident investigation. The in-
vestigation report is divided into three main sections. The first, referred to as the factual 
section, recounts the events and their background. In the analysis section, the investigation 
commission analyses the facts that emerged in the investigation and discusses their signifi-
cance. On the basis of the preceding analysis, the last section of the investigation report 
presents the conclusions and recommendations of the investigation commission. 
The investigation was aimed at the prevention of similar incidents and the improvement 
of safety, so no consideration was given to questions of guilt or compensation. The in-
vestigation report was not written to be used in a court of law; therefore, its content and 
style do not correspond to legal practice. 
 The draft investigation report was circulated for comments in the Prime Minister’s Office, 
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Addi-
tionally, interested parties and persons and organisations closely involved in the incident 
were invited to submit their comments on the report. The comments were taken into ac-
count when the finishing touches were being put to the report. 
The investigation report is available for download on the Ministry of Justice Web site, 
www.om.fi. The investigation material is held by the Accident Investigation Board of 
Finland. 
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1. THE INCIDENT 
1.1. General description 
On 23 September 2008, a student at Kauhajoki polytechnic entered a classroom midway 
through an exam and, seriously wounding another student, shot the teacher and nine of 
his classmates with a handgun. He also set fire to the building, fired numerous shots in 
other parts of the building, and eventually killed himself. 
1.2. The locale 
Picture 1. The locale. (Map from KTJ/Ministry of Justice/NSL) 
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The municipality of Kauhajoki is situated in South Ostrobothnia, in the Province of 
Western Finland, approximately 60 km south-west of Seinäjoki and 100 km south of 
Vaasa. The distance between Helsinki and Kauhajoki is some 330 km. Kauhajoki has a 
population of approximately 15,000. 
The site of the incident is in central Kauhajoki, on the bank of the Kauhajoki river, 
which flows through the town. To the west, the school building is bordered by Topeeka, 
a road passing through the town. On the northern side of the school there is a car park, 
and in the east a park-like forest on the riverbank. The school building houses the Hos-
pitality Management branch of the Seinäjoki Polytechnic Unit of Business Administra-
tion, Food Management and Entrepreneurship. The Vocational Education Centre Sedu 
Wellness and Sedu Adult Education are also situated within the school complex. 
Picture 2. The school complex. (Picture from police investigation material) 
1.3. The course of events 
On the morning of Tuesday, 23 September 2008, another school day was about to start 
for the Kauhajoki unit of Seinäjoki Polytechnic. Lessons and training sessions were un-
der way in the classrooms and training facilities. Some students were having a break, 
the staff were busy with their work, and lunch was about to be served. In the morning, 
the president of Seinäjoki Polytechnic gave a lecture for the new Hospitality Manage-
ment students, followed by a lecture for the staff.  
In classroom 3, in the basement of the new section of the building, a lesson on the ba-
sics of entrepreneurship for Hospitality Management students started at 8:00am. The 
lesson was to consist of two-hour revision on the subject, followed by a test at 10:00am. 
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The students and the teacher agreed at the very start of the lesson, however, that there 
would be only an hour of revision before the test. At 9:00, there was a break, after 
which the test started at 9:15. At the start of the test, the teacher announced that every-
body would have to work on the test for an hour at least before anyone would be al-
lowed to leave. By 10:30, five students had left the classroom. The male teacher and the 
other 12 students were still in the classroom. All but one of the students who were still 
in the classroom were female. 
Around this time, at about 10:30, a Hospitality Management student belonging to the 
same study group entered the schoolyard. He should have been taking the test along 
with the others. A few other students were absent, however; the absence of this particu-
lar student was not exceptional. The student was wearing the black clothes he customar-
ily wore, but what was exceptional was the large black bag he was carrying. Some stu-
dents and staff members saw the student arrive. Some recognised him, but nobody 
found the situation particularly exceptional in any way.  
The student entered the school building, went back outside, and approached classroom 3 
via a stairway. It is probable that he was not seen from the classroom, but at least three 
people saw him standing for a while outside the classroom door. Nobody saw him car-
rying a gun at this point. The man entered the classroom, firing his pistol toward the 
front part of the room. After this, he returned to the corridor, where he loaded a new clip 
into his gun.  
The teacher supervising the test told all of the students to throw themselves to the floor 
and ran to push against the door, which opened inward into the classroom. He managed 
to hold back the gunman for only a short while before the student fired through the 
round window in the door. At around this time, he also fired at other people who had 
come into the corridor, but he missed. Having re-entered the classroom, the perpetrator 
fired several rounds at the teacher, then continued in a rage, swearing and shooting at 
the students who were scrambling for cover behind tables and chairs.  
The perpetrator moved around the classroom, shooting whenever he noticed someone 
make a sound or move. Two of the students in the classroom managed to hide and re-
main still enough to avoid being shot. A third student survived even though she received 
a bullet to the head. Immediately after the shooting started, one of these three students 
called the Emergency Response Centre, at 10:43am. 
At 10:53, the perpetrator spread petrol on the classroom floor, set it on fire, and exited 
through the door at the back of the room, toward the adjacent drying room. The three 
students hiding in the classroom got up from the floor and opened two ventilation win-
dows. To get out, they also had to break some windows, which they managed to do by 
hitting them with chairs. Two of them escaped through the window and ran toward the 
river, hiding and remaining at the riverbank for more than an hour and a half. The stu-
dent with a gunshot wound to the head could not keep up with the others, and she tried 
to escape in another direction. She collapsed on the way but was soon picked up by an 
ambulance crew and promptly taken to hospital. All three students had heard and in part 
seen what had happened in the classroom, so they were extremely frightened and wor-
ried about the perpetrator following them. In addition to these three students, another 
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student managed to escape from the classroom, through the door. She was, however, 
found dead in the corridor outside the classroom. She probably managed to escape from 
the classroom after the perpetrator had started the fire. The perpetrator apparently shot 
her both in the classroom and in the corridor.  
For the next hour and 15 minutes, the perpetrator moved about unhindered in the school 
building, firing his gun, breaking things, and starting fires, which could be heard and 
seen also outside the school. The perpetrator failed to find new victims inside the build-
ing, however. At 11:05, he appeared at the front door, firing at the policemen outside. 
He came to the door again at 11:22, this time firing at rescue vehicles and emergency 
crews. At 11:53, the perpetrator called his friend, who lived in another locality, telling 
him during the ensuing phone conversation, which lasted nearly eight minutes, that he 
had shot 10 people and that there was nobody in the building anymore. 
As he moved around the building, the perpetrator spotted, probably at 12:09, the po-
licemen who had entered the building. It seems likely that at this point he realised he 
had no options left and shot himself in the head in the first-floor lobby.  
Picture 3. The escape routes taken by the students who escaped from the classroom 
around the time the perpetrator started the fire. The student escaping along 
the lower route was met by Emergency Medical Services personnel, but the 
other two remained hiding on the riverbank for about an hour and a half. 
(Picture from police investigation material) 
Self-rescue 
One of the students who had left the classroom earlier in the testing period went first to 
the lobby near the main entrance of the building but came back to the ground floor, en-
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tering a toilet there. Coming out of the toilet, she saw through the glass walls that the 
perpetrator, a fellow student, was entering classroom 3. She heard sounds from the 
classroom that, because of the glass walls, she could not recognise as gunshots. Soon 
she saw the perpetrator leave the classroom for the corridor to load a new clip into the 
gun he was holding in his hand. Cries for help could be heard from the classroom. The 
student ran to the top floor, where she told a teacher what was going on, then continued 
to a classroom called Vinkkeli, shouting the same through the open door. There were 
fewer than 20 students in the classroom at that time. 
At the same time, the 10 or so students in classroom 2, which was near classroom 3, 
heard strange sounds. Some of the students went into the corridor to find out what was 
happening and saw the perpetrator firing through the window in the door of classroom 
3. The perpetrator also fired at these students, and some of them escaped down the stairs 
into the lobby while others remained in classroom 2. As a lesson was not in progress in 
classroom 2, there was no teacher present. A teacher turned up soon, however, but the 
students he met on his way did not tell him what was happening on the ground floor. 
The teacher and a couple of the students who had remained in classroom 2 hid behind a 
table for a while, but they soon decided to exit into the lobby, joining the others. A 
crowd started to gather in the lobby, but some left the building via the main entrance. 
The events in the initial stages of the incident were also witnessed by three students who 
had been in the cleaning centre, and another who had come downstairs with a cleaning 
cart in a lift. The students who were in the cleaning centre did not notice or recognise 
the shooting, which is why they exited into the lobby only after a maintenance man ar-
rived on the scene, looking into the classroom where the incident took place and telling 
them that it was for real. The maintenance man had arrived there from the monitoring 
room, which was in the same corridor. As he was leaving via the classroom door, the 
maintenance man called the Emergency Response Centre at 10:46. 
Just before the maintenance man turned up, eight students coming from the Vinkkeli 
classroom had arrived at the door of classroom 3. They had left their classroom to see 
what was happening. The students saw cartridge cases on the floor outside the class-
room. The perpetrator was still in the classroom at this point. Everybody had already 
escaped from the ground floor after the maintenance man saw the perpetrator in the 
classroom, but not all left or entered the lobby immediately; instead, they went to get 
their things from classrooms, warning other students as they came across them. 
Having come back from the ground floor, two students from the Vinkkeli classroom 
went into a classroom where a first-aid course was in progress. The ambulance-driver in 
charge of the course told them to warn others and escape via the nearest stairway. Then 
he switched on the VIRVE network (Finnish Public Safety Network) phone he was car-
rying and assumed command of first aid. 
In the auditorium near the lobby, the president was giving a lecture for the school staff. 
Exceptional noises were heard in the auditorium, and one of the teachers went outside to 
see what was going on. He was told that a gunman had entered the school. Another 
teacher called the Emergency Response Centre (ERC) and was instructed to remain in 
the auditorium. Some of the staff members who were in the auditorium hid in the stor-
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age room for a while. The situation was very confusing, because the instructions given 
by the ERC were being passed on amongst the students and the staff while some of 
them had already left the building. If there were any people still in the building by the 
time the guidance counsellor entered the PA room and advised everybody through the 
PA system to leave, they made their way out of the building then. She gave added em-
phasis to her announcement by saying that she was not asking them but ordering them 
to leave.  
The PA system did not cover all parts of the building, which is why one staff member 
did not learn of the incident and remained in the building. Going into the copying room, 
she saw smoke in the corridor and thought there was some kind of exercise in progress. 
The surveillance camera records show that she left through the main entrance at 11:01. 
She was the last person to exit through that door. The announcement was not heard in 
the other buildings in the complex, which is why someone working in another building 
tried to enter the school canteen through the main entrance at 11:04. People shouted at 
him to leave, however.   
Some of those who left the building went to the laboratory building nearby, others went 
to the lower-level comprehensive school, and the rest remained near the school. Emer-
gency Medical Services personnel were trying to find a suitable assembly point for the 
students. The lower-level comprehensive school was nearby, but it was agreed that it 
would not be a good idea to bring the students there among the children. So Emergency 
Medical Services personnel contacted the nearby commercial college. After a second 
phone call, they were given permission to use this as their assembly point. The students 
were instructed to head for the commercial college, where the teachers started to draw 
up a list of those who had not been contacted yet.  
Self-rescue was affected by the fact that many people found it difficult to believe what 
was happening. This is why many people did not initially react at all or just laughed 
about it. Having left the scene, some returned to the school building. A few people 
imagined that the gun they had seen was not real or that the gunman was firing blanks. 
Some believed the sound of gunshots came from firecrackers or a fixing gun. Some 
sounds were described as having sounded like a lift falling. Many people seem to have 
believed the whole thing was an exercise, or that there was a self-defence or drama 
training session underway in classroom 3.  
1.4. Police and rescue operations 
1.4.1. Alerts 
One of the students in classroom 3 called the ERC of Ostrobothnia at 10:43 and told the 
operator that somebody was shooting in the classroom. She whispered that she was call-
ing from Kauhajoki. She used the abbreviation ‘SeAMK’ to refer to the school complex 
and said it was a vocational school on the Topeeka road. She also stated that the class-
room where the incident was taking place was on the ground floor. The student told the 
operator many people were injured and that there were about 20 people in the room in 
total. At the request of the ERC operator, the caller kept the line open with hardly any 
interruptions for an hour and a half. In the initial stages of the call, the voices of the per-
petrator and the students could be heard at the ERC. The announcement made at 10:51, 
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wherein everybody was asked to leave the building, can also be made out in the re-
cording. The caller was hiding under a table up until the gunman started the fire. At 
10:54, she told the operator of the fire. After the gunman left the classroom, the caller 
managed to escape with two other students. At this point, she told the operator the name 
of the gunman and that he was alone.  
The ERC operator alerted the police at 10:44, two ambulance units from Kauhajoki and 
a rescue helicopter at 10:45, and Rescue Services units at 10:46. Initially there was 
some confusion about the address, and the destination first given was the nearby voca-
tional school. This error was soon corrected, however. The ERC learned the exact name 
and address of the school at 10:46 when the maintenance man made an emergency call, 
reporting somebody shooting with a handgun. A head of a degree programme, who had 
been attending the lecture in the auditorium, also made an emergency call, at 10:47. The 
president of the polytechnic, who usually worked in his office in Seinäjoki, was also in 
the auditorium, so he had first-hand information on the incident. 
At 10:45, the ERC also alerted ambulance units from Teuva, Isojoki, and Jalasjärvi. An 
ambulance unit from Kurikka volunteered for the mission on their own initiative at 
10:53, postponing a non-urgent transportation mission until later. As a large number of 
casualties was to be expected, two more ambulance units were alerted, from Jurva and 
Ilmajoki, with an additional one from Seinäjoki at 11:21. Because of poor flying 
weather, rescue helicopter Pete could not take off from Vaasa, but the Pete doctor 
headed for Kauhajoki by car at 10:50, arriving at 12:06. The weather improved shortly 
thereafter, and the rescue helicopter made it to the scene at 1:20pm. During the crisis, 
several ambulances were moved from one station to another. Ambulance units were also 
placed in reserve and on alert in case reinforcements were needed or if there were si-
multaneous missions.  
At 11:25, the Rescue Services requested the ERC to look into the possibility of getting 
more rescue helicopters to the scene to increase transportation capacity. This need was 
met when a Border Guard Service helicopter transporting a police readiness unit arrived 
in Kauhajoki at 1:09pm, with another arriving from Turku at 1:16. Army helicopters 
were also placed on alert until 2:25pm, when the alert was called off. 
The ERC learned of the fire immediately after it was started, as the phone line to the 
classroom was still open. On the orders of the fire chief on duty, the ERC alerted rescue 
units from Teuva, Jurva, and Karijoki at 10:57. At 11:06, the ERC alerted a rescue unit 
from Kurikka, and at 11:10 a first-response unit from Isojoki. At 11:41, Kauhajoki Fire 
Brigade personnel were alerted for supply duties. At 1:28, the authorities decided more 
resources were needed for smoke diving, so rescue units from Isojoki and Jalasjärvi 
were summoned to the scene.  
Apart from these two rescue units, all rescue units on the scene were reinforced. This 
means that the units set off with more personnel than in normal station service, even if 
the exact number of personnel participating in the mission may not be known when the 
alert is issued. In practice, the stations are able to send at least a minimum complement 
of an officer and three fire-fighters. Units can also be complemented and further rein-
forced with varying delays and strengths through the use of volunteer fire brigades. In 
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addition to the standard fire engine, the rescue units may be equipped with other vehi-
cles, such as a fire truck, a first-response vehicle, or a crew vehicle. This arrangement 
was created because there are only part-time or volunteer fire brigades in the Kauhajoki 
region. Some stations do employ individual professional fire-fighters on a regular basis. 
The ERC reported the incident to the Ministry of the Interior’s Department for Rescue 
Services at 10:59 and to the Police Department just after 11am. Seinäjoki Central Hos-
pital was alerted at 11:11, Tampere University Hospital via the ERC of Pirkanmaa at 
11:33, and Satakunta Central Hospital via the ERC of Satakunta at 11:25. During the 
incident, the ERC maintained a log and an overall picture of the situation.  
Alerting the police 
At 10:44, the ERC alerted the Kauhajoki police patrols by radio with the following mes-
sage: ‘Kauhajoki vocational school possible shooting incident underway’. The ‘vocational 
school’ mentioned in the alert was incorrect information, but the target was correctly iden-
tified as the ‘polytechnic’ in the text message that was sent in conjunction with the alert. 
The error was corrected also in a radio message at 10:53. A Kauhajoki District Police De-
partment patrol accepted the mission immediately. The ERC then requested other police 
patrols in the area to head for Kauhajoki, informing them that there were several wounded 
and possibly casualties there. When the patrols asked for more information, the ERC op-
erator told them that it was ‘apparently a replay of Jokela, vocational school and one of the 
classrooms’. The information received at this point was that an unknown male had entered 
the school ‘through the windows’ and there was still shooting at the school. Several police 
patrols from Alavus and Kurikka, among others; dog handlers interrupting their training 
session in Seinäjoki; and five policemen from the Seinäjoki Police Department who had 
been in support weapons training in Ylistaro immediately headed for Kauhajoki.  
Within five minutes, the policemen were speculating that the perpetrator could be the per-
son whose firearm possession permit had only recently been under consideration. The 
Criminal Police lieutenant who acted as the situation commander in the early stages of the 
incident had played an instrumental part in the revocation of the perpetrator’s firearm pos-
session permit. This is why he asked to be relieved of his command at around 11am.  
News of the incident spread through the police organisation. At 11:02, a Criminal Police 
lieutenant at the Kauhajoki District Police Department informed the Provincial Command 
of Western Finland of the incident. The Western Finland Provincial Police commissioner 
in turn submitted a situation report to the National Police commissioner at 11:05. At 11:10, 
the deputy police commissioner of the Seinäjoki District Police Department informed Pro-
vincial Police Command of the incident, and the Provincial Police commissioner ordered 
the deputy police commissioner to take charge of the situation.   
The commanding officer of the Turku Regional Division of the National Bureau of Inves-
tigation was informed of the incident by the Western Finland Provincial Police commis-
sioner at 11:12, at which point a decision was made to hand over the investigation of the 
incident to the National Bureau of Investigation. At 11:22, the deputy police commissioner 
who had assumed situation command informed the Police Situation Centre in Helsinki of 
the incident and ordered a police readiness unit to be deployed. 
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1.4.2. Police operations  
When alerted at 10:44, a patrol of the Kauhajoki District Police Department was on its 
way from Teuva to Kauhajoki, approximately 10 minutes away from Kauhajoki. The 
patrol was led by a sergeant of the Kauhajoki District Police Department, who was also 
the police field commander for the area. On his way to Kauhajoki, the field commander 
contacted the officers of the Kauhajoki Police Department, requesting them to set up a 
situation command at Police Department Headquarters. At this point, at 10:49, one of 
the patrols from Seinäjoki informed the other patrols participating in the mission of the 
suspected identity of the perpetrator, which information later proved to be correct.  
Initially, the Kauhajoki patrol was, as instructed by the ERC, on its way to the voca-
tional school, but at 10:53, as a result of further police information-gathering efforts, 
another Kauhajoki patrol identified the target correctly as ‘the household school oppo-
site the R [a Finnish chain of newsagents]’ – that is, the polytechnic.  
The Kauhajoki patrol alerted by the ERC arrived at the southern entry to the polytechnic 
at 10:54 and found Rescue Services units already cordoning off the school building. At 
this point, a fire had been started inside the school building, confirmed by the smoke 
rising from behind the school.  
The patrol had no idea where the perpetrator or perpetrators were at that moment. The 
patrol had been informed by the ERC that the shooting had started in classroom 3, but 
they had no idea of where the classroom was. When the patrol came upon the school’s 
maintenance man, he told the patrol what had happened and where. 
Two patrol policemen donned tactical protective equipment and started to approach the 
school building, protected by an armoured shield. Their intention was to enter the 
school building to cover the evacuation and to rescue casualties and anybody else still 
inside. The patrol believed there were still students and teachers inside the building at 
this point. As the patrol set off from the corner of the hall of residence towards the 
school building, three or four shots were fired at them from the B entrance at 11:06. 
Having fired the shots, the perpetrator went inside again. The shots fired at the patrol 
did not hit the policemen, but they still returned to the corner of the hall of residence, 
behind which they took cover. As the other patrols neared the scene, the field com-
mander instructed them to cordon off the sides of the building.  
On the same day, support weapons men from the Seinäjoki District Police Department 
were training in Ylistaro, while regional dog handlers were attending a training session 
in Seinäjoki. The policemen attending the training were informed of the incident via ra-
dio and immediately left for Kauhajoki. Some of them drove police vehicles while oth-
ers used their own cars. As soon as enough policemen had arrived on the scene, two of 
the policemen together set up two teams on their own initiative. At 11:30, the field 
commander issued instructions on the use of force in the current situation. All in all, 
some 100 policemen arrived on the scene.  
After the teams had been formed and the entry into the building planned, the field com-
mander ordered the first team to enter at 11:36, followed by the second team at 11:45. 
There were three policemen in the first team and five in the second. The teams entered 
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from opposite ends of the school building, one at the north and the other at the south 
end. The teams were instructed to check the whole building and to make sure they left 
no unchecked rooms behind them as they proceeded.  
As the teams entered, the perpetrator was moving around in the building, shooting and 
starting fires. The first team soon radioed the field commander that they were unable to 
proceed because of the smoke. At 12:09, the second team reported having sighted 
through the armoured glass a person dressed in black with a gun in his hand on the 
first-floor landing. The team proceeded to the first-floor lobby and at about 12:10 found 
a male lying on his side with a gun next to him. There was blood next to his head. It was 
not apparent immediately that this person was the gunman, but the clips found in his 
pocket confirmed that the gun belonged to him. At this point, it was still uncertain 
whether there was just one gunman or whether there were explosives in the building. In 
reality, there was no danger anymore, apart from the fire. 
Owing to busy radio traffic, it was not until 12:13 that, using a VIRVE network emer-
gency call, the team managed to radio that they had perhaps found the perpetrator. The 
police carried the perpetrator to the exit, from which Rescue Services personnel carried 
him to the ambulance. At this point, the police did not allow Rescue Services personnel 
to enter the building, for safety reasons. 
There were still copious amounts of combustion gases inside the building, and by order 
of the situation commander, the patrols were informed at 12:16 that they were to take 
into account in their operations that police gas masks are not effective against carbon 
monoxide. To overcome this problem, Rescue Services personnel guided the police in 
the use of SCBA masks.  
At around 12:20, the police allowed Rescue Services personnel to enter the building to 
extinguish the fires. The police remained within the building, however – to safeguard 
the rescue activities while rescue workers extinguished the fires. 
The police also continued checking the facilities in case there were still other people in 
the building. The school building was also checked thoroughly for any explosives or 
flammable liquids. As there was still a lot of smoke in the building, the police were un-
able to conduct a complete check of the facilities immediately. At 12:42, the police were 
able to report that so far, five casualties had been found in the building. 
The first members of the police readiness unit arrived on the scene by helicopter from 
Helsinki at 1:09pm. At 1:30, the remainder of the readiness unit arrived by car from 
Tampere, where they had been attending a training session. The readiness unit was 
charged with making a final check of the building. They also checked the hall of resi-
dence and other school facilities. Because of simultaneous threats in Seinäjoki and 
Lapua, some readiness unit policemen remained on alert in the vicinity. The school’s 
hall of residence was checked by a team consisting of policemen from the Seinäjoki Po-
lice Department. 
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At 2:27, the situation commander decided that cordoning off the other schools in Kau-
hajoki as a precaution was no longer necessary. At 3:34, the police confirmed that the 
number of casualties found in the building was 10. 
Starting at 5pm, police personnel were provided with psychosocial support in a debrief-
ing held at the Suupohja Vocational Institute. The debriefing was attended by the ap-
proximately 70 policemen who had participated in the action in Kauhajoki. Two further 
debriefings were held on the following day.  
The police investigated the incident as 10 murders, 12 attempted murders, and an ag-
gravated act of destruction. 
1.4.3. Rescue operations 
Led by the Kauhajoki fire marshal, the first rescue units arrived on the scene from the 
Kauhajoki Rescue Department at 10:52. The rescue units started to cordon off the area 
because at that point there were many bystanders and escapees from the school building 
in the area. The Kauhajoki fire marshal radioed the units that were still arriving, telling 
them which direction to approach from and where to enter. 
At 11:22, the perpetrator stepped outside to fire at the rescue units. One fire engine was 
hit by a bullet, and rescue personnel were instructed to take cover. The fire engine was 
left at the junction to prevent outsiders from entering the danger zone and to provide 
cover against bullets. The command vehicle and an ambulance, which were the first ve-
hicles to arrive, had to be left in the area of the junction as it was too dangerous to ap-
proach any nearer. 
The next five rescue units from neighbouring municipalities arrived between 11:27 and 
11:45. The rescue chief (P2) of the Rescue Department of Southern Ostrobothnia ar-
rived on the scene at 11:30 and the Suupohja fire chief on duty (P3) at 11:34. The rescue 
chief assumed command for rescue operations. He instructed the fire chief on duty to 
lead the troops participating in rescue operations and proceeded to set up a command 
centre for rescue operations at Kauhajoki Fire Department Headquarters. Rescue Ser-
vices supply teams arrived in the area at 12:10. 
Rescue workers assisted the school staff in guiding those who had left the building to-
ward the nearby commercial college. They also assisted the police in cordoning off the 
school building. Passers-by were directed away from the area. Rescue workers gave or-
ders to empty the commercial building and a couple of residential buildings nearby. 
The staff at the nearby day-care centre were aware of the danger and gathered all the 
children together. Rescue workers guided them to safety at the commercial college, 
where a classroom was reserved for the day-care centre personnel. The staff of the 
nearby Sanssi School were instructed to keep their students indoors until it was safe to 
go outside again. Permission to leave the school building was given at 12:42. 
From the emergency call made from the classroom, the rescue authorities were immedi-
ately aware that the perpetrator had started a fire in the building. The smoke was soon 
visible outside, as was the fact that there were several fires, in different parts of the 
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building. Rescue Services personnel prepared to start the fire-fighting and rescue mis-
sion as soon as the police gave them permission to do so after the threat of gunshots had 
been eliminated. 
At 12:15, the chief of rescue operations was informed by the police that the gunman was 
wounded and the police had his gun. At 12:20, the police permitted the rescue workers 
to enter the building. As there was no definite information on the number of possible 
perpetrators or the presence of explosives at this point, the first Rescue Services smoke 
divers were covered by armed policemen wearing SCBA masks. By order of the police 
command, Rescue Services personnel had just before this shown the police how to use 
SCBA masks. As there were numerous fires burning in the large and sprawling build-
ing, extinguishing the fires proved problematic, particularly in the old part of the build-
ing. Many doors were locked, all of which had to be broken open to secure the facilities. 
The two additional rescue units called to the scene arrived at 2:02 and 2:52. 
Gradually, the fire-fighters managed to get the fire under control, and by 2:55 all fires 
had been extinguished. Follow-up monitoring and clearing-up work were continued, 
however. The command centre for rescue operations at Kauhajoki Fire Department 
Headquarters had been dismantled by 1pm, after which rescue operations were led from 
a specially designated room at Kauhajoki Municipality Hall until 4:00pm. It was at this 
point that rescue operations on the scene were officially terminated.  
Later that day, a debriefing session was held for Rescue Services personnel at Kauha-
joki Fire Department Headquarters at 7:30pm. A similar debriefing was held in Karijoki 
for personnel from the fire departments that participated in rescue operations on the 
scene.  
1.4.4. Emergency Medical Services 
When the shooting started, a first-aid training session for students was in progress in the 
classroom above, led by a local paramedic-level ambulance-driver. An ambu-
lance-driver with paramedic-level qualifications is capable of handling even demanding 
first-aid situations. Two students knocked on the classroom door, telling those present 
that somebody was shooting in the school and that everyone should leave the building. 
The ambulance-driver led the students out and used his VIRVE network phone to con-
tact the ERC at 10:45. He told the ERC operator that he was already on the scene and 
that he would assume command of emergency medical services there. The first two am-
bulance units arrived on the scene at 10:47 and 10:49. The next six ambulances arrived 
between 11:04 and 11:12, with one more ambulance, alerted slightly later, arriving from 
Seinäjoki at 11:57. 
As soon as a command centre for rescue operations had been set up, the Emergency 
Medical Services field commander assumed command there as the medical chief. He 
maintained a situation overview for Emergency Medical Services, informed hospitals 
beforehand, and kept them up-to-date on the situation picture. He also appointed a 
treatment, triage, and transportation leader from among the ambulance unit members on 
the scene. Triage refers to the assessment and classification or prioritisation of patients’ 
need for treatment.  
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Within roughly two hours of the alert, a dozen or so ambulance units and five doctors 
had arrived on the scene. The doctors were responsible for medical treatment and triage. 
One of the doctors was stationed at the commercial college to receive the students who 
had escaped from the school building, while another was in the health centre to provide 
crisis assistance. A rescue helicopter, two Border Guard Service helicopters, and four 
Army helicopters were also available for the transportation of patients, for example. To 
ensure sufficient transportation resources, all non-urgent ambulance missions within the 
Suupohja region of Southern Ostrobothnia were postponed. Such missions include the 
non-urgent transportation of elderly patients from health centres to hospital or from their 
home to a health centre. 
In relation to the available resources, there were few patients in need of treatment. A 
student who escaped through a classroom window was dispatched to Seinäjoki Central 
Hospital at 11:24, where she arrived at 11:50. There her injuries were found to be so 
severe that she was sent to Tampere University Hospital. In the early stages of emergency 
medical care, the seriousness of her injury was not immediately apparent, but a little 
later the patient was found to have a serious gunshot wound to the head. Additionally, a 
person in a state of shock was transported to Kauhajoki Health Centre at 11:30.  
Two of the students who had escaped from the classroom where the incident took place 
had to remain in the small forest near the school for about an hour and a half. They were 
in almost continuous contact with the ERC, with the operator calming them down and 
advising them against swimming across the river. At 12:28, the police rescued them 
from the forest and escorted them to an ambulance unit, which took them to the health 
centre. One of them had received minor injuries when escaping through the window. 
These students’ experiences of the events in the classroom and the time they had to re-
main in the forest, frightened of the gunman, were extremely distressing for them, 
which the authorities initially failed to appreciate in full. The students had to follow the 
police away from the forest without the physical assistance they required. When they 
arrived at the ambulance, one of the personnel there said aloud that he would go else-
where to treat those who were really in need of help. 
The perpetrator was found at 12:10. He had shot himself in the head and was uncon-
scious but alive. He was taken to an ambulance, which headed for Tampere University 
Hospital at 12:35. There he was pronounced officially dead at 4:46pm.  
Emergency medical operations were continued between 1:34 and 1:45, when two ambu-
lances from Seinäjoki, an ambulance from Ilmajoki, and a Tactical Emergency Medical 
Service team were dispatched to the School of Health Care and Social Work of 
Seinäjoki Polytechnic because of a bomb threat.  
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Picture 4. A timeline of the events related to the school shootings in Kauhajoki. 
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1.4.5. Activities at medical institutions 
News of the incident was quickly relayed to Kauhajoki Health Centre, Seinäjoki Health 
Centre, Jalasjärvi Health Centre, Seinäjoki Central Hospital, Vaasa Central Hospital, 
and Tampere University Hospital, all of which immediately started preparing for the 
reception of patients. At this point, the hospitals and health centres were told they could 
expect some 20–40 patients.  
Kauhajoki Health Centre 
Kauhajoki Health Centre learned of the incident when the ambulance-driver who had been 
teaching at the school and who subsequently assumed command for emergency medical 
care called the ERC. Standard reception and emergency services were under way at the 
health centre. Health centre personnel started to prepare for the reception of patients im-
mediately, even though they initially knew very little of what had happened. The First Aid 
ward manager alerted the chief physician, the head of nursing, the care work leader, and 
the Family Centre ward manager.  
Standard reception activities were terminated at that point. The First Aid wing was emptied 
of patients and doctor–nurse teams were formed there to perform the expected triage. The 
First Aid wing was reserved for those with somatic injuries. The personnel prepared to 
empty 5–6 rooms in the acute ward in case there was need for beds there. The main lobby 
and the facilities surrounding it were reserved for the psychological first aid to be given to 
the next of kin. Apart from that, psychological first aid was to be given in the nearby café, 
which was turned into a temporary psychological first-aid station where the crisis workers 
were directed when they started to arrive. Later on, some crisis workers were stationed in 
the commercial college that was used as an evacuation centre. Having heard what was 
happening, most of those who arrived at the health centre for standard appointments at this 
stage turned away and cancelled their appointments. 
In the first two hours, dozens of distressed people arrived at the health centre. Some of 
these were young people evacuated from the school building, but there were also people 
whose next of kin had been there at the time of the incident. All told, more than a hundred 
people arrived at the health centre in the course of the day. The triage nurses were there to 
meet the people arriving at the door to the First Aid section. At the main entrance and in 
the lobby, the patients and next of kin were guided by Family Centre and Community 
Nursing nurses. They also guided the crisis workers arriving from the Hospital District of 
Southern Ostrobothnia, the Finnish Red Cross, and the local parish, among others.  
The nurses guiding people in the lobby informed the media that their presence was not 
welcome in the health centre, and that the police and municipality representatives would 
hold a media conference at Municipality Hall. As soon as more information on the situa-
tion at the school was available, health care personnel started to set up a crisis organisation 
in co-operation with crisis workers from various organisations. The mission of the crisis 
organisation was the comprehensive co-ordination of after-care in the weeks following the 
incident. 
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Hospitals 
At 11:15, Seinäjoki Central Hospital was placed on full alert in accordance with its 
readiness instructions, and 35 beds were made available for potential patients. Only the 
patient who received a gunshot wound in the classroom was taken to Seinäjoki, how-
ever, and this patient was eventually transported from here to Tampere University Hos-
pital (TAYS). The Psychological First Aid Team of Seinäjoki Central Hospital was ac-
tively involved in the incident from the beginning. 
Tampere University Hospital prepared to receive patients with head or chest injuries. 
Non-urgent operations were postponed, which left four general surgery operating theatres 
in readiness between 12:30 and 1:50pm – that is, until more specific information on the 
patients was available. Additionally, Tampere University Hospital informed Seinäjoki 
Central Hospital that, if necessary, five anaesthesiologist–nurse teams would be available 
and could be flown there in a Border Guard Service helicopter. It turned out that this was 
not necessary, however. In total, only two patients were transported to Tampere. One of 
them was the student with a gunshot wound who arrived there via Seinäjoki Central Hospi-
tal. The other patient taken to Tampere was the perpetrator with his serious head injury. 
The ERC also alerted the Emergency Clinic of Vaasa Central Hospital. Seinäjoki Cen-
tral Hospital requested that Vaasa Central Hospital prepare to receive patients with chest 
injuries if necessary. Accordingly, Vaasa Central Hospital placed in readiness five oper-
ating theatres, five intensive care beds, five cardiac telemetry beds, and an internal 
medicine surgeon.  
Readiness was also stepped up in Satakunta Central Hospital, where key personnel were 
alerted, psychological first-aid readiness was stepped up, and a doctor’s unit was placed 
on alert for a possible call to leave for Kauhajoki. Additionally, Northern Satakunta am-
bulances were placed in readiness for possible support needs. 
At 1:45pm, the hospitals were stood down from alert. By this time, it was apparent that 
no more patients would arrive from Kauhajoki. 
1.4.6. Other immediate action taken by the authorities 
Border Guard Service helicopters from Turku and Helsinki Air Patrol squadrons pro-
vided operational support. An Agusta-Bell 412 helicopter from Helsinki arrived on the 
scene at 1:09pm with five policemen from Police Readiness Unit Karhu. Reaching 
Kauhajoki at 1:16pm, a Super Puma helicopter arrived on the scene from Turku. The 
Coast Guard was also in readiness to provide executive assistance if necessary. 
At the request of the police, the Finnish Defence Forces sent five Pasi armoured person-
nel carriers to Kauhajoki, not all of which arrived on the scene in time. One of these ve-
hicles carried a special response unit of the Pori Brigade. The Artillery Brigade in Ni-
inisalo sent a platoon-strength unit and the Kauhava Training Air Wing a squad-strength 
unit. The Defence Forces helicopters in Seinäjoki and Oulu were in readiness for trans-
port missions. Further Defence Forces executive assistance took the form of Air Force 
planes bringing National Bureau of Investigation investigators to the scene. From 
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3:00pm, a no-fly zone was established over Kauhajoki for approximately 12 hours. The 
no-fly zone was patrolled by various Air Force aircraft, including Hornet fighters.  
The Municipality of Kauhajoki 
Municipality of Kauhajoki authorities were informed of the incident by the Rescue De-
partment of Southern Ostrobothnia at 11:07. The news was relayed to the mayor, who 
immediately convened the Municipality Management Team. The mayor was also con-
tacted by the ERC at 11:32. Because of the seriousness of the situation, it was decided 
to set up a command centre in the health centre meeting room, about 100 metres from 
Municipality Hall. In the health centre, the authorities had the VIRVE network at their 
disposal. The Management Team soon established that the municipality was in a state of 
emergency. It was decided to interrupt all non-urgent municipal functions and to chan-
nel all resources to provision of support for the operations of the various authorities. Us-
ing the VIRVE network, the medical chief provided the command centre with a situa-
tion overview via the health centre’s chief physician. Information was also relayed by 
mobile phone.  
Led by the police, media conferences were held at the Council Hall, where the reporters 
were given use of the Municipality Hall telecommunications network. The municipality 
also prepared to receive foreign media representatives and to respond to enquiries. Ad-
ditionally, a 24-hour food service was established in the municipality. 
1.4.7. Operational command involving multiple authorities 
In a shooting incident such as this, the police usually are in overall command of the 
situation. The police patrol arriving first on the scene set up a police field command post 
at the corner of the school’s hall of residence, where they were in visual contact with the 
school building. On account of the small number of policemen on the scene, the Kauha-
joki District Police Department sergeant did not at that point set up a separate field or-
ganisation at the field command post; instead, he in practice led the operation independ-
ently on the scene. Later on, there was no longer any need to set up a field organisation, 
as the perpetrator was found dead inside the building and acute operational command 
was no longer necessary. 
At 11:20, the Provincial Police commissioner appointed the deputy police commissioner 
of the Seinäjoki District Police Department as situation commander. Having arrived at 
Kauhajoki Police Department Headquarters at 11:50, the deputy police commissioner 
assumed the duties of situation commander after being briefed on the situation by the Kau-
hajoki Police Department Criminal Police sergeant who had been in command up until 
then. All others involved in the operations were informed of the change in command via 
the VIRVE network. The situation commander set up his command at Kauhajoki Police 
Department Headquarters. He also established a field organisation in accordance with 
the action plan for demanding situations.  
To improve and enhance co-operation between various units, the situation commander 
sent, at 12:15pm, a policeman to act as a liaison from the Rescue Services command 
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centre at Rescue Department Headquarters. This policeman remained in the Rescue 
Services command centre until approximately 3:45pm. 
The rescue director of the Rescue Department of Southern Ostrobothnia was informed 
of the incident in conjunction with the first alerts. He ordered the departmental rescue 
chief to lead local rescue operations and also left for Kauhajoki. While still on his way 
to Kauhajoki, the rescue director established external communication channels and pro-
vided support for the imminent rescue operation by arranging bullet-proof vests for the 
rescue workers, for example. He also ensured that there were sufficient resources avail-
able for incidents that might occur simultaneously, and a building fire did in fact occur 
in Kauhajoki, for which the alert came at 12:21pm. The necessary resources were sent 
from units that were involved in the rescue operation at the polytechnic. 
The rescue director informed the State Provincial Office and the Municipality of Kauha-
joki authorities of the incident. He also notified the Ministry of the Interior’s Depart-
ment for Rescue Services and provided that department with regular situation reports. 
As an example, the director-general of the Rescue Services was informed of the situa-
tion while most of the rescue units alerted were still on their way to the scene. The De-
partment for Rescue Services relayed news of the incident to the Ministry of the Inte-
rior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Gov-
ernment Situation Centre. On the basis of these reports and alerts and the information 
relayed later via the police administration, such portions of the State Crisis Management 
System as were considered necessary were activated. 
The rescue chief on duty for the Rescue Department of Southern Ostrobothnia acted as 
the situation commander for rescue operations and emergency medical services in the 
field. Rescue operations and emergency medical services were led from the rescue op-
erations command centre, which facilitated the co-ordination of the various activities. 
The medical chief was responsible for providing the medical institutions with the neces-
sary advance information and situation reports later on. The maintenance of a suffi-
ciently up-to-date situation overview, in terms of the measures taken by Municipality of 
Kauhajoki authorities, was also mainly based on the situation reports sent to the health 
centre by the medical chief.  
1.4.8. Communications 
The Public Safety Network (VIRVE) with its standard internal and co-operation call 
groups was the authorities’ primary means of communication during the crisis. Rescue 
Services and Emergency Medical Services personnel operated in the call group meant 
for the Suupohja area, whose communications were recorded by the ERC of Ostroboth-
nia. In addition to VIRVE network radios, phones were used to some extent. 
The ERC of Ostrobothnia assigned the mission to the police via the channel reserved for 
assignment of missions. Initially, the police field commander used the same channel, to 
ensure that all police patrols arriving on the scene would be able to monitor radio com-
munications in the early stages of the operation.  
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After the police patrol that had arrived on the scene first had been fired at, the field 
commander switched channels at the request of the ERC of Ostrobothnia, using the field 
operations channel for radio communications concerning police operations. That made 
it easier for the ERC to assign missions to police patrols that were not involved in this 
operation. 
After this switch of channels, all police communications were transmitted via the field 
operations channel. During the incident, radio traffic became cluttered, which hindered 
communication between the main operators, particularly the field commander and po-
lice teams. Furthermore, the field commander and the situation commander had occa-
sional problems in contacting one another. On two occasions, the field commander even 
had to visit the command centre in person to give a situation report. The acute, opera-
tional stage of the incident was over at this point, however. Communications problems 
were exacerbated by the fact that, at any given time, there were many policemen either 
on the scene or on the way there. The patrols and individual policemen arriving on the 
scene all used the same channel to ask where to go and to request further instructions.  
Another source of problems for the police was the collapse of the GSM network, which 
hampered communications between the situation commander and the field commander, 
regardless of several attempts. Police operations on the scene were hampered also by a 
shortage of VIRVE network phones. 
1.4.9. Action taken by central administration authorities 
The Ministry of the Interior 
At 10:50, the rescue director of the Rescue Department of Southern Ostrobothnia re-
ported by phone to the head of the Department for Rescue Services – that is, the direc-
tor-general of the Rescue Services – on the shooting incident and the action taken by 
authorities. At about 10:55, the director-general reported the incident to the Ministry of 
the Interior’s Internal Security Management Group, who were about to start their regu-
lar meeting at 11:00. The Internal Security Management Group is chaired by the Minis-
ter of the Interior, with the Permanent Secretary as vice-chair. The members of the man-
agement group are the director-general of the Police Department, the director-general of 
the Department for Rescue Services, the chief of the Border Guard, the director-general 
of the International Affairs Unit, the chief of the National Bureau of Investigation, and 
the director of the Emergency Response Centre Administration.  
Between 11:05 and 11:15, an official was appointed to monitor the situation for the De-
partment for Rescue Services and a situation centre was set up at the ministry. Between 
11:15 and 11:30, the Ministry of the Interior’s Department for Rescue Services in-
formed the Government Situation Centre, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of-
ficer on duty, and the Preparedness Plan Officer of the Ministry of Education of the in-
cident. At 11:36, the Internal Security Management Group decided that the police were 
in charge of the operation, including the provision of information and all situation re-
ports. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Ministry of Education were 
informed of this by the Department for Rescue Services.  
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On the basis of the reports submitted earlier by the rescue director of the Rescue De-
partment of Southern Ostrobothnia, the Department for Rescue Services declared at 
about 12:30 that the incident was over. Fires were still being extinguished, however, and 
the authorities continued to monitor the situation. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
The duty officer of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health was informed of the shoot-
ing incident by the Department for Rescue Services at 11:17. At 11:35, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health Preparedness Unit sent a text message to the management 
group of the ministry and phoned both ministers, informing them of the incident. Some 
10 minutes later, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Government Crisis 
Communications Unit, and the Ministry of the Interior Police Department agreed on 
how publicity was to be handled and co-ordinated. At this point, the police were already 
in charge of the situation and the provision of information. 
At 12:05, a phone call was placed with the preparedness physician of Seinäjoki Central 
Hospital to ensure that the hospital was in emergency readiness. The hospital confirmed 
that one injured person had already been brought there. It was around this time also that 
the Seinäjoki, Tampere, and Vaasa hospitals agreed on how patients would be assigned 
among them. The situation was assessed as not requiring any national-level support. 
At 12:15, the Finnish Red Cross (FRC) chief of operations reported that the organisa-
tion had alerted its Psycho-social Support Team and psychologist in the Kauhajoki re-
gion. In addition, the Seinäjoki and Vaasa chiefs of operations were on their way to 
Kauhajoki. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health informed the medical chief of the Hospital 
District of Helsinki and Uusimaa (HUS) of the situation at 12:30 and received confirma-
tion that HUS would be able to provide additional resources if necessary. To ensure 
availability of the necessary resources for psychosocial support, the authorities con-
tacted the Vantaa Social and Crisis Emergency Centre, which promised to provide sup-
port. The Finnish Red Cross chief of operations in Finland announced that the FRC had 
set up a crisis hotline for the public. 
On the day following the incident, the Kauhajoki Taskforce, appointed by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health, met for the first time. Its task was to provide support for 
the Municipality of Kauhajoki in the organisation of support and crisis assistance for the 
victims, their next of kin, and the students and staff of the polytechnic. The taskforce 
was charged with ensuring that the necessary experts and support were available and 
that the division of responsibilities among the various support providers was clear.  
The taskforce consisted of representatives of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the 
National Public Health Institute1, the Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa, Stakes 
(the National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health)1, the National 
Board of Education, Kauhajoki Health Centre, the Seinäjoki Joint Municipal Authority for 
Education, the Hospital District of Southern Ostrobothnia, the Tuusula After-care Team, 
                                                 
1 The National Institute for Health and Welfare from 1 January 2009. 
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the City of Vantaa, and the Finnish Red Cross. On Sunday, 28 September 2008, a team of 
experts summoned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Preparedness Unit visited 
Kauhajoki to provide support for the municipal planning of psychosocial support and to 
determine the need for special resources. The organisation of psychosocial support in the 
initial stage of the crisis was also assessed during this visit.  
The Ministry of Education and the National Board of Education 
The Ministry of Education’s head of preparedness was informed of the incident by 
phone by the Department for Rescue Services at 11:31. The preparedness organisation 
of the ministry convened at 11:40. The Minister of Education, the Secretary of State, the 
Permanent Secretary, and the head of Vocational Training were also advised of the 
situation at this time. Operations were also commenced in the Communications and 
Public Relations unit of the ministry, where the developments were monitored via the 
government’s situation overview portal, the media, and international news compilations 
issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Communications and Public Relations 
unit gathered information and forwarded it via e-mail, from 11:50. The last message 
was sent at 6:53pm, at which point the total number of messages sent was about 100. 
The Ministry of the Interior’s Department for Rescue Services informed the Ministry of 
Education at 12:10 that the police would be in charge of communications and publicity. 
The ministry contacted the government’s head of security, who confirmed that 
up-to-date information on the measures taken by the authorities and the government 
would be available through the government situation overview portal.  
At 12:35, the Ministry of Education appointed officials tasked with responding to media 
enquiries, and the Communications and Public Relations unit of the Ministry for For-
eign Affairs was provided with a list of the responsible officials. The Communications 
and Public Relations unit was also contacted to co-ordinate communications and public-
ity with the police. Around the same time, news arrived that the General Synod had ini-
tiated action to help the victims’ families.  
The aim of the Ministry of Education was to ensure sufficient post-incident support not 
only for the management, staff, and students of Seinäjoki Polytechnic, the Vocational 
Education Centre Sedu, and Sedu Adult Education, which were the units operating in 
the school complex, but also for the staff and students of other units and branches of the 
Seinäjoki Joint Municipal Authority for Education. The information and guidance pro-
vided for the other schools and educational institutions was mainly the responsibility of 
the National Board of Education. 
The preparedness personnel of the National Board of Education learned of the incident 
through the media at 11:50, and the head of preparedness contacted the Ministry of 
Education for more details and to agree on the division of duties between the two au-
thorities. Simultaneously with this, the Preparedness Group of the National Board of 
Education started a meeting at which decisions were made concerning the division of 
responsibility within the unit. The personnel were first informed of the measures to be 
taken at 12:22, via the intranet.  
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The crisis support material for schools and other educational institutions that was pub-
lished on the National Board of Education Web site after the November 2007 school 
shootings in Jokela was updated. The updated material was published on the National 
Board of Education Web site at 12:44. A direct link to the material was added on the 
Ministry of Education Web site. The material provided educational institutions with in-
structions concerning how to deal with the incident. According to Web site statistics, the 
pages focusing on the provision of support for schools and other educational institutions 
received the most hits, followed by those focusing on dealing with the crisis and after-
care in schools. Many educational institutions also contacted National Board of Educa-
tion experts directly after the incident. 
Prime Minister’s Office 
The Prime Minister’s Office was informed of the incident by the Ministry of the 
Interior’s Department for Rescue Services at 11:21. The news was relayed in a text 
message to the leadership of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Finnish Security 
Police. A new topic was opened on the incident in the government situation overview 
portal at 11:33. At 12:01, the Government Situation Centre sent the government 
members a text message containing the current situation overview. The compilation of a 
report on the shooting incident and the gunman was commenced at around this time.  
At 12:26, the Government Situation Centre received a text message from the Ministry of 
the Interior’s Department for Rescue Services, informing them of the identity of the 
gunman and that he had shot himself. The situation centre also learned that first aid was 
being given to victims and the fires were being extinguished. The news was forwarded 
to the leadership of the Prime Minister’s Office, and the government situation overview 
portal was updated accordingly. A moment later, the Defence Forces informed the 
Government Situation Centre that five Pasi armoured personnel carriers and an Army 
helicopter had been deployed to the scene. It was unclear at this point what the role of 
the helicopter would be. 
A meeting concerning the Kauhajoki incident convened at 1:00pm in the Prime 
Minister’s personal office. Present were the leaders of the governmental party groups, 
the Minister of Education, the Minister of the Interior, and Supreme Police Command 
representatives. The ministries’ heads of preparedness convened a meeting at 2:00pm, 
during which they were informed that the current number of victims stood at nine. At 
3:00pm, the government held a news conference.  
During the afternoon and evening, the Government Situation Centre received several 
reports concerning the no-fly zone, the termination of the helicopter missions, the 
Defence Forces resources, preparedness, and the termination of various missions. The 
last update to the government situation overview portal was made at 11:40pm. 
1.5. Identifying the victims and informing the families 
Identifying the victims  
Since 1991, a Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) unit specialising in the identification 
of victims has been in operation under the National Bureau of Investigation. Its task is 
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to identify disaster or other victims who cannot otherwise be reliably identified. The 
team is assisted by the investigators of police forensic science laboratories all over 
Finland. In its work, the Finnish DVI unit utilises a procedure approved by Interpol 
member states, which has proved reliable. In addition to the identification of victims, 
the unit informs the victims’ families by utilising the family contact person system. In 
this system, the local police are only minimally involved in delivering the sad news or 
in interaction with the victim’s family. 
The DVI unit was informed of the school shooting soon after 11 o’clock. At that point, 
it was already apparent that victim identification would be necessary and that the 
investigators would have to be transported to the scene rapidly. The DVI unit managed 
to secure air transport exceptionally soon: two small Air Force planes would take them 
to an airport in Kauhajoki usually used by amateur pilots. Taking off from Helsinki at 
2:30pm, the planes carried three DVI unit members, two forensic pathologists, and a 
National Bureau of Investigation PR officer to the scene.  
The DVI team arrived at Kauhajoki Police Department Headquarters at 3:50pm, where 
they were briefed on the situation. Around 4pm, it was known that the probable number 
of victims was 11, including the perpetrator. The police had been collecting information 
from the school staff, the students, and the next of kin who had contacted them by then. 
On the basis of this information, at around 4:30pm the police had managed to compile a 
list of the people known to have participated in the test in the classroom where the 
incident took place and, on the other hand, of those the police had not been able to 
contact so far. The lists matched, so the police had a preliminary estimate of the number 
of victims, even though crime scene investigation had not yet commenced at that point, 
apart from documentation of the victims’ locations and positions. 
After the briefing, the DVI team left for the school, where police forensic science 
laboratory investigators were waiting for them. Because of the combustion gases, it was 
not safe to access all parts of the building at this point, so the DVI team and the 
investigators prepared for victim identification in the schoolyard. The DVI team were 
allowed to enter after all of the facilities had been checked, at about 6pm. At that point, 
there were 10 bodies inside the building, as one, the perpetrator, had been taken to 
Tampere University Hospital soon after he was found. There he was pronounced 
officially dead at 4:46pm. 
First of all, the police forensic science laboratory investigators marked and 
photographed the victims at the locations where they were found. Next, an identification 
point was established in the training laundry near the classroom where the incident took 
place. Each victim was inspected externally and prepared for transportation. External 
inspection refers to the taking of body temperature and the documentation of clothing, 
jewellery, tattoos, and other distinctive marks to get initial data for the actual 
identification work. Any marks related to the incident, such as bullet marks, were also 
documented during the external inspection. The inspection of the first victim started at 
7:35pm, and the inspection had been completed by 2am. Several victims were found to 
have been badly burned. 
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The DVI team had decided early on that the victims would be transported to Helsinki 
for a forensic post-mortem examination. The Air Force plane transporting the bodies 
took off from the Ilmajoki airport at 3:20am. The plane landed at Helsinki–Vantaa 
airport at 4:40am, and the bodies arrived at the Department of Forensic Medicine of the 
University of Helsinki before morning. The forensic pathologists travelled in the same 
plane. 
On Thursday, 25 September 2008, at 6:20pm, all victims had been positively identified 
on the basis of their dental records. This was confirmed by DNA identification later that 
night. A forensic post-mortem examination had been performed on all victims by 
Monday, 29 September 2008. The official identification meeting was held at National 
Bureau of Investigation Headquarters on 30 September 2008. 
Informing the families 
Two of the DVI team police officers who had flown to Kauhajoki were appointed as 
contact persons for the families. They first went to Kauhajoki Police Department 
Headquarters to get an up-to-date situation report at 3:50pm, then accompanied the DVI 
team to the school building to get an overview of the situation, also visiting the actual 
crime scene inside the building when it became possible to do so.  
Shortly before noon, a hotline for the victims’ families had been opened at Kauhajoki 
Police Department Headquarters by order of the situation commander. Another hotline 
for next of kin had also been opened, at Seinäjoki Central Hospital. The hotline numbers 
were published in the media, but, unfortunately, the central hospital number as given 
was incorrect. Furthermore, the central hospital terminated all of its media activities at 
6pm.  
The police received a large number of calls, and many callers had to remain on hold for 
long periods. Kauhajoki Police Department personnel answered the calls. The family 
contact persons arrived from the school soon after 7pm and started calling the victims’ 
families, many of whom had already called the police. The family of one of the victims 
also arrived there. Guided there by crisis workers near the scene, many of the families 
of the other victims had found their way to the health centre.  
From 4:30pm onward, the police had a preliminary list of the missing persons. As the 
list contained the names of people whom the authorities had not been able to contact 
since morning, school staff and the students had more or less the same information. At 
that point, no-one had had the opportunity to examine the bodies. The authorities did not 
contact the victims’ families solely on the basis of the list, and they did not have the 
contact details for all families at that point either. As the external inspection of the 
victims, started at 7:35pm, progressed, the family contact persons were able to provide 
the families with the information the police had discovered while identifying the 
victims. 
A policeman recording the identification data called the family contact persons every so 
often, sharing the information with them as it became available. The family contact 
persons relayed this information to the families, which also provided them with an 
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opportunity to ask the families about any distinctive marks, to facilitate identification. 
By early afternoon, the victims’ families had realised that they were unable to get in 
touch with their loved ones. In the course of the evening, the family contact persons told 
the families that the situation did not look good for them. They also described the 
findings the identification team had made in the external inspection by then. 
On the basis of the list of names at their disposal, the police accessed the National 
Population Register and obtained the contact details of the persons on the list. The 
family contact persons were able to contact the families of all the victims by 11:00pm. 
The next afternoon, 24 September 2008, the family contact persons decided to visit the 
families of all of the victims. The families were divided into two groups according to 
where they lived, and, with the exception of one, all families were visited in the evening 
of 24 September 2008. With the first group, the visits were made by the two policemen 
and a priest. For the other group, they were accompanied by a psychologist. During the 
visits, a police forensic science laboratory investigator took a DNA sample from a 
family member to facilitate positive identification. 
The perpetrator’s closest relative was his mother, who had been trying to find out what 
had happened to her son by calling Seinäjoki Central Hospital and the Kauhajoki Police 
Department before 3pm. The time of the call in police records is 2:38pm, and the 
mother was told that her son was a suspect but at that time no definitive information was 
available. The perpetrator’s name was made public in the government news conference 
at 3pm. After this, the police asked the mother for any distinctive tattoos and dispatched 
a policeman and crisis workers to her home, where they, according to the mother, 
arrived around 4pm. So it was between 3 and 4pm that the mother learned of her son’s 
involvement in the incident, as well as the fact that he was in hospital, seriously injured. 
The mother felt that there was more information publicly available than what was given 
to her personally. 
The perpetrator’s father, who lived in Southern Finland, rang the perpetrator’s mother as 
soon as he heard about the incident, around noon. He searched for more information on 
the Web, and as early as in early afternoon he had a feeling that his son might have been 
involved. He called the perpetrator's mother again at this point and told her about his 
misgivings. The police confirmed these misgivings the next morning.  
Most victims were badly burnt, which is why some families were advised not to go to 
see their loved one. The family of one of the victims told the authorities that the hospital 
had given them incorrect information in this respect, as it later turned out that their 
loved one’s burns were actually minor. 
1.6. Psychosocial support 
1.6.1. Acute crisis relief 
The incident was especially distressing for the families of the perpetrator and the 
victims, those who survived the shooting, the staff and other students of the school, and 
their circle of friends and acquaintances all over Finland. The incident had a significant 
impact on the inhabitants of Kauhajoki and the neighbouring municipalities. The whole 
country was shocked, and the incident triggered strong debate also abroad. The incident 
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placed a heavy burden on the authorities involved in it, as well as the crisis workers and 
their families.  
The chief physician of the health centre and the specialist health-care first-aid 
psychologist were in charge of psychosocial support in the early stages. As soon as they 
learned of the incident, the first nurses from the family centre interrupted their standard 
duties and headed for the scene. They were soon at the nearby commercial college, 
receiving the students who had escaped from the school building some 200 metres 
away. Initially, psychosocial support was provided mainly by the municipal crisis team, 
nurses, social workers, and the Kurikka crisis team (which arrived on the scene on the 
same day). Further resources and expertise were provided on the day of the incident by 
Seinäjoki Central Hospital crisis psychologists, and by the Psychological First Aid team 
of the hospital on the following day. The Vaasa crisis team also provided support. The 
local population were informed of the available psychosocial support via the 
Municipality of Kauhajoki Web site and in the local paper. 
On the day following the incident, a memorial event was arranged for the polytechnic’s 
students and staff. The purpose of the event was to mourn the victims, to provide the 
students and staff with information, and to tell them where to find help. Both youth and 
adults who were clearly shocked by the events were actively encouraged to seek 
support. The authorities started to make telephone contact with the students who had left 
for their homes elsewhere. The first debriefing sessions for the staff were held in the 
afternoon, followed by sessions for the students the next day, two days after the 
incident. Screening interviews, which provided an overview of the psychological 
condition of all staff and the students, were commenced two weeks after the incident. 
Kauhajoki and Ilmajoki parish workers were also soon on the scene to provide support. 
Kauhajoki Parish held a short memorial service at 7pm on the day of the incident. After 
this, the church kept its doors open from 9am till 9pm for five days to provide spiritual 
and psychological support. On the initiative of the Diocese of Lapua, the 10-member 
Vaasa psychological support team soon headed for Kauhajoki. Prayer meetings were 
held every night. Parish workers took to the streets and were available for spiritual and 
psychological support in various locations around the town. The next Sunday, five days 
after the incident, a memorial service was held for the victims. Kauhajoki Parish held 
numerous small services both at the polytechnic and at the other educational institutions 
nearby. 
These activities were supported by volunteer workers with the Finnish Red Cross. The 
FRC opened a meeting point for psychological support in Kauhajoki, and an FRC 
national toll-free help line was also available to provide psychological support. The help 
line was in use for 48 hours, with a total of 360 calls. On the day of the incident, the 
FRC added to its Web site information concerning psychological support, such as the 
organisation of crisis sessions in schools, how to deal with fear, and instructions for 
morning assembly. Two psychologists belonging to the FRC Psychologists’ 
Preparedness Group arrived in Kauhajoki on the day of the incident. On the following 
day, a total of 13 more preparedness group psychologists arrived. They were involved in 
the planning of operations and organised crisis sessions and individual meetings for 
teachers and students from various schools, the victims’ families, and Municipality of 
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Kauhajoki personnel. The work of the psychologists was, for the most part, completed 
within two weeks.  
In co-operation with schools and social services workers, youth workers acted as 
support persons for young people, keeping the doors of youth facilities open every night 
in collaboration with the FRC. A crisis support centre was established in the local youth 
centre, which also provided a media-free zone for children and young people. The 
facilities also served as a servicing area for executive assistance units of the Defence 
Forces.  
For four weeks after the incident, a low-threshold crisis emergency clinic, set up jointly 
by authorities in primary health care and specialised health care, was operational in the 
health centre. The students and staff of the polytechnic and local residents were 
encouraged to seek support there. There were hundreds of visits, some of which went 
unrecorded. The personnel for the clinic were provided by the psychiatric operations 
section of the hospital district, and the health centre doctor on duty acted also as the 
clinic doctor. The clinic was manned by four workers on weekdays and two on 
weekends. It was possible to come to the clinic without a referral, and the clinic was 
open every day. The hospital district informed local residents of the service via a 
bulletin published in the media. 
Psychosocial support for the victims’ families was initially provided by a crisis team in 
their municipality of residence. This support took different forms in different 
municipalities. The Municipality of Kauhajoki advised the crisis teams in other 
municipalities to contact the families and to offer them help and support. Some families 
reported that they did not receive sufficient help in dealing with practical matters.  
The municipality of Ilmajoki was particularly affected by the incident, as it was home to 
four of the victims and several other students. The municipality had to rely solely on 
their own crisis team, which placed a heavy burden on this small municipality. In 
November 2008, a steering group was set up in Ilmajoki to provide guidance for those 
involved in crisis work. The municipal council authorised the local authorities to recruit 
reinforcements for basic services. The municipal crisis workers co-operated with the 
Kauhajoki Project, described below.  
Two of the students who escaped from the classroom received support from crisis 
workers in the health centre, as well as from crisis psychologists, in the first few days 
after the incident. The third student who escaped from the classroom was transported 
first to Seinäjoki and then to Tampere, where she received support from hospital 
personnel. After this, she received support from the crisis team in her municipality and 
the psychologists of the Kauhajoki Project, which was established later. Some of the 
survivors’ family members told the authorities that they received support in their 
municipality of residence only after they had actively sought it. 
A few days after the incident, the hospital district sent the health centres of the 
municipalities involved in the incident a letter, urging them to take an active role in 
crisis work. They were encouraged in particular to pay special attention to how those 
involved in the incident in one way or another were coping, as well as how the students 
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and staff of various educational institutions were coping. In its letter, the hospital 
district recommended that the municipal authorities gain a picture of the situation in the 
municipality and take the necessary steps. All municipalities were also sent information 
on the possible activation of earlier traumatic experiences and the need to prevent 
suicides after a shocking event. 
Within two weeks of the incident, psychosocial support had been given to the police and 
rescue workers involved in the incident and their families, ERC personnel, the personnel 
of the organisations in the immediate vicinity of the school, the social workers, and 
Municipality of Kauhajoki personnel. Significant support was provided also for the 
students and staff of all Kauhajoki schools and other educational institutions.  
Plans were made to keep the threshold low for seeking support, through co-operation 
between those in primary health care and the hospital district. In the plans, special 
attention was paid to the coping of nurses, education welfare officers, and school 
psychologists; the coping of the staff of educational institutions; fulfilment of the basic 
mission of Educational and Social Welfare and Health Services; the support provided by 
experts; work counselling; communications and PR work; and the provision of support 
in the future. Some of those involved in the crisis work had participated in the after-care 
following the Jokela school shooting, which was an asset in the planning of crisis work. 
There was also written material available on the provision of psychosocial support in 
conjunction with the Jokela incident. 
In the weeks following the incident, people had strong feelings of anxiety, fear, and 
insecurity. People were particularly worried about the possibility that the perpetrator 
had not acted alone and that the incident could be repeated. These fears were allayed to 
some extent by the police opening a hotline that allowed people to tell them about the 
threats they had heard about. The fears caused by the incident also kept the child 
welfare authorities busy to some extent. There was increased demand for social and 
family work as well. However, the actual psychosocial support was mainly the 
responsibility of the crisis teams of the municipalities involved; the Hospital District of 
Southern Ostrobothnia; and, as far as the polytechnic was involved, the Seinäjoki Joint 
Municipal Authority for Education. Public discussions and parents’ nights were 
organised in the various units of the Joint Municipal Authority for Education, the other 
educational institutions in Kauhajoki, day-care centres, and also many workplaces. 
At the polytechnic, crisis work was commenced immediately, utilising the school’s own 
organisations and multidisciplinary networks. On the day following the incident, an 
after-care co-ordinator was appointed for the school. The school staff provided the 
students with necessary information and guided those in shock to seek help and support. 
In the first few school days after the incident, the students and staff were informed of 
the various ways in which people react to a crisis situation. They were also instructed on 
ways to deal with anxiety.  
Normal school activities were resumed two weeks after the incident, in substitute 
facilities, where the students and staff had to work for five months. The school was 
provided with additional resources, and the augmented Student Welfare Team met 
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several times a week at first, then weekly. School staff kept in constant touch with the 
parents of minor students in particular. 
The students received support at both individual and community level. The polytechnic 
employed a full-time school psychologist to provide additional support for the students 
and staff. The Municipality of Kauhajoki also employed a part-time psychologist in the 
polytechnic’s occupational health services to support the staff. The Hospital District of 
Southern Ostrobothnia, for its part, employed a part-time crisis psychologist for the 
students. Additionally, the Municipality of Kauhajoki employed a part-time student 
nurse. Education welfare officers were also involved in the crisis work.  
The Mannerheim League for Child Welfare offers its ‘Child and Youth Phone’ service on 
a daily basis. In the first few days after the incident, more than 50 calls a day were 
received. Calls kept coming in even after two months. In addition to the anxiety caused by 
the incident, the callers expressed fear of going to their own school. Many of the callers 
were young people, closely connected to the incident in some way, who felt the need to 
share their grief and anxiety with somebody.  
1.6.2. Psychosocial support in the following months and years 
The Kauhajoki Project 
In a Ministry of Social Affairs and Health working group meeting held in Kauhajoki 
four days after the incident, it was decided that, owing to the magnitude of the incident, 
a multi-operator project should be set up to co-ordinate psychosocial support. The 
Hospital District of Southern Ostrobothnia, the Municipality of Kauhajoki, the 
Seinäjoki Joint Municipal Authority for Education, the Seinäjoki Region Health 
Consortium, and the Municipality of Ilmajoki joined forces in November 2008 to create 
a joint project and financing plan to organise the necessary psychosocial support. As of 
1 January 2009, the Seinäjoki Region Health Consortium was replaced by the City of 
Seinäjoki and the Municipality of Ilmajoki by the Jalasjärvi, Ilmajoki, and Kurikka joint 
municipal commercial enterprise. The project is a continuation of the Kauhajoki 
Taskforce, which was set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health immediately 
after the incident to monitor and co-ordinate after-care. On the basis of the project plan, 
the Ministry of Finance granted the necessary funding in December 2008 for the 
implementation of after-care. 
The main aim of the project plan was to ensure that those who suffered in the incident 
would recover from the crisis and would be able to continue their everyday lives. In the 
project plan, after-care was divided into four stages – namely, first aid, acute care, 
after-care, and follow-up after-care.  
Lasting one month, the first-aid stage focused on immediate crisis work, counselling, 
and the drawing up of plans for acute care and after-care. Ending on 31 December 2009, 
the acute-care stage placed its emphasis on finding those in need of help and support, on 
early crisis relief, and on modifications to the after-care plan. The seven-month 
after-care stage focuses on the identification and screening of delayed trauma symptoms 
and referral to treatment, as well as various forms of therapy. Co-operation with the 
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victims’ families and professionally organised peer support meetings will also be 
continued systematically. After-care is currently being provided for more than 100 next 
of kin, all over Finland. The final stage will continue until the end of 2013. Any therapy 
and other psychosocial support still deemed necessary at that point will be continued, 
however.  
All in all, some 20–25 people have been employed by the Kauhajoki Project to organise 
after-care services. Additionally, 35 therapists were employed through the purchased 
services system. More than a hundred people were still involved in therapy relationships 
in various parts of Finland at the end of 2009.  
Church activities 
Several parishes reacted immediately to the crisis, organising brief services, prayer 
meetings, morning assemblies at school, periods of silence, confirmation school 
meetings, diaconal assistance, burial services, meetings with next of kin, home visits, 
discussions, concerts, work counselling, and visits by hospital priests.  
To provide psychological support for the crisis victims, the Kauhajoki Project of the 
Church was set up under the auspices of the Diocese of Lapua, the steering group of 
which includes representatives of the Kauhajoki Project co-ordinated by the Hospital 
District of Southern Ostrobothnia, the Seinäjoki Joint Municipal Authority for 
Education, the Municipality of Kauhajoki, Kauhajoki Parish, and the Deanery of 
Southern Ostrobothnia. Within the framework of the project, the authorities have been 
in close contact with all 10 parishes that were directly affected by the incident. More 
than 100 people from these parishes are estimated to have participated in the work. The 
parishes of Kauhajoki and Ilmajoki played the most important roles. In Ilmajoki, the 
Orthodox Church participated in the work. Workers from Seinäjoki Parish were also 
active in the crisis teams. In October, the General Synod granted €500,000 for after-
care.  
There was significant co-operation between the Kauhajoki Project of the Church and the 
Kauhajoki Project described earlier, on both administrative and practical levels. The 
Church also co-operated with the polytechnic. 
Activities at the school 
After-care at the school where the incident took place was planned by a co-ordination 
team that initially met weekly and then convened once a month. The team consisted of 
the after-care co-ordinator, teachers, the guidance counsellor, the school psychologist, 
the school nurse, a crisis psychologist, and a Church representative. Led by the 
president, a special team is active at Seinäjoki Polytechnic with the aim of securing the 
necessary resources. 
In the autumn, into early 2009, the school implemented enhanced guidance counselling 
and reduced the length of the study week from five to four days. This made it possible 
to organise work counselling as well as health improvement and treatment services for 
the staff, and to offer them appointments with a crisis psychologist. The students and 
staff also underwent enhanced health examinations. The school also employed a 
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tutor-based teaching system, where each tutor was responsible for a group of about 10 
students. 
Discussion meetings for the victims’ families were organised by the Kauhajoki Project, 
the polytechnic, and Ilmajoki Parish. Some families visited the school in autumn 2008, 
and after renovation work had been completed, in April 2009, all of the families were 
invited to visit the school. Two peer support meetings were organised for the students 
who had escaped from the classroom where the incident took place and their families. 
Kauhajoki Parish and members of the Kauhajoki Project of the Church were involved in 
the activities in many ways.  
Numerous family nights were organised for the students’ parents and other family 
members. The students were given sports vouchers, and jogging events were organised. 
A special activity programme was drawn up for the weeks following the incident, 
including such activities as ornamental forging and games. The aim was to organise 
supervised activities while maintaining a steady weekly routine.  
Youth workers arranged recess activities, for instance. The school film club was 
reactivated, and concerts were held. Additionally, a so-called wellness corridor was 
built in the school. The after-care workers’ offices are located in the corridor, which 
also serves as a low-threshold meeting point. 
Youth Services 
With subsidies from the Ministry of Education, the Youth Services authorities in 
Kauhajoki enhanced their services by employing additional youth workers. Enhanced 
youth work services were offered between 1 October 2008 and 31 December 2009. This 
included the development of virtual youth work, club and other group activities, the 
provision of free sport vouchers for polytechnic students, and outreach youth work in 
the town. Enhanced youth work also made it possible to provide both financial and 
personnel resources for polytechnic student excursions. As four of the victims and 
several other students lived in Ilmajoki, it was necessary to enhance youth work services 
there also. Three weeks after the incident, Ilmajoki received a special grant from the 
National Board of Education for the enhancement of municipal youth work to provide 
crisis support for the friends and age peers of the victims. 
Municipality of Kauhajoki youth workers, education welfare officers, and nurses 
formed a multi-profession network, which met regularly to look into the special 
problems faced by youth in their everyday lives, and to support them jointly, avoiding 
overlaps and increasing the flow of information. 
1.7. Damage 
1.7.1. Personal injury  
The perpetrator shot a teacher, nine students, and finally himself. All told, 11 people 
were killed, eight women and three men.  
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The forensic post-mortem examinations revealed that, in all cases, the primary cause of 
death was gunshot wounds. The bodies had been hit by, in total, 62 bullets. Nothing 
could have saved them, even if first aid had been started immediately after the wounds 
were inflicted. 
One of the students who managed to escape from the classroom was seriously injured 
by a bullet that had hit her in the head, while another received minor injuries from a 
broken window. The psychological injuries received by those involved were 
considerable, and the need for psychosocial support will continue for years to come. 
There were approximately 260 people in the school building when the incident began. 
According to the rescue plan, the maximum number of people allowed in the old section 
of the building is 120 and 500 in the new section.  
Some 30 policemen were exposed to combustion gases, dust, or other air impurities to 
such an extent that they developed symptoms and had to seek medical help via 
occupational health care. With 14 of them, the symptoms were prolonged, and one of 
them was found to have an illness that could be classified as a work-related disease. 
Most symptoms were developed by the policemen who had to work in the smoke-filled 
building before the fires had been extinguished. The symptoms were milder with those 
who only participated in the forensic investigation and victim identification after the 
fires had been extinguished. The police borrowed smoke diving equipment from the 
Rescue Department, and there were also some respirators available. Some activities 
were carried out without these, however. The policemen wore standard uniforms, which 
were not suitable clothing in a burning building. The uniform of one of the policemen 
caught fire while he was inside the building, but he received no burns. 
The families of the deceased, including the perpetrator, whose lives would never be the 
same after the incident, can be considered indirect victims of the school shootings. They 
suffered psychologically and are in danger of developing long-term illnesses. Likewise, 
the friends and acquaintances of the victims, the teachers, school staff, and the other 
students and their families too can be regarded as indirect victims. The incident also left 
its mark on the first-line rescue workers, policemen, and crisis workers, even though as 
professionals in this field they are better equipped to face situations of this nature than 
the rest of us are. Many others suffered as a result of the incident, among them those 
who became a target for threats or accusations or whose feeling of security has been 
undermined. 
1.7.2. Damage to property 
The perpetrator started several fires, in various parts of the building, causing 
considerable fire, smoke, and water damage. As judged by the number of cartridge 
cases, he fired 157 shots in the building or its immediate vicinity. In total, 118 bullet 
impact craters were found in the building, which damaged windows, doors, walls, other 
structures, and movable property. 
The costs incurred in the renovation amounted to approximately €1.1 million, with an 
additional €100,000 paid in rent for substitute facilities. 
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1.7.3. Other damage 
Threats against schools and educational institutions are harmful to school communities 
in many ways. The increased number of threats received after the school shootings can 
be considered indirect damage caused by the school shootings.  
There were occasional threats even before the Jokela school shootings, but in that 
event’s immediate aftermath more than 20 were made within a month. In the months 
that followed, anywhere between one and six threats were recorded in the police 
information system every month.  
The Kauhajoki school shootings were committed on 23 September 2008. Even though 
there was only about a week left in September, 41 threats against schools were reported 
to the police in the remainder of the month. There were 54 threats in October 2008, 40 
in November, and four in December. Between January and April 2009, 35 threats – on 
average, nine per month – were made.  
In total, 225 threats against schools were recorded in the police information system 
between the Jokela school shootings and April 2009, half of which led to a criminal 
complaint. As some threats were recorded only in the Emergency Response Centre 
information system, and as there is considerable variation in the recording procedures, 
the actual number of threats is probably somewhat higher. In some cases, the police 
assessed the incident to be of such a nature that there was no need to report it.  
School shootings can be considered to have long-term effects on young people’s group 
relationships and youth culture. For example, the Mannerheim League for Child 
Welfare has reported cases wherein a young person was falsely branded as a person who 
intended to commit a school shooting. In the IRC Gallery (‘IRC-Galleria’), a Web 
service popular with young people, the question of the day in February 2009 was this: 
‘Have you encountered school-shootings-related bullying?’ Of the 9,255 people who 
answered the question, 282 (3%) reported having been the target of such bullying, and 
some 1,500 (17%) knew of a person in their school or elsewhere who had been 
subjected to such bullying.  
1.8. Communications and PR work 
While on his way from Seinäjoki to the scene, the police situation commander appointed 
the detective chief inspector of the Seinäjoki Police Department as PR officer. While still 
on his way, the situation commander dictated at 11:30am a first bulletin to be released by 
the Police Provincial Command PR officer. The situation commander also decided that the 
first news conference would be held in Kauhajoki at 1pm. He also announced that news 
conferences would be held every hour; this aim was not completely met, however. At 
11:42am, the PR officer of the Police Provincial Command of Western Finland released a 
national bulletin on the incident. It was agreed that the PR officer would be responsible for 
media liaison activities even after the detective inspector, who had been appointed as the 
chief of investigation of the National Bureau of Investigation, had arrived. After his arrival, 
the chief of investigation was still present at the news conferences, however. 
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Four news conferences were held in Kauhajoki on the day the incident took place, the 
first of them in the Council Hall at 1pm. In the news conferences, the media 
representatives, who initially were mainly from nearby areas, were given a summary of 
the facts. More information was provided in the following news conferences, at 2:00, 
3:30, and 6:00pm. The number of victims was given as nine in the 2pm conference. The 
name of the perpetrator was revealed in the government news conference at 3pm and at 
3:30pm in Kauhajoki. 
The news conferences were attended by representatives of the police, the Rescue 
Services, the school, the Municipality of Kauhajoki, and the Church. Also, the Minister 
of Health and Social Services was present at the last news conference. One further news 
conference was held on the day following the incident, at noon. In addition to the news 
conferences, the police PR officer and the National Bureau of Investigation’s chief of 
investigation responded to the numerous requests for an interview submitted by the 
media. Before the news conferences, the police, the Rescue Services, the mayor, and the 
representatives of the parish and volunteer workers agreed on who would say what. On 
the basis of the interviews of participants in the events, the co-operation can be 
considered to have gone reasonably smoothly, even if there were a few breakdowns. 
At 2:10pm, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health released a bulletin in Finnish, 
Swedish, and English, informing the general public of the crisis Web site and the 
establishment of the Kauhajoki Project, which would co-ordinate crisis relief. The 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health also provided the media with background 
information and experts’ contact details. 
The relevant government ministers convened to discuss the situation at 1pm, and the 
Prime Minister’s Office held a news conference in the Government Palace at 3pm. In 
the conference, the government offered its condolences to the victims’ families and 
announced that flags would be flown at half-mast all over Finland the next day. The 
Minister of the Interior announced that the police had been aware of the perpetrator’s 
Internet videos as early as the previous Friday. 
The Kauhajoki health centre held its first news conference at noon. Seinäjoki Central 
Hospital also held one at 1:45pm, followed by Tampere University Hospital at 3pm. 
After the Seinäjoki Central Hospital news conference, the situation commander 
contacted the hospital, informing the staff of their media responsibilities. 
The conduct of the media 
The first emergency call concerning the incident came through to the Emergency 
Response Centre at 10:43am, and the newspaper Ilta-Sanomat reported the incident via 
its Web service at 11:12. YLE and the Helsingin Sanomat Web site broke the news half 
an hour after the incident, and soon thereafter most of the media reported it on their 
Web sites. 
Journalists were provided with workspaces, meals, and interviews with various 
authorities in Municipality Hall. What the journalists were not happy with was that, 
apart from the authorities, they found it difficult to find anyone to interview. The 
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inhabitants of Kauhajoki did not have much information on the subject and were 
reluctant to speak. There was no hostility toward, or criticism of the conduct of, the 
media, however. An exception to this was the families of some of the victims, who 
considered the way some foreign media representatives tried to get into their homes 
inappropriate. It is likely that the news conferences held during the afternoon directed 
the publicity received by the incident. The media were also slowed down by the fact that 
many journalists had to travel to Kauhajoki from the Helsinki metropolitan area. 
Accordingly, they were able to start their news coverage only after the news 
conferences had been held. 
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
2.1. Description of the site and the instruments of crime 
2.1.1. The school building 
The school building consists of a new and an old section, with a combined gross floor 
area of 5,785 m2. The sections are connected by a corridor some seven metres long. The 
old section, at the southern end of the plot, was built in 1929. The new annex was built 
in 1992. The old section was thoroughly refurbished in conjunction with the building of 
the annex. The events started to unfold in the annex, in classroom 3, which is on the 
ground floor, right next to the corridor. 
Picture 5.  The windows of classroom 3, seen from the rear of the school. The old 
section and corridor are on the left. The outer walls of the building are made 
of stone. (Picture from police investigation material) 
The annex is a two-storey building, with classrooms on both floors. The ground floor 
constitutes one fire compartment. The first floor is divided into two fire compartments, 
and the attic is divided into sections with structures that have a fire resistance rating of 
15 minutes. The ground floor is a stone structure, while the first floor has a lightweight 
structure. The wall, roof, and floor structures of the building are flame-retardant. The 
escape zones on both floors have access to three separate exits. The new section can 
probably be considered a building with a fire rating of P2, which means that the bearing 
structures must withstand the effects of a fire for 30 minutes without collapsing.  
Classroom 3
To drying room 
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Picture 6. Floor plan of the new section at ground-floor level. Classroom 3 is shown in 
the picture, with students’ tables marked in grey. The tables are not to scale. 
(Picture from police investigation material) 
Picture 7. Floor plan of the new section at ground-floor level, with classroom 3 in the 
top right corner. (Picture from police investigation material) 
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Tapahtumaluokka 3 oli tavanomainen luokkatila, jonka etuosassa oli opettajan kiinteä 
Classroom 3 was an ordinary classroom with an immovable teacher’s desk at the front, 
a blackboard, and a projection screen. The students sat mainly in twos at adjacent desks. 
All in all, there was room for approximately 25 people. On the window side, beneath 
the windows, there was a table that extended from one end of the room to the other. 
There were some built-in cupboards below the table top, but there were also empty 
spaces between the cupboards. On the corridor side, the classroom was lined with tall 
cabinets. The classroom had four windows. 
There were two doors, one of which led to the corridor and the other to the drying room 
next door, and further to the training laundry. Both the drying room and the laundry had 
access to the school’s yard. There was a round window, at a height of approximately six 
feet, in the top section of the door leading to the corridor. The door could be locked 
mechanically. Both doors were at the back of the classroom, less than four metres from 
each other. The classroom was approximately seven metres wide and some 10 metres in 
length. 
Picture 8. Classroom 2, on the ground floor. The furniture in this classroom is similar 
to that in classroom 3. In classroom 3, the windows were on the left-hand 
side in relation to the students. (Picture from police investigation material) 
The old section has a ground floor, first floor, second floor, and attic. There are 
classrooms on three of these floors. The attic houses team work areas and the 
air-conditioning equipment room. The building is largely made of stone. The 
intermediate floor structure and the uppermost floor slab are upstand beam systems 
made of reinforced concrete. The upstand beam system insulation is peat moss, and the 
floors are made of wood. The internal walls are mainly of stone. Some of the 
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non-load-bearing walls are made of wood and covered with plasterboard and fibreglass 
wallpaper. The internal wall and ceiling surfaces in the building are flame-retardant. 
The floor surfaces are plastic or massive wood, tongue-and-groove, which can be 
considered flame-retardant. Each floor constitutes its own fire compartment. The exits 
and the air-conditioning equipment room in the attic also constitute separate fire 
compartments. There are three exits on the ground floor and two on the second floor. 
The team work area in the attic had access to only one exit. After the incident, an 
emergency exit was added there. The outer wall facing the new section is built in the 
manner of a fire-rated wall. Despite the flammable insulation in the intermediate floors, 
the building can probably be considered equivalent to a building with a P1 fire rating. In 
essence, a fire rating of P1 means that the structures are expected to withstand a fire 
without collapsing, and that there are no limitations as to the size of the building or the 
number of people inside. 
By means of wire net doors, fire compartments have been built at both ends of the 
corridor connecting the two sections of the building. Both sections of the building are 
equipped with first-aid extinguishing equipment, emergency exit signs, and safety 
lights. Fluorescent emergency exit signs were added after the incident. 
2.1.2. The weapon, the ammunition, and the materials used to start the fires 
The firearm purchase permit, acquisition of the weapon, and the firearm 
possession permit 
On 25 June 2008, the perpetrator delivered a personal firearm permit application to the 
Kauhajoki Police Department for the acquisition of a Walther P22 Target small-bore 
pistol. According to the application, the perpetrator intended to practise precision 
shooting on the Sotka shooting range in Kauhajoki. The perpetrator stated in his 
application that he had joined the local shooting club on 30 January 2008. This was 
actually incorrect information, as it later transpired that the fee the perpetrator had paid 
to the shooting club only entitled him to use the shooting range. 
In accordance with standard policy, the perpetrator was invited to arrive for a personal 
interview with the detective chief inspector at the Kauhajoki Police Department on 7 
August 2008. According to departmental division of duties, the granting of firearm 
permits was the duty of the police commissioner of the police department or, if he was 
absent, the detective chief inspector. In the interview, the perpetrator stated that he had 
practised shooting with his father’s .22-calibre pistol, which was probably not true, even 
though his father had had several weapons when the perpetrator was still a child. After 
the interview, the detective chief inspector made the decision to grant the perpetrator a 
firearm purchase permit. 
Using this permit, the perpetrator ordered on 12 August 2008 a Walther P22 small-bore 
pistol, a laser sight, and a silencer from a Web shop. The latter items were not used in 
the school shootings, however. The perpetrator also purchased eight 10-round clips, 
1,000 rounds, small-bore-rifle targets, and stickers to cover the bullet holes.  
On 2 September 2008, the perpetrator visited the Kauhajoki Police Department to 
present his new Walther P22 small-bore pistol for inspection in accordance with the 
52 
 
 
Firearms Act. The policeman who inspected the gun found it in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in the purchase permit. The policeman was bothered, however, by 
the perpetrator’s odd behaviour. For example, he had been giggling and snuffling while 
presenting the gun. After the perpetrator had left, the policeman checked who had 
granted the purchase permit. Seeing that the decision had been made by the experienced 
detective chief inspector, the policemen let the matter rest. The policeman who had 
performed the inspection did take the matter up in the police department later that day, 
saying that he hoped this was not the next school killer. 
The events of the weekend preceding the school shootings 
Around 7:30am on the morning of Friday, 19 September 2008, a Municipality of 
Kauhajoki park employee was on his way to work in the park area near Kauhajoki 
Upper Secondary School. The park employee came across the upper secondary school 
caretaker near a deserted building opposite the school. A lit grave candle had been 
placed near the building.  
The candle bothered the park employee to such an extent that, while at home on his 
lunch hour, he started to search the Internet for things connected to Kauhajoki and a 
grave candle. He seemed to recollect that, about a year earlier, the Jokela school killer 
had uploaded material related to school shootings to a video Web site. Among the 
search results for ‘Kauhajoki’ was a video uploaded less than 12 hours ago, showing a 
boy shooting a pistol. There were other shooting-related videos on the Web site. What 
caught the park employee’s eye in the videos was that, in the latest one, the shooter’s 
appearance had changed and he was now wearing a black leather jacket. Clicking on the 
screen name, the park employee discovered the age, place of residence, and hobbies of 
the person who uploaded the video, along with the lyrics of a song the park employee 
found horrifying. 
Back at work, the park employee told the upper secondary school caretaker about his 
observations, and the caretaker immediately went to report the matter to the Kauhajoki 
police. The policemen at the Kauhajoki Police Department started to collect data on the 
person who had uploaded the material, who later was revealed to be the perpetrator. One 
of the perpetrator’s postings on the discussion forum mentioned that he was going to 
spend the weekend in Pyhäjärvi, where he had lived previously. 
The perpetrator’s material worried the policemen, so at around 3pm on Friday the 
Kauhajoki field commander, a sergeant, called the deputy police commissioner of the 
Seinäjoki Police Department, who was the officer on duty then. The deputy police 
commissioner watched the videos on the Web and found similarities between them and 
the videos uploaded by the Jokela school killer. The deputy police commissioner 
ordered his staff to find the perpetrator and take the gun away from him.  
At around 4pm, the Kauhajoki Police Department field commander called the deputy 
police commissioner, saying that the perpetrator was not at home and there was nobody 
there. The deputy police commissioner considered it tactically wiser not to have the 
policemen enter the house. He told the field commander that the matter would be 
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handed over to the officers of the Kauhajoki Police Department, who would address it 
on Monday.  
On Monday, 22 September 2008, the matter was discussed in a morning meeting at the 
Kauhajoki Police Department, where the officers were told what kind of material had 
been found on the Web. The documents concerning the perpetrator’s firearm permit 
were brought out, and the observations of the policeman who had inspected the gun 
were discussed.  
The detective chief inspector managed to reach the perpetrator by phone, and he 
promised to arrive immediately at the Police Department to settle the matter. At the 
Police Department, he denied having left a grave candle near the upper secondary 
school, which indeed he had not. As to the videos he had uploaded, he said that there 
were plenty of other shooting videos on that particular Web service. On the basis of the 
discussion, the detective chief inspector decided to give the perpetrator a verbal 
warning. According to the detective chief inspector, he found no grounds for a written 
admonition or the removal of the firearm as laid down in the Firearms Act. 
Other materials or equipment carried by the perpetrator 
To start the fires, the perpetrator used petrol that he had poured into 1.5-litre lemonade 
bottles. As some of the bottles may have burned completely in the fires, the 
investigations revealed no definite data on the number of bottles or the amount of petrol 
used. He took the bottles to the school in a sports bag.  
The perpetrator also carried in the bag a hammer he had bought in a hardware store, but 
there is no information on its purpose. The perpetrator may have intended to use it to 
break movable property, to break down locked doors, or in acts of violence in an 
unforeseen situation. 
2.1.3. The Internet as part of the crime 
Many school killers have utilised the Internet in connection with school shootings to 
gain publicity for their acts. They have published texts on school shootings and their 
own views. In the Kauhajoki school shooting, the Internet played a minor role, although 
the perpetrator did otherwise spend a lot of time at the computer – seeking information 
on previous school shootings, for example. The perpetrator uploaded pictures of himself 
with a gun and also published videos shot on a shooting range. There was very little 
textual content in these, however, and, apart from the guns and shooting, there were no 
references to school shootings. However, many of the pictures and videos did resemble 
the ones that have become familiar in conjunction with the publicity surrounding 
previous school shootings. On the day before the incident, the perpetrator had used his 
camera to shoot videos in the schoolyard. In the videos, he said that he was going to kill 
many people in the school on the following day. The video was found among the 
deleted files on his camera, and he apparently never published or showed the video 
anywhere. 
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2.2. The circumstances 
According to information received afterward from the school, there were 260 people in 
the school building at the time of the incident. Lessons were under way as usual. Some 
polytechnic staff were in the auditorium, listening to a talk given by the president of the 
school. A test was in progress in the classroom where most of the shootings took place. 
Some of the students had already handed in their test papers and left the classroom. As 
the perpetrator entered, there were 12 students and the teacher in the classroom.  
According to the Kuja-Kokko observation station in Kauhajoki, at 11am on the day of 
the incident, the weather was clear, calm, and dry. The temperature was 10 °C and the 
relative humidity 90%. The weather had no effect on the incident.  
2.3. The organisations and people involved in the incident 
2.3.1. The perpetrator 
The police were able to establish at an early stage the identity of the 22-year-old male 
who committed the school shootings. The perpetrator had been living in Kauhajoki for 
approximately a year, which was also the time for which he had studied at the 
polytechnic. 
According to the police investigation, the perpetrator planned and carried out the deed 
alone. The perpetrator had made verbal references to both school shootings and suicide. 
This was considered strange and worrying, but the references did not really give an idea 
of what the perpetrator was about to do. 
The perpetrator had behaved violently or aggressively on a few occasions, but he had 
not been accused of violent crime or convicted. The only entries in the police records 
concern drink-driving and an incident at a grill kiosk, where the perpetrator had been 
threatened. It has also come to light that, on a boat cruise in the summer of 2008, the 
perpetrator was imprisoned aboard the ship after behaving violently toward a friend.  
Childhood 
Born in 1986, the perpetrator was the second child in the family. The family were living 
in Oulu at the time of his birth. In his early childhood, the perpetrator was under 
monitoring because of his slow growth and development, which caused considerable 
concern. He had to be hospitalised a few times before he started school. He has been 
described as lively and happy as a baby but shy, withdrawn, and quiet as a child and 
later in his life. According to the mother, the perpetrator was quite normal as a baby and 
child, although he did cry a lot because of his frequent illness.  
According to the mother, the family situation was not stable at the time of his birth or 
after it, as the parents’ relationship had become strained. The perpetrator’s parents 
separated when he was approximately a year old, but the divorce did not become 
effective until the perpetrator was three years old. After the separation, the mother 
looked after her two children on her own. That the perpetrator’s brother, four years his 
senior, had a congenital illness placed an additional burden on the mother. The mother 
55 
 
was single for six years, after which she remarried. The perpetrator had three half-
brothers, in their teens at the time of the incident, from his mother’s new relationship. 
The perpetrator’s relationship with his stepfather and half-brothers has been described 
as not exceptional in any way.  
The perpetrator had a close relationship with his elder brother. However, the brother 
died of his illness in 2003, when the perpetrator was 17. This was a tremendous blow to 
the perpetrator.  
At the time of the incident in Kauhajoki, the perpetrator’s mother, stepfather, and three 
half-brothers were living in Pyhäjärvi. The mother has a reputation for being industrious 
and hard-working, and, after some initial difficulties, nothing unusual has ever 
happened in the family. The family also provided support for many other children. 
However, the family have had to move quite often because of the father’s work. The 
perpetrator had officially lived at 12 different addresses. He moved away from home a 
little before his 18th birthday but remained in close contact with his mother. The 
perpetrator’s official place of residence was Kauhajoki, where he lived in a rented flat 
near the school. During the previous summer, he had had problems in paying the rent, 
and his financial problems caused some anxiety for him. His mother came to his rescue 
then.  
After his parents’ divorce, the father moved elsewhere and started a new relationship. 
According to the father, his new spouse did not take kindly to his children from his 
previous relationship and had a negative attitude toward them. In his childhood, the 
perpetrator saw his father infrequently, but they began to see each other more often 
when the perpetrator was in his teens, after the father started a new relationship. This 
new, closer relationship continued into the perpetrator’s adulthood. The perpetrator’s 
father has a son and daughter who are the perpetrator’s half-siblings. 
School attendance 
The perpetrator’s school record was never below fair; in vocational school and at the 
polytechnic, it was even good. He has been characterised as a conscientious student. His 
lower-level comprehensive-school teachers described him as quiet and well-behaved. 
There were some difficulties, however. According to his mother, the perpetrator was 
bullied in his lower-level comprehensive-school years. In upper-level comprehensive 
school, he was physically assaulted. In upper secondary school, bullies threatened to 
break his moped, so he sold it. He was also called disparaging names in upper 
secondary school, and his classmates used to draw caricatures of him on the classroom 
blackboard. Some also spat in his face. Because of these acts of bullying, he rang his 
mother several times in the middle of the school day, asking her to come and take him 
home. During his upper-level comprehensive years, the perpetrator started to spend his 
evenings in the town, and his mother caught him committing petty theft and using 
intoxicants. In a health questionnaire completed between lower- and upper-level 
comprehensive school, the perpetrator stated that he was suffering from sleeplessness, 
concentration problems, melancholia, depression, and timidity. He dropped out of upper 
secondary school but liked things better in vocational school. He completed his studies 
in vocational school successfully.  
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There are no records or references indicating that the perpetrator had been discriminated 
against or bullied at Kauhajoki Polytechnic. His studies went well there. The perpetrator 
had told his mother and friends that he liked it in Kauhajoki. He also had a few friends 
at the polytechnic, with whom he spent some of his leisure time. According to his 
fellow students, in autumn 2008 he was more often late for lessons than before or left 
earlier. In early autumn, just before the school shootings, a fellow student noticed that 
the perpetrator was having problems in completing his cooking-related tasks at a food 
fair.  
In spring 2008, the perpetrator attended a practical training course in Hungary with a 
number of other polytechnic students. According to both the perpetrator’s personal 
assessment and the supervisor’s assessment, his performance there was excellent. 
However, his fellow students wrote to the polytechnic teacher in charge of practical 
training about some problems that manifested themselves especially during leisure time. 
The problems were the perpetrator’s use of alcohol, playing with a knife, and references 
to suicide. He had also seemed depressed and lonely, and he had expressed admiration 
with reference to the Jokela school shootings. The contact persons at the Hungarian 
sister school addressed these problems, and they seem to have disappeared. The 
problems were not taken up again once the students had returned to Finland.  
Health status and personal qualities 
During his early development, the perpetrator was under special monitoring because his 
height–weight curve was lower than expected. He remained slight in build for a long 
time but later gained weight. His height was below the average for Finnish males. The 
mother regarded him as basically quiet, helpful, and tidy, in some respects even 
excessively tidy and almost obsessive about having everything arranged in an organised 
way. The perpetrator took failure to heart, and setbacks were difficult for him. One such 
setback preceding the school shooting occurred in early September 2008 in Pyhäjärvi, 
when some acquaintances of the perpetrator were killed in a serious road accident. 
Furthermore, a brief relationship with a girlfriend ended just before the incident. The 
perpetrator was quoted as saying that he would probably become depressed as a result 
of this.  
The first records of the perpetrator’s mental health problems dated back to his time in 
upper-level comprehensive school at the age of thirteen. There are numerous entries 
concerning quite serious mental health problems in the years preceding the school 
shooting. The perpetrator suffered from anxiety and panic attacks and from depression, 
and he also had suicidal thoughts and sleeping problems. According to his mother, there 
were sudden shifts in his psychological condition.  
The perpetrator had gone to England for a couple of months of practical training in late 
2006. After his return in January 2007, there was a sudden and dramatic change in his 
behaviour. According to his mother, he lay motionless and apathetic in his bed, refusing 
to eat or drink anything. The mother took him to a doctor, after which the perpetrator’s 
behaviour soon became normal again. On a visit to the health centre, he was diagnosed 
as showing symptoms of depression.  
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In addition to anxiety- and depression-related problems, his circadian rhythm had been 
disrupted during the summer preceding the incident. According to the results of a 
questionnaire he completed in August 2008, the perpetrator was moderately depressed, 
and his score in the AUDIT (Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test) test was high 
enough to merit referral to treatment. His fellow students told the authorities that when 
he drank, he was often in an advanced state of intoxication, which made it difficult to 
talk to him. His intoxication was occasionally accompanied by aggressive behaviour, 
fisticuffs and language his friends considered frightening. The perpetrator was not under 
the influence of intoxicants during the school shootings. He had occasionally – in late 
summer 2008, for instance – expressed feelings of undefined anger toward a hotel in 
Pyhäjärvi and a teacher in Kauhajoki. He never explained the reasons behind this. His 
family had not been aware of his aggression. 
Some of the perpetrator’s friends think his behaviour changed approximately two years 
prior to the school shootings, while others feel that this happened only a couple of 
months before the incident. According to his friends, the perpetrator had been interested 
in school shootings after the Jokela school shootings and was sympathetic towards the 
perpetrator of those shootings. Some considered the Kauhajoki perpetrator somewhat 
abnormal, while others seemed to think he was just another youth. He was considered a 
rather withdrawn person who would not discuss his personal life, except when drunk.  
In the week preceding the incident, the perpetrator had attracted attention at a student 
party by imposing himself on women while intoxicated, talking about school shootings 
and, having been rejected, saying threateningly: ‘You’ll be sorry.’ According to a 
member of the restaurant staff who interfered in the situation, the perpetrator had 
seemed strange: he had not responded when talked to, and it was impossible to make 
eye contact with him. 
The perpetrator’s mother had not noticed any particular changes in her son during the 
months preceding the incident. He had bought new furniture for his flat and got himself 
a kitten a few weeks before the incident. His father, however, had been worried about 
his son’s psychological condition during spring 2008 and had told his spouse that he 
was hoping his son would not harm himself or anybody else. The father has not been 
able to put his finger on what exactly was worrying him back then. In spring 2008, the 
perpetrator had said to his half-sister that everybody would be better off if he were gone, 
hinting at his suicidal intentions. She had also told her half-sister about this anxiety a 
week before the incident. 
The perpetrator’s hair and dressing style had undergone a change during the summer 
preceding the incident. He now combed his hair back and wore a black leather jacket, 
which attracted attention. His new style was reminiscent of that of the Jokela school 
killer, which had caused the sales assistants in the gun shop where he bought his clips 
and cartridges to call him a copycat. The owner of the gun shop described him as 
expressionless and stony-faced.  
At the request of a depression nurse specialist, a health centre physician had prescribed 
medication for the perpetrator both for depression (SSRI medication) and for anxiety 
attacks (alprazolam) without seeing him personally. The anxiety and panic attacks 
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manifested themselves both in public performance and social situations and in solitary 
situations. In a network screening test performed on the perpetrator in the months 
preceding the incident, the perpetrator’s personal network was shown to be quite small. 
The perpetrator apparently took his medication as prescribed and had a positive and 
seemingly open attitude towards treatment. He did, however, avoid eye contact with the 
depression nurse specialist. He remained in treatment up until the incident but had 
postponed an appointment he had for the Friday preceding the incident. He was never 
examined by a psychiatry or adolescent psychiatry specialist. The perpetrator had low 
concentrations of the medication prescribed for him in his blood when he carried out the 
deed. 
On its own initiative, Valvira, the National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and 
Health, conducted a study of the appropriateness of the treatment received by the 
perpetrator. The conclusion was that the treatment had been appropriate in all respects. 
The Defence Forces health care services were excluded from the study, as they lie 
outside the scope of Valvira’s authority.  
Hobbies 
The perpetrator had a few hobbies in his adult years. He liked swimming and played 
electric drums. He also spent a lot of time at the computer, watching videos, listening to 
music, and viewing material on the Columbine and Jokela school shootings, for 
example. Ha had not downloaded any games to his computer, but there were references 
to him playing a standard Internet war game in the Web material. The perpetrator also 
had an interest in music. Before the school shootings, he took up indoor air-gun 
shooting, followed by firearm shooting at outdoor ranges.  
The perpetrator had no particular social views or religious conviction, and his mother 
described his values as not exceptional in any way. The mother’s image of the 
perpetrator was that he frowned upon school shootings and was not particularly 
interested in computers or guns.  
Military service 
The perpetrator started his military service in Kajaani on 10 July 2006. Before his entry 
into service, he had been found fit for service in a physical examination carried out in 
conjunction with the call-up. His service started in the usual way with a basic training 
period, which the perpetrator managed to complete. His scores in physical tests were 
poor, however. As far as can be established, the perpetrator’s motivation to complete his 
military service was initially high, but five weeks into the service, the possibility of the 
perpetrator interrupting his service was first taken up during a doctor’s appointment.  
The perpetrator told the garrison doctor that he had been forced to distance himself from 
the other conscripts. He told the doctor that he had been bullied not only in the army but 
also in his upper-level comprehensive and upper secondary school years. He told his 
mother that somebody had urinated in his bed. At a training camp, the perpetrator had 
also been involved in a situation where he had pushed and shoved another conscript 
while holding a gun in his hand. The perpetrator also told the doctor about his mood 
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swings, suicidal thoughts, sleeping problems, and anxiety attacks. His problems were 
exacerbated by a physical injury to his foot, which made running painful. In accordance 
with the partnership agreement between the Defence Forces and Specialised Health 
Care Services, the perpetrator was referred to the Psychiatry Department of Kainuu 
Central Hospital.  
He visited a psychiatric nurse in the hospital a week later, telling her he was not sure he 
could cope with it all. The nurse recommended making an appointment with a 
psychiatrist. This did not happen, however. After a week, the perpetrator visited the 
doctor again, who proposed that his fitness classification be downgraded to class E for 
1–2 years for psychological reasons. The perpetrator himself wanted to interrupt his 
service. The proposal was forwarded via the unit commander and the Fitness Review 
Board to the brigade commander, who made the decision to carry out a service fitness 
review. The perpetrator’s service was interrupted on 31 August 2006, and on the basis 
of his foot injury and adaptation-related diagnoses, his fitness classification was 
changed to E. This meant that his fitness for service would be reviewed in two years’ 
time. Before the school shootings, the perpetrator had received a summons to a follow-
up examination to be carried out on 12 November 2008, organised by the Ostrobothnia 
Regional Office, where his fitness for service would have been reviewed and 
determined in accordance with the new Conscription Act that had become effective on 1 
January 2008.  
Leaks 
Reports on school shootings abroad suggest that, prior to their deed, school killers often 
leak information to people around them on the act they are about to commit. This 
information is often referred to as leaks.  
The Kauhajoki school killer indeed told his age peers things that can, with the benefit of 
hindsight, be construed as leaks. For example, in 2006 the perpetrator showed a friend a 
video clip on school shootings, saying that he wanted to do something like that, too. 
Three months after the Jokela school shootings, he said to his half-sister: ‘Maybe I 
should go to my school and start shooting.’ The half-sister had thought he was joking. 
In August, the perpetrator took photographs of himself and his gun with his computer’s 
webcam. The pictures were modelled on some of the pictures related to the Jokela 
school shootings. At a student party on 17 September 2008, the perpetrator approached 
a female student but was rejected. The perpetrator repeated many times that she would 
be sorry. At the same party, the perpetrator asked a fellow student for his opinion on 
American school shootings. The perpetrator was generally interested in school 
shootings, and maybe it was because of this that on a trip to Southern Finland, he went 
to and took some photographs of the Jokela School Centre on 5 August 2008. He may 
also have visited the Jokela gun shop where the Jokela school killer had bought his gun. 
Two days later, the perpetrator placed an order for a gun on the Web site of the same 
shop. The police investigated whether the perpetrator had any connections with the 
Jokela school killer, but none were found. 
On Thursday, 18 September 2008, the perpetrator paid a surprise visit to his mother and 
her family. His stepfather noticed that the perpetrator did not bring any laundry with 
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him as he usually did. Otherwise, there was nothing unusual about the perpetrator’s 
behaviour. He also went to visit his grandmother; she was not at home, however. 
According to his friends, the weekend was spent drinking, and the perpetrator had 
stopped people in the streets, asking them: ‘Humanity is overrated, isn’t it?’ The same 
question was printed on a t-shirt worn by the Jokela school killer. According to his 
friends, the perpetrator was very drunk at the weekend. With regard to the events in 
Jokela, to his friends it had seemed that, instead of condemning them, the perpetrator 
seemed to understand and admire them.   
He had filmed shooting videos at a shooting range, publishing them through a Web 
video service. On the evening preceding the school shootings, he shot new videos on the 
shooting range and one in the polytechnic yard. The videos he shot at the shooting range 
show him saying: ‘You will die next’ and ‘Goodbye.’ Approximately an hour before 
leaving for school, the perpetrator uploaded these videos to a file-sharing service on the 
Internet. Files cannot be directly browsed there, but anybody who downloads the files is 
provided with a link he or she can share with others by e-mail or via another Web 
service, for example. The perpetrator had named this file package ‘Massacre in 
Kauhajoki’, and he enclosed some pictures of himself. Most of the pictures show him 
carrying a gun. Half an hour later, he uploaded three of these pictures to his profile in 
the IRC Gallery community. In the pictures, the perpetrator points a gun at the viewer. 
In the video he shot in the schoolyard, the perpetrator said: ‘So that was my school then 
… tomorrow … I’m going to kill a lot of people here … die, all you fucking bastards.’ 
As far as can be established, the perpetrator never published this video or sent it to 
anyone.  
His threats were often veiled or indirect. He also assured the above-mentioned friend on 
several occasions that he would never actually do anything. What made the threat even 
more serious was that the perpetrator had acquired a gun and a firearm permit and 
practised shooting.  
He left behind two messages, which both say he had been planning the deed since 2002 
and that his motive was hatred of people and bullying-related revenge. He rang a friend 
during the incident, saying that he had been planning the deed for a couple of years. No 
concrete evidence of him planning the deed has come to light.  
2.3.2. The schools attended earlier by the perpetrator 
The perpetrator started comprehensive school in 1993. At the end of his first autumn 
term, he moved to another school, where he remained until the end of his third school 
year. He went to a different school for both his fourth and fifth year and started the sixth 
in yet another school. After his sixth year, he started upper-level comprehensive school 
in another locality but returned after only a month to continue his upper-level 
comprehensive studies at the same school centre where he had completed his sixth-year 
studies. So, in his lower-level comprehensive years he changed school six times. The 
information received from the schools and the mother’s interviews indicate that the 
changes were mainly a result of the family moving often.  
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According to the schools he attended, there was nothing unusual about the perpetrator’s 
academic record or his integration into the school community, and he did not require 
any special health care or student welfare measures. The teachers – where the 
authorities managed to track them down – described the perpetrator as quiet and 
well-behaved. According to his mother, there were some problems with his time in 
school, related to social relationships in particular. It is not known to what extent the 
schools were aware of these problems. According to the mother, the perpetrator did talk 
about them while at upper-level comprehensive school, to the education welfare officer 
at least.  
Having completed comprehensive school, the perpetrator started vocational school, but 
he dropped out after a week, on his own initiative. In autumn 2002, he started upper 
secondary school. After a few months, in late November, the perpetrator moved and had 
to change schools. The perpetrator studied for one period at the new school and dropped 
out in February 2003. It has been suggested that the reason behind this was poor 
academic performance, on one hand, and his starting his studies at another educational 
institution, on the other. Having studied in upper secondary school for less than a year, 
the perpetrator completed vocational school in three years without any interruptions, he 
and graduated with good marks in June 2006. After this, he started his military service, 
which was interrupted after a few months. Next, he worked in a hotel in England for 
some time. Having returned to Finland in January 2007, he was unemployed for a while, 
then worked at restaurants and cleaning companies owned by his relatives.  
Starting his studies in the Kauhajoki unit of Seinäjoki Polytechnic in autumn 2007, he 
managed to complete one full academic year. In April 2008, he completed the 
above-mentioned period of practical training in Hungary, which was an optional but 
recommended part of his studies at the polytechnic. He was personally willing to attend 
the practical training. When he committed the school shootings, the perpetrator had 
recently started his second academic year. The shootings came as a complete surprise to 
the staff.  
2.3.3. The Kauhajoki Unit of Seinäjoki Polytechnic 
Seinäjoki Polytechnic is a Southern-Ostrobothnia-based institution of higher education 
maintained by the Seinäjoki Joint Municipal Authority for Education. The main campus 
is in Seinäjoki. The other branches are situated in Ilmajoki, Jurva, Kauhajoki, Kauhava, 
and Ähtäri. The total number of students is some 4,600, of whom 800 are adult learners. 
The fields of study offered at the polytechnic include cultural studies; social sciences, 
business and administration; tourism, catering, and domestic services; technology, 
communication, and transport; natural sciences; natural resources and the environment; 
and social services, health, and sports. These fields of study were placed under the 
leadership of five different leaders. The entire institution is led by its Seinäjoki-based 
president. 
The Business, Entrepreneurship and Hospitality Management Unit has branches in 
Seinäjoki, Kauhava, and Kauhajoki. The total number of students in the unit was 1,400, 
with some 90 staff. The Kauhajoki unit offered degree programme studies under the 
title ‘Hospitality Management’. The degree programme produced graduates with a 
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Bachelor of Hospitality Management degree for the hospitality field. The total number 
of students in the Kauhajoki Hospitality Management branch was about 250, 60 of 
whom were adult learners. The full-time staff numbered 15, with four support services 
staff. They shared the building with upper-secondary-level students of the Sedu 
Vocational Education Centre. The total number of Sedu students was 140, with 46 staff. 
The Sedu students were aged between 15 and 25. 
In addition to the polytechnic unit manager and the teachers, the main operators in 
student welfare were the head of students services, responsible for student welfare 
services throughout the polytechnic; the head of degree programme, responsible for 
Bachelor of Hospitality Management training; the part-time guidance counsellor, 
responsible for career counselling; and the study secretary, responsible for secretarial 
duties.  
2.3.4. Health care organisations 
Health care services for the students were provided by Kauhajoki Health Centre. The 
students could see a public health nurse on any day, between 8:00 and 10:00am with no 
appointment necessary. The services of the public health nurse were also available in 
the school facilities by appointment on two afternoons each week. Calculated on the 
basis of these times, the services of a public health nurse were available for 14–17 hours 
per week for every 250 students, which was sufficient to fulfil the recommendations 
issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. When necessary, the public health 
nurse could refer students to a psychologist or a health centre physician. The public 
health nurse attended the monthly meetings of the Student Welfare Team. 
During their first year, the students were asked to fill in a questionnaire to determine 
their need for a health examination. A health examination was performed if it was 
deemed necessary or a student requested it. In the summer of 2008, the system was 
revised, however, and all first-year students now underwent a health examination. The 
use of health care services is optional for adult students. 
With regard to the services of a doctor, the system was that emergency cases were 
treated in Kauhajoki, while in the case of long-term illness the students were required to 
see a doctor in their home locality. Flexibility was the key word in problem situations. 
For example, if a student lived far away, he or she was allowed to see a doctor in 
Kauhajoki. 
In a meeting held in 2006, it had been concluded that the need for mental health services 
had increased in recent years, which is why additional resources were called for. This 
meant that the services of public health nurses; health centre psychologists; education 
welfare officers; and, in some instances, specialised health care – in the psychiatry 
department nearby, for instance – had better availability than usual. As far as is known, 
basic health services personnel were also able to consult the psychiatry department 
when necessary. A system utilising the services of a depression nurse specialist had 
been developed in Southern Ostrobothnia with the aim of enhancing outpatient care for 
patients suffering from depression. In Kauhajoki, the depression nurse specialist worked 
alongside doctors, and each patient’s care arrangements were discussed within a team.  
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2.3.5. The Defence Forces  
Before entering military service, the perpetrator underwent a standard medical 
examination, wherein he was found to be fit for service. The services of the garrison 
hospital and a social welfare officer were available to the conscripts – and, accordingly, 
the perpetrator – during their military service with the Kainuu Brigade. The conscripts 
were also told that if they had any problems, they could turn to the unit‘s sergeant-major 
or the unit commander. These channels are relatively easily and equally available to all 
conscripts, but, in practice, getting help may not be so easy. Additionally, the threshold 
for seeking help varies, depending on the individual’s knowledge and social skills. 
In 2009, the Finnish Youth Research Society conducted and published a study on 
military service in Finland. It was in the Kainuu Brigade that the material for the study 
was collected. According to the study, the methods and medical criteria of the garrison 
hospital and the doctors working there are different from those of civilian life. The 
difference is explained by the exceptional nature of a military institution and, for 
example, the malingering some conscripts engage in. The identification of an actual 
medical need and getting a referral to Kajaani Central Hospital has been found to be a 
cumbersome process. In some cases, most of them concerning physical complaints, the 
conscripts had to be extremely determined and persistent in order to get a referral to 
appropriate further examinations. In practice, this often meant several visits to the 
garrison hospital, and insistence on further examinations. Some conscripts simply gave 
up and let their complaints go untreated, while others, thanks to their persistence, did 
manage to get appropriate treatment.  
The general conclusion of the study was that, with regard to the most serious medical 
complaints, getting appropriate treatment was more difficult than in civilian life. This 
phenomenon could not be verified on the basis of documents; instead, it is apparent as 
part of conscripts’ everyday life and their unofficial culture. Official rhetoric 
emphasises that all individuals are responsible for their own health, but in a 
unidirectional command relationship, the individual’s real opportunities to make his or 
her voice heard in practice are limited. The official line of the Defence Forces is that, in 
practice, conscripts have easier access to specialist health care than the rest of the 
population. It also maintains that medical criteria are the same as in civilian health care. 
According to the study mentioned above, social welfare officers are readily accessible 
and a quick way to find help. Social welfare officers offer assistance, for example, with 
mental-health-related issues, which have not been dealt with in the garrison hospital as 
hoped. In this respect, the Kainuu Brigade is well equipped to deal with personal 
problems. It is not possible, however, to assess on the basis of the study to what extent 
the social welfare officers can assist their patients in getting treatment for their mental 
health problems.  
The unit commander and the unit sergeant-major are also possible channels for seeking 
help, but the kind of assistance they provide varies with the unit. According to the 
study, the basic unit that was studied met the conscripts’ needs quite well, but 
interviews indicate that the perpetrator’s basic unit was, at least in 2008, clearly less 
flexible. This inflexibility is apparent in the conscripts’ descriptions of the officers’ 
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attitude towards the needs of the conscripts. This observation is not directly related to 
mental health problems; instead, it sheds light on how individual needs are met in 
general. It should be borne in mind, however, that the observations made in 2008 do not 
necessarily correspond to the situation prevailing during the perpetrator’s service in 
2006. 
After the perpetrator’s service had already been interrupted in September 2006, the 
‘Aikalisä’ (‘Time-out’) project was initiated in the Kainuu Brigade with the aim of 
providing assistance to those whose service had already been interrupted. The project 
concentrated on monitoring the circumstances and psychosocial well-being in civilian 
life of the conscripts whose service had been interrupted because of mental health 
problems. The project provides valuable assistance to those young people who have, 
during their military service, been found to suffer from psychosocial problems.  
Intervention in bullying  
In the Finnish Youth Research Society study on the Kainuu Brigade and the Armoured 
Brigade, significant differences were discovered in how units intervened in bullying. In 
the basic unit that was the target of the study in Kainuu, officers took bullying seriously 
and repeatedly reminded the conscripts of this. However, in the unit in which the 
perpetrator served, intervention was described in interviews as more ‘chaotic’ or ‘not 
working’. The perpetrator served in the unit in 2006, but the research material is from 
2008, when several officers and all conscripts had been replaced. Bullying in the 
military is not always related to the standard practices of an institution. In a large group, 
the social dynamics make it possible to bully individual conscripts. Peer pressure may, 
however, prevent conscripts from telling anyone, as the conscript may fear that 
reporting the incident could just make matters worse. If the officers in a service unit 
appear indifferent, refuse to discuss such issues with conscripts, or seldom offer an 
opportunity for discussion, the victim of bullying may not feel confident about the 
officers intervening in the matter. However, on the basis of the study it seems that 
bullying is mostly a thing of the past in Finnish garrisons.  
2.4. Organisational preparedness and preventive work 
2.4.1. The school  
A rescue plan as referred to in rescue legislation had been drawn up for the school. In 
addition, the polytechnic had a crisis plan, drawn up on the school’s initiative, and a 
crisis operation plan in the Vocational Education Centre Sedu.  
Rescue plan 
The rescue plan is property-specific, so the polytechnic and Sedu share the same plan. 
The rescue plan is based on a safety plan, the drawing up of which had been initiated in 
2002. The first safety plan was approved and distributed in 2003, after which the plan 
was updated several times. The last update was in April 2008. The Rescue Services 
were involved in drawing up of the plan. The rescue plan was mainly distributed to the 
safety organisation, but, according to instructions, such sections of it as were deemed 
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necessary were to be at the disposal of staff at various work stations. According to the 
instructions, every staff member was to familiarise him- or herself with the plan.  
The rescue plan includes general information on the property, building capacities, and 
points of contact with public rescue services. The rescue plan also comprises a safety 
analysis, which in practice contains detailed ratings of ergonomics, accident hazards, 
factors concerning work and environmental hygiene, the work community, workflow, 
and the special characteristics of the property. The risk assessment produced a list of 
corrective measures, each of which was assigned to a person specifically responsible for 
implementing them. The realisation of the measures was monitored and documented, 
and a risk assessment was carried out every few years. The risk assessment included, for 
example, the assessment of first-aid extinguishing equipment, emergency exits, first-aid 
and rescue preparedness, and the threat of violence. The threat posed by a violent 
student had been recognised in conjunction with the assessment carried out in the career 
guidance facilities, and it had been proposed that an alert button be installed there. 
The rescue plan also lists possible hazards and their effects. The hazards listed are a fire 
hazard, the threat of violence, the transport of dangerous substances in the nearby street, 
and burglaries. With regard to fire safety, structural fire safety and fire safety equipment 
are described in the plan, with instructions on how to prevent fires. To prevent 
accidents, the staff are instructed to observe all safety regulations concerning 
machinery, equipment, and chemical substances; to wear personal protective equipment 
correctly; to work ergonomically; to maintain cleanliness; to report slipping hazards to 
maintenance personnel; and to notify a superior or a member of the safety organisation 
of any hazards and safety-related defects detected. 
The plan provides instructions on what to do in the event of an accident or sudden 
illness, and also how to act in the case of a fire, a radiation hazard, or a threatening 
situation. In addition, the plan provides instructions on how to make an emergency call 
in case of accident or an emergency. The fire instructions follow the standard formula 
of: rescue, extinguish, alert, retard, and guide. When one is leaving a burning building, 
the assembly point is the large car park next to the main building or that next to the hall 
of residence. These assembly points could not be used during the shooting incident. A 
threatening situation refers to a bomb threat or a situation wherein an object is found 
that is suspected of being a bomb. For situations such as these, the plan includes 
instructions for identifying such an object or what to do in the case of a threatening 
phone call. 
Internal emergency instructions are given a chapter of their own. According to these, 
each employee must be familiar with the rescue plan; know how to make an emergency 
call; know how to act, and follow instructions, in cases of accident and hazardous 
situations; know the location of exits and assembly points; know where to find the 
nearest first-aid extinguishing equipment and first-aid kit; know how to use first-aid 
extinguishing equipment; know how to work safely; and report any risk factors to a 
superior. With regard to fires, the emergency instructions further provide instructions on 
how to make an emergency call; how to close doors and windows and shut off 
ventilation; how to exit the building and find the assembly point, with the guidance of 
the rescue leader or a teacher; and how to guide the fire brigade to the scene. In case of 
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fire, there is also an announcement template, telling everyone to stay calm and leave the 
building through the nearest exit marked with an exit sign. 
In the rescue plan, the safety organisation is led by three leadership members. 
Additionally, the plan lists a rescue leader, a deputy rescue leader, and seven rescue 
supervisors for various parts of the buildings. Their duties are specified in the appendix 
to the rescue plan. The rescue plan also comprises a staff training plan and a list of 
completed training sessions.  
Internal safety inspections, plan updates, and safety training to be arranged for the 
students and staff were also listed in the plan. School staff had not yet organised a 
rescue drill for new students when the school shootings were committed on 23 
September 2008. In safety training, not only the staff but also the students had been 
informed of whom to contact in relation to safety issues. These persons were the rescue 
leader, the deputy rescue leader, and the rescue supervisors in each part of the school 
complex. 
Well-being activities and preparedness for a crisis 
Seinäjoki Polytechnic, and the Kauhajoki unit as part of it, has, since the Myyrmanni 
shopping centre explosion in 2002, prepared itself in many ways to support the 
well-being of its students. The bomber in that incident was likewise a polytechnic 
student. In 2002, the first multidisciplinary well-being working group was set up, with 
members from some 10 distinct organisations. The aim was to get an overview of the 
various units’ crisis plans and to develop solutions to ensure and enhance the well-being 
of the students. In 2003, an initial assessment was carried out, and teams were set up to 
prepare to address various matters, such as student welfare, substance abuse work, crisis 
work, sport and leisure activities, co-operation with the parish, and career guidance. It 
was standard practice in the school to assign every student a teacher as a tutor providing 
additional support.  
The first crisis plan was approved in April 2004, followed by an update in March 2007. 
Instructions for substance misuse cases were approved and updated, following roughly 
the same schedule. Likewise, reports on student health care and co-operation with the 
parish were completed in April 2004. The plan for guidance and counselling services 
was approved in a meeting for heads of units in November 2005, and it was integrated 
into the Seinäjoki Polytechnic quality system. The plan was updated in 2008. A 
well-being programme for the students for 2008–2011 was approved by the school 
board in February 2008. According to the well-being programme, the units are sent a 
crisis plan, on which the units then model their practical applications. The programme 
further states that the students will be informed of the contact details of the unit’s crisis 
work personnel, an information session will be organised for all personnel, and such 
parts of the plan as are deemed necessary will be translated into English. 
The polytechnic crisis plan was meant for the whole polytechnic, but in February 2008, 
new instructions for the Business Administration, Food Management, and 
Entrepreneurship unit were added. These instructions outlined the composition of crisis 
teams and their duties in various situations. The part of these instructions that was 
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applicable in the shooting incident was the one concerning an immediate threat of 
violence. In such a case, an announcement should be made; the building emptied; and, if 
possible, the head of the unit or immediate supervisor informed of the situation. 
Informing the head of the unit and convening the crisis team were all that was 
mentioned in the item ‘Incidents involving violence’. 
According to the instructions, the purpose of the actual crisis plan was to outline how to 
act in a crisis situation, where to find outside help, and how to support the students and 
staff in a crisis situation. The aim is to maintain the community’s functional status, to 
support the recovery of the students and staff, and to prevent any adverse psychological 
or physical effects. The plan discusses the different ways in which people respond to 
traumatic crisis situations and how to deal with them. Additionally, the plan defines the 
duties of the crisis team and the duties of leadership, with examples of how to act in a 
crisis situation. The sections applicable to an incident such as a school shooting include 
instructions on how to deal with potential mental health problems, a serious accident, or 
a situation involving violence. The section addressing how to deal with mental health 
problems emphasises discussion with the student and referring the student to student 
health services. The possible need for psychosocial support arising from the situation is 
also mentioned here, as is the fact that the student in question or the student’s parents 
must be consulted regarding how the situation will be dealt with within the unit.  
The instructions applying to a serious accident emphasise the role of the crisis team and 
its duty to see that the necessary psychosocial support is provided for those who need it. 
The plan states that rescue activities are carried out in co-operation with the building 
protection committee and the first-aid team, and that first aid must be provided and 
alerts issued. The section discussing situations involving violence states that, in addition 
to the assessment of the need for psychosocial support, the president / unit leadership 
and occupational safety personnel must be informed of what has happened. The 
technical aspects must also be taken into account so that the necessary steps can be 
taken.  
At the end of the crisis plan, instructions are given for after-care, preparations for a 
memorial event, and communications. It is assessed as necessary for the crisis team to 
meet once per term to determine the composition of the team and to assess the activities 
during the previous term. The crisis team should also review the crisis plan and make 
the necessary changes. The crisis team informs the students and staff of the instructions. 
The appendix to the plan includes the distribution of duties in a crisis situation, a list of 
important phone numbers, and a list of references. 
The Vocational Education Centre Sedu and Sedu Adult Education have a corresponding 
plan, the contents of which are more or less the same. 
Physical safety of the building 
The schoolyard was monitored by a recording camera surveillance system. During 
school hours, most of the school doors were unlocked. In the evenings and on 
weekends, the doors were electronically locked and the door alarms were activated. 
Locking the doors also activated the motion detectors within the building. There is no 
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actual surveillance within the school facilities while the students are attending lessons. 
Announcements can be made over the PA system, but at the time of the incident, the PA 
system did not cover all parts of the complex. Announcements could be issued from the 
caretaker’s room in the main entrance corridors and the office room in the old section. 
After the incident, the number of announcement points was increased to four, and 
announcements are now heard throughout the school complex. 
2.4.2. The Municipality of Kauhajoki 
Approved by the municipality executive board in June 2007, the Municipality of 
Kauhajoki had a valid emergency plan in place. The emergency plan is drawn up with 
the purpose of preparation for special situations and disturbances both in normal 
conditions and in exceptional circumstances. Additionally, special command centre 
operation instructions have been drawn up for leadership in special situations and cases 
of disturbances. According to the operation instructions, the command centre is manned 
by the mayor, sector leaders, and representatives of the Rescue Services and the police. 
Kauhajoki comprehensive schools and the upper secondary school have their own 
rescue plans, which also address situations involving violence. The authorities have 
endeavoured to update the plans annually. In addition to rescue plans, crisis plans have 
been drawn up for unexpected and unforeseen situations, such as accidents, deaths, and 
other serious accidents.  
In late 2007, a preparedness drill was carried out in Kauhajoki. Municipality emergency 
plans were also revised and updated at that time. During the drill, time was set aside to 
provide training for the municipality management team. Schools’ rescue plans were 
revised simultaneously in co-operation with the Rescue Services. The Nokia water crisis 
and the Jokela school shootings were still fresh in people’s minds, so matters 
concerning communications and the distribution of duties were discussed in detail. 
Potential risk factors in Kauhajoki were also assessed, and electricity distribution issues 
were reviewed, with the result that a stand-by supply system was installed in the health 
centre.  
The new, local safety plans provided for in the Internal Security Programme are to be 
discussed in municipal councils by the end of 2010 at the latest. This time, the aim in 
the planning is to address accidents and incidents involving violence in particular. In 
Kauhajoki, the police are in charge of local security planning. At the time of the school 
shootings, the plan was not yet in place in Kauhajoki, however, as it is to be discussed 
in the municipality council in summer 2010.  
The Rescue Services have drawn up an evacuation plan for the Municipality of 
Kauhajoki area, which was approved by the Kauhajoki municipality executive board in 
March 2006. It is to be implemented in situations where the population – or parts of it – 
have to be evacuated from a danger zone. The assembly points specified in the plan are 
the swimming hall / sports hall and one of the comprehensive schools. Under normal 
conditions, the evacuation is led by a rescue or police authority, assisted by the Finnish 
Red Cross or voluntary rescue services. In the school shooting incident, the students and 
staff were instructed to take shelter at the commercial college nearby.  
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Together with the City of Seinäjoki and the municipalities in the Suupohja region, the 
Municipality of Kauhajoki is part of a regional social on-call system, which is utilised to 
prepare for urgent need for social services. The on-call system, initiated through a 
development project in May 2005, has, through a joint agreement, been in operation since 
May 2006. The social on-call system refers to on-call services outside office hours, where 
the social workers in a region take turns being on call. All alerts are issued by the 
Emergency Response Centre of Ostrobothnia via the VIRVE network. Most assignments 
are dealt with on the phone, but occasionally it is necessary to leave for the scene in 
person. When this happens, the police usually are already on the scene to provide 
assistance.  
2.4.3. The police 
Police preparedness for incidents of this general nature 
In demanding circumstances, police operations are usually built around standard, everyday 
police activities, and preparedness for incidents such as the Kauhajoki school shootings is 
rather poor. Police departments do, however, prepare and drill for demanding situations, 
and this training can be utilised in school shooting incidents, for example. It has not been 
possible to establish dedicated teams for demanding situations in most police departments.  
If possible, the first patrol on the scene should take command, cordon off the area, and 
form a situation picture of the incident. If necessary, more policemen with tactical training 
are then dispatched to the scene. If human lives are not in immediate danger, the police try 
to resolve the situation through negotiation. In demanding situations, it is often necessary 
to call for additional forces from nearby police departments. When necessary, the Helsinki 
Police Department’s police readiness unit can also be asked for assistance.  
At the time of the incident, the Kauhajoki District Police Department was in charge of 
police duties in the municipalities of Kauhajoki, Isojoki, Karijoki, Teuva, and Jurva. The 
police department had a single police station, situated in Kauhajoki. There were also 
service offices, providing mainly licensing services, in Isojoki, Teuva, and Jurva. The 
distance between Kauhajoki police station and the polytechnic, where the incident took 
place, is approximately one kilometre. 
At the time of the incident, the Kauhajoki District Police Department employed some 20 
policemen and sergeants and two commanding officers. Additionally, five guards were 
employed by the police department. The police department did not have a 24-hour on-call 
system. 
Preventive measures employed by the police 
Early intervention is part of preventive police work, and, accordingly, the focus in 
community policing has in recent years been on children, adolescents, and families in 
danger of becoming marginalised. In practice, early intervention has been carried out 
through co-operation with the Social Services and other authorities and organisations 
involved in child welfare matters, for example. Child welfare reports are a concrete 
example of the means applied in early intervention. Local security planning serves as a 
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platform for agreeing on the means of early intervention. The planning process involves 
all of the relevant co-operating authorities. 
Finland has a long tradition of co-operation between the police and schools. This has 
always been an essential part of preventive work, even if its volume and intensity has 
varied according to local conditions and the availability of resources. On a national 
level, the police engage in co-operation with the Ministry of Education, the National 
Board of Education, and the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities. An 
example of joint projects is the annual declaration of ‘school peace’ in Finnish schools. 
The police also produce a lot of preventive material, which is available on the Web – 
also for schools. On the provincial level, the co-operation is co-ordinated by community 
policing contact persons. The police stations, for their part, ensure that police 
co-operation with schools is agreed on with municipalities. 
At the Kauhajoki District Police Department, the preventive police work was the 
responsibility of the public order department’s superintendent, who was assisted by a 
sergeant. Additionally, two senior constables had been appointed to provide legality 
education. The police department did not have a separate plan concerning the provision 
of annual legality education; instead, the department policy was to provide this 
education if and when the resources were available. Occasionally, detective department 
personnel also participated in preventive work – by giving anti-drug lectures, for 
example. Most requests came from the educational institutions in the area, and the 
police endeavoured to visit each of them every second year.  
The extent and allocation of preventive police work is affected by the fact that in basic 
police training, the training for this is dispersed across several study modules. What 
preventive police work actually consists of has been a matter of debate. In practice, 
preventive work is not always part of everyday activities. The crucial elements in 
preventive police work are co-operation with other authorities, interest groups, and the 
third sector, as well as early intervention whenever problem areas are discovered. 
2.4.4. The Rescue Services 
Preparedness of the Rescue Services for accidents in schools 
At the time of the incident, the Rescue Department of Southern Ostrobothnia was in 
charge of rescue services in 26 municipalities within the province. There are 30 fire 
stations in the Rescue Department area, divided into six fire station groups. Together 
with Teuva, Isojoki, and Karijoki, Kauhajoki belongs to group 6. The Seinäjoki fire 
station has an officer and five rescuers on call. At other stations, the professional staff 
are complemented with 15–40 part-time firemen when necessary. At these stations, the 
fire brigade deployment time is approximately five minutes. 
The service level decision for the Rescue Services for 2007–2008 was approved by the 
board of the Southern Ostrobothnia Rescue Department on 12 December 2006. Rescue 
co-operation agreements have been concluded with the Ähtäri Explosives Centre and 
the Kauhava Training Air Wing. 
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The polytechnic was in the Kauhajoki town centre, which in the service level decisions 
of the Rescue Services is classified as being in risk area 2. This means that the rescue 
unit leader and five rescuers must arrive on the scene within 10 minutes of the alert, 
along with a fire engine and a fire truck. A rescue platoon – a platoon leader and three 
rescue units – must reach the scene within 30 minutes of the alert.  
The fire station is located in the town centre, approximately one kilometre from the 
polytechnic. According to the service level decision, the regular personnel at the 
Kauhajoki fire station consist of a fire marshal, a fire inspector, and four fire-fighters. 
Additionally, 30 voluntary firemen, paid on a per-mission basis, participate in 
operations. During office hours, one officer, two sergeants, and two fire-fighters are in 
readiness. The volunteer firemen are also summoned in the event of an alert. Outside 
office hours, a sergeant and three fire-fighters remain on call until 10:00pm. The same 
personnel are on high-readiness reserve at night, which means that they are at home, 
ready to respond to an alert. The Kauhajoki fire station equipment consists of two fire 
engines, two fire trucks, two command vehicles, a crew carrier, an inspection vehicle, 
and other equipment. Latterly, the Kauhajoki fire station acquired an aerial platform. 
The Rescue Services have drawn up instructions for the Emergency Response Centre, 
according to which additional resources are summoned to Kauhajoki, if and when the 
need arises, from several stations within the province. In the school shooting incident, 
rescue units from five fire station groups were dispatched to the scene. In addition to the 
Kauhajoki fire station, rescue units arrived from fire stations in Ilmajoki, Teuva, Isojoki, 
Jalasjärvi, Jurva, Kurikka, and the Kauhava Training Air Wing. With regard to Rescue 
Services operative leadership, an officer is on high-readiness reserve at all times at the 
Kauhajoki fire station. Additionally, the fire chief on duty and the head of rescue 
services responsible for the Kauhajoki area are on high-readiness reserve. 
Preventive measures employed by the Rescue Services 
According to the service level decision, the Southern Ostrobothnia Rescue Department 
carries out education work for the prevention of accidents and also instructs the public 
in how to act correctly in the event of an accident. The beneficiaries of this educational 
and informative work are mainly schoolchildren and the personnel of medical and 
welfare institutions and other large institutions, offices, and factories. General education 
and information work is carried out in conjunction with national campaigns.  
A general fire inspection is performed annually in buildings requiring special attention. 
Special fire inspections and later inspections are performed according to regional needs. 
Rescue plans are inspected in conjunction with general fire inspections. If a building 
does not have a rescue plan in place, an order will be issued to rectify the matter. The 
rescue department provides guidance on how to draw up the plans and update them. 
Self-preparedness training is provided in co-operation with other rescue organisations. 
Rescue authorities also act as experts on building fire safety. A rescue authority works 
in co-operation with the authority issuing the building permit, issuing statements upon 
request. 
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The rescue department has guided and supported safety planning, self-preparedness, and 
related training activities at the polytechnic. A fire inspection had been performed for 
the polytechnic annually, or more often when necessary. Safety-related co-operation 
between educational institutions and the rescue department has been close. 
2.4.5. Medical services and first aid 
Kauhajoki has a health centre, maintained by Municipality Health Services, with two 
wards, a laboratory, and an X-ray section. Eight doctors work in the health centre, and 
between 8am and 10pm there is a doctor on call. Seinäjoki Central Hospital provides 
on-call service between 10pm and 8am. Additionally, the Kauhajoki health centre offers 
family centre, occupational health, and health centre psychologist’s services. 
The Municipality of Kauhajoki is part of the Hospital District of Southern Ostrobothnia. 
The central hospital of the hospital district is in Seinäjoki, 59 km from Kauhajoki. The 
central hospital had an emergency plan, as referred to in the Emergency Powers Act, 
which had last been updated in November 2008. The plan specifies three different alerts 
for major accidents: 
1. A standard alert during on-call hours (2:30pm–8:00am)  
2. A standard alert during office hours (8:00am–2:30pm) 
3. A full alert (the number of seriously injured patients exceeds 10) 
The plan also states that Seinäjoki Central Hospital is obliged to dispatch a medical 
team to the accident site. The team can be dispatched either at the request of an 
authority or on the hospital’s own initiative. A medical team consists of a doctor, a 
nurse, a paramedic, and a rescuer from the rescue department. The rescuer’s duties 
consist mainly of transportation and communications. If and when the need arises, the 
team can be augmented with two doctors and nursing personnel, for example. The 
decisions on the augmentation of the team and its dispatch are made by the chief 
medical officer or the head of medical services. 
The Hospital District of Southern Ostrobothnia is part of a special area of responsibility 
of Tampere University Hospital, which means that patients requiring demanding and 
specialised medical care are treated at Tampere University Hospital. The distance 
between Kauhajoki and Tampere is 165 km.  
In addition to Seinäjoki Central Hospital, the other central hospitals in the region are 
Vaasa Central Hospital, in the Hospital District of Vaasa, 95 km from Kauhajoki, and 
Satakunta Central Hospital, in the Hospital District of Satakunta, 125 km from 
Kauhajoki.  
A Kauhajoki-based private ambulance company is in charge of emergency medical 
services in Kauhajoki. In accordance with an agreement concluded with the 
Municipality of Kauhajoki, the company maintains two paramedic-level ambulance 
units in immediate readiness on weekdays between 8am and 4pm. At other times, the 
unit is ready to be deployed within 15 minutes. Additionally, on weekdays another 
ambulance unit is ready to be deployed in 15 minutes. ‘Paramedic-level’ means that the 
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unit is capable of treating the patient at intensive care-level and can maintain the 
patient’s vital functions during transport. The personnel and equipment have been 
defined as paramedic-level by the Hospital District of Southern Ostrobothnia. 
The Hospital District of Southern Ostrobothnia has issued instructions on the provision 
of first aid outside hospitals. These instructions specify command relationships, call 
signs, communications, and duties, and they also list operator-specific duties. The 
Social Welfare and Health Department of the Province of Western Finland has issued 
instructions on the use of the VIRVE network for social welfare and health authorities. 
Rescue helicopter Pete 
Pete is a Vaasa-based rescue helicopter maintained by a volunteer association. A 
multipurpose helicopter in constant 24-hour readiness, it is used on fire-fighting, search, 
and executive assistance missions, such as oil spill containment and other special 
missions, in the Ostrobothnia region, Central Ostrobothnia, Southern Ostrobothnia, and 
the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia region.  
2.4.6. Emergency Response Centre 
The Emergency Response Centre (ERC) of Ostrobothnia is in Vaasa and serves some 
half a million people, a significant proportion of them Swedish-speaking. The ERC’s 
area of operation consisted of 55 municipalities at the time of the incident. Various 
authorities have issued alert instructions for the ERC, which the ERC operators use to 
issue the necessary alerts.  
2.4.7. The Finnish Defence Forces’ preparedness and preventive work 
The duties of the Defence Forces as set forth by law include the provision of support for 
other authorities. This includes, among other elements, the provision of executive 
assistance to maintain public order and security, to prevent and interrupt terrorist acts, and 
otherwise to protect society at large, as well as the provision of assistance in rescue 
operations by contributing equipment, personnel, and expert services. 
The Defence Forces are prepared to participate in rescue operations when necessary, 
provided that these activities do not endanger the execution of its national defence duties. 
The Defence Forces resources available for use in rescue operations include, for example, 
military fire brigades, experts on leadership and communications, communications 
equipment, field accommodation and food equipment, first-aid and emergency medical 
care equipment, other special equipment and special experts, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and 
transportation systems.  
The Defence Forces endeavour to support the well-being and mental health of 
conscripts. In the Kainuu Brigade, for example, this means that the services of the 
garrison hospital and the social welfare officer are available for the conscripts when 
necessary. All conscripts also undergo a standard health examination when entering 
service. If necessary, conscripts are referred to appropriate further treatment. 
Additionally, the conscripts can turn to the unit‘s sergeant major or the unit commander 
in problem situations. If the health status of a conscript is considered to prevent him 
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from participating in military training, the conscript’s service fitness classification can 
be downgraded or service interrupted. Garrisons offer numerous leisure activities to 
promote the well-being of conscripts. Their well-being is also enhanced through the 
physical exercise that is part of service. 
2.4.8. The State Provincial Office of Western Finland 
The Provincial Police Command of Western Finland plans, develops, and leads police 
operations in the province. As the regional rescue authority, the rescue department has an 
obligation to ensure that the service level of the Rescue Services is sufficient in the 
municipalities, to plan and develop the Rescue Services, to see to it that adequate 
leadership resources are available for major accidents and exceptional circumstances, and 
to promote good security culture. The social welfare and health department is charged with 
the guidance and supervision of social welfare and health services at regional 
administration level. The education and culture department is charged with enhancement 
of the quality of education and cultural services, and with ensuring that they produce good 
results. The department has teams for vocational education and training, the assessment of 
educational services, continuing education for teaching staff, legal protection, construction 
matters, library services, sport services, youth services, and the EU’s structural funds. 
Furthermore, the State Provincial Office of Western Finland co-ordinates regional 
preparedness planning. 
2.4.9. The National Board of Education 
After the Jokela school shootings, committed on 7 November 2007, educational 
institutions received dozens of threats of varying nature and level. As the number of 
threats increased, the National Board of Education deemed it necessary to provide 
schools with instructions in case they received further threats.  
Instructions on how to respond to violent behaviour or the threat thereof were published 
on the National Board of Education Web site. Educational institutions were informed 
directly by e-mail of the existence of the support material on how to deal with crisis 
situations that was published on the Web site. Additionally, the Internet address of the 
National Board of Education was published in several media. Experts of the National 
Board of Education’s preparedness group contacted educational institutions by phone 
and e-mail on security issues. 
Less than a week after the incident, the National Board of Education reminded 
educational institutions by e-mail to ensure that they had updated rescue plans in place. 
The educational institutions were also requested to emphasise in their education work 
the individual’s responsibility for general safety, and to take all school threats seriously 
and always inform the police of them. 
In spring 2008, the National Board of Education organised, in co-operation with state 
provincial offices, 14 training sessions on the theme ‘Security and preparing for crisis 
situations’ in various parts of Finland. The sessions focused on crisis preparedness, how 
to respond in a crisis situation, dealing with a crisis, after-care, and media coverage of 
crises.  
75 
 
2.4.10. Psychosocial support organisations’ preparedness 
The municipal crisis team 
The Kauhajoki Social Welfare and Health Services have had a crisis team for more than 
20 years. The activities of the team are based on Social Welfare and Health Services 
personnel, co-operation between authorities, and volunteer workers. Municipality of 
Kauhajoki personnel involved in this work include, among others, psychologists, 
doctors, public health nurses, social workers, and nurses. Some members have been part 
of the team since it was established, while others have been rotated. Team membership 
is completely voluntary. The employer has provided the team members with support, 
organising practical and theoretical training and work counselling for them. The crisis 
team have carried out debriefing activities. Requests for help have mainly been 
submitted during office hours, sometimes also in the evening via an on-call phone line. 
In the evenings and on weekends, the crisis team can be contacted via the health centre 
emergency clinic or emergency medical services. 
Psychosocial support provided by the Church (parish) 
In major accident and crisis situations, the Church is a functional part of the rescue 
system, because the Church is an important partner for the Social Welfare and Health 
Services in contingency planning and preparedness. In cases of major accidents and 
crisis situations, the Church help line is open 24 hours a day if necessary. The Church 
also maintains a Web help service, where people can leave messages anonymously and 
discuss things that are worrying them. If requested to do so, priests and other crisis 
workers can assist the police in delivering the sad news to next of kin. 
On the national level, the crisis relief co-operation is led by the permanent secretary of 
the General Synod, who is also the chairman of the Church’s preparedness committee. 
At the regional level, the Church’s emergency planning and preparedness are 
co-ordinated by diocese cathedral chapters, which co-operate with state provincial 
offices. Locally, parishes or parish unions are responsible for emergency planning, 
preparedness, and psychological support. Kirkon henkinen huolto (the psychological 
support provided by the Church) employs an organisation that is mainly active in the 
Helsinki metropolitan area. It is a part of the psychosocial support system, providing 
psychological support to accident victims; their families; and, if necessary, rescue 
workers. 
More than 2,000 priests and some 1,500 diaconal workers have been trained for crisis 
situations. Priests are also active in various educational institutions, including those of 
higher education. Additionally, special youth workers are active in youth work.  
Local branches of the Finnish Red Cross (FRC) 
In cases of major accidents, local FRC branches can be utilised to plan and organise 
psychological support. They can also provide assistance if necessary. Preliminary 
welfare and psychological support is provided by local emergency units, which offer 
material and psychological support during the first few days after accidents and in other 
special situations. The activities are largely based on the operators and resources of 
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local branches. Professional staff are assisted by volunteer workers, who have been 
trained for their duties through basic and advanced courses in psychological support. 
The emergency unit is part of the organisation and alert system of the Voluntary Rescue 
Service. The psychological support teams of the Voluntary Rescue Service and their 
services are co-ordinated by the Finnish Red Cross. 
The FRC Preparedness and Response Unit 
The FRC Preparedness and Response Unit consists of 25 experienced crisis 
psychologists, in various parts of Finland, who all meet the unit’s selection criteria. Unit 
members have an agreement with their employers whereby they can temporarily leave 
their duties within 24 hours if they are needed, for example, to provide crisis support 
after a serious accident. Four levels of text message alert can be used to alert the unit. 
The level of the alert determines how many psychologists are summoned for crisis 
work. Usually, not all of them are summoned, as usually they are not all needed 
simultaneously and, at the same time, resources have to be reserved for crisis work 
lasting longer than a week. For major accidents, the need for crisis relief provided by 
the unit has usually lasted some two weeks.  
Established in 1993, the unit has participated in acute crisis work for all major accidents 
involving Finnish citizens, both in Finland and abroad. The unit plans, co-ordinates, and 
provides crisis relief at the request of various authorities and also supports local crisis 
teams.  
2.5. Rules, regulations, instructions, and other documents 
2.5.1. Rules and regulations concerning polytechnic schools and preventive work 
In 2009, there were 26 polytechnic schools in operation under the Ministry of 
Education, of which three were municipal, seven owned by joint municipal authorities, 
and 13 privately owned. Fewer rules and regulations concerning safety, crisis 
preparedness, and students’ well-being, have been issued for polytechnic schools than, 
for example, comprehensive schools, upper secondary schools, and universities. 
The most relevant provisions are those of the Polytechnics Act of 2003. It provides for the 
status, administration, and duties of polytechnics; the instruction provided by them; the 
number and selection of students; fees; teachers; and funding. The participation of students 
is mainly provided for in the provision concerning the student body. In universities, the 
students automatically belong to the student body, but in polytechnics this is not 
obligatory. One of the duties of the student body is to elect student representatives for the 
polytechnic board. According to the law, the mission of the student body is to act as a 
uniting body for its members and to promote their self-development and societal and social 
aspirations, as well as those related to studying and the students’ status in society.  
According to the Primary Health Care Act, each municipality is responsible for the 
provision of health care services for polytechnic students. The dimensions of student health 
care are governed by Ministry of Social Affairs and Health recommendations, which are 
laid down in its Handbook on Health Care during Studies, published in 2006. According 
to the handbook, in higher education, which includes polytechnics, there should be a public 
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health nurse for every 800–1,000 students under normal conditions. Similarly, one 
full-time doctor is required for every 2,500–3,000 students. 
At the time of the school shootings, there were no security-related provisions in the 
Polytechnics Act or the Polytechnics Decree. However, early in 2010, a new provision was 
introduced, according to which polytechnics must prepare themselves for disturbances, 
special situations, and exceptional circumstances by drawing up emergency preparedness 
plans and making advance preparations.  
2.5.2. Provisions for mental health services 
Mental health work refers to the promotion of an individual’s psychological well-being, 
functionality, and personal development, as well as the prevention, treatment, and 
alleviation of mental illness and other mental health disorders. According to the Mental 
Health Act, Finnish municipalities are responsible for the provision of mental health 
services for their inhabitants. 
Mental health work includes the social welfare and health services that are targeted at 
persons suffering from mental illness or other mental health disorders. The services are 
provided for an illness or disturbance that is assessed on medical grounds. Mental health 
work also includes the development of the living conditions of the Finnish population in 
such a manner that they better prevent mental health disorders, promote mental health 
work, and support the provision of mental health services. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for the general planning, 
steering, and supervision of mental health work. On the provincial level, these duties are 
carried out by state provincial offices. For their part, municipalities are responsible for 
the provision of mental health services as part of public health work and social welfare 
services. The extent and quality of the services must be commensurate with the need for 
services within the municipality of the joint municipal authority. Primarily, mental 
health services must be provided in the form of community care and in such a manner 
as to promote the patients’ initiative in seeking help and managing on their own. 
According to the Act on Specialised Health Care, the mental health services provided 
within the framework of specialist health care are the responsibility of each hospital 
district’s joint municipal authority. These activities are provided for in the Act on 
Planning and Government Grants for Social Welfare and Health. Each hospital district’s 
joint municipal authority, its health centres, the social welfare services, and those 
providing specialised services must see to it that the mental health services available 
form a functioning system. 
Mental health services for children and adolescents are provided for in the Mental 
Health Decree. According to that decree, each municipality must see to it that necessary 
and sufficient support measures are available to enable an individual to cope with the 
situation at home. Each hospital district’s joint municipal authority and the 
municipalities in its area must agree on the regional distribution of duties and their 
implementation. 
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2.5.3. Provisions on municipal activities 
In public administration, a municipality is at the lowest administrative level, governed 
by the Local Government Act. On the basis of the principle of self-administration, a 
municipality carries out the duties it has assumed, as well as those provided for by law. 
New obligations can be imposed on municipalities, or their duties diminished or rights 
revoked, only through the enactment of new legislation. On the basis of an agreement, 
municipalities can, however, assume other duties than the public duties belonging to 
their self-administration. Each municipality may carry out its duties alone or in 
co-operation with other municipalities.  
Municipalities can establish, for example, foundations, organisations, or business 
enterprises jointly with other municipalities to handle various matters. Municipalities 
can also form joint municipal authorities for the provision of joint services. This is 
particularly common for small municipalities. To perform their statutory duties, 
municipalities can also purchase services from other service providers.  
There are many provisions concerning municipalities, pertaining to, for example, social 
welfare and health services, day care, and basic education, as well as the infrastructure, 
such as town planning, heat and electricity distribution, sewerage, sanitation, building 
permits, and building control. Municipalities are responsible for the maintenance of the 
road and street network and for the rescue services, as well as duties related to culture, 
leisure, and youth services. Special municipal duties include child welfare, income 
support, elderly care, care of the disabled, and services addressing substance misuse. 
All in all, municipalities are the basic units in public administration and as such are 
trusted with the key duties in terms of the lives of the inhabitants. Membership of a 
municipality and the benefits it offers to its residents are available to those living in its 
area of operation. 
2.5.4. Provisions concerning police preparedness and prevention 
Provisions concerning police preparedness 
The duties of the police are provided for in the Police Act, according to which the duty 
of the police is to ensure judicial and social order, maintain public order and security, 
prevent and investigate crimes, and forward cases to a prosecutor for consideration of 
charges. Police measures shall be taken without causing more damage or inconvenience 
than is necessary for carrying out the duty at hand. The measures shall be justifiable in 
relation to the importance and urgency of the duty and the factors affecting overall 
assessment of the situation. The police shall attempt to maintain public order and 
security primarily through advice, requests, and orders. The police shall not interfere in 
anyone’s rights more than is necessary for carrying out their duties. The police shall 
perform their duties with all due efficiency and expediency. If circumstances so require, 
duties shall be prioritised in order of importance. 
According to the Police Act, police officers have the right to use necessary forms of 
force that can be considered justifiable to overcome opposition, remove a person from 
the scene, carry out an apprehension, prevent the escape of a person who has lost his or 
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her liberty, eliminate an obstacle, or avert immediate threat of a crime or other 
dangerous act or event. In judgement of the justifiability of forcible measures, the 
importance and urgency of the duty, the danger posed by the opposition, the available 
resources, and other factors affecting the overall assessment of the situation shall be 
taken into consideration. 
A Ministry of the Interior decree provides for the use of forcible measures and the 
means to be employed in the use of force. According to the decree, the probable effects 
and consequences of forcible means on the person in question, and the safety of 
bystanders in particular, shall be considered in the selection and use thereof. The decree 
also provides for police training in the use of force and the means to be employed in the 
use of force.  
The Ministry of the Interior’s Police Department, the police departments of state 
provincial offices, and local police departments have issued various regulations and 
instructions concerning police operations and demanding situations.  
In 2002, the Supreme Police Command issued instructions on operational activities and 
their leadership. The instructions focus on various concepts and definitions, as well as 
legislation and police ethics. The main emphasis is on leadership in everyday field 
operations and demanding situations that are closely connected with police tactical 
negotiation, the tactics employed in the use of force, and occupational safety issues. The 
instructions also address communications and executive assistance issues. 
In 2006, the Supreme Police Command issued an order concerning operative command 
readiness and communications, which deals with the command readiness system, 
command outside office hours, and communications. The command readiness system 
consists of the command readiness of local police, the supreme police command, and 
national police units.  
In 2004, the State Provincial Office for Western Finland’s police department issued 
instructions on the organisation of 24-hour command readiness and the submission of 
reports to the Provincial Police Command of Western Finland. The instructions concern 
the activities and duties of police officers in command readiness in provincial police 
command or among local police. 
A separate plan of action for demanding situations, concerning the police departments 
of Seinäjoki, Alavus, Kauhajoki, and Lapua, had been drawn up for the operational area 
of Southern Ostrobothnia. The plan was last updated in 2005 and was up to date at the 
time of the school shootings. The plan includes operation principles and instructions on 
how to initiate and lead actions in a demanding situation. Additionally, the plan 
comprises instructions on how to create a situation organisation, description of its 
duties, and communication instructions. 
In 2004, the Ministry of the Interior’s police department issued an order concerning the 
police readiness unit. According to the order, the Helsinki Police Department maintains a 
readiness unit with special training and equipment. The order lists the duties of the 
readiness unit and provides instructions on how to alert the unit.  
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Provisions concerning preventive police work 
Community policing is an important part of preventive police work. It involves 
systematic co-operation among the police, authorities, local residents, citizens, and other 
interest groups. Community policing is part of the basic duties of the police, so it is not 
considered a separate activity. The aim is to enhance security and the feeling of security, 
as well as to reduce and prevent crime and public disturbance, and thus maintain a 
positive image of the police, while ensuring that public confidence in the police remains 
high. 
Community policing was introduced in Finland in the 1980s and was influenced by 
developments in international community policing. The principles of community 
policing were described as early as in 1987, in a report submitted by the strategic 
working group on preventive police work. They were also mentioned in two documents 
published in 1999: Guidelines for Community Policing and Good Results through 
Security Co-operation. In the early 2000s, the aim in police administration has been the 
establishment of community policing as part of standard police operations all over 
Finland.  
Community policing is also an element in the national vision and strategy of the police. 
The objectives of the police are defined in the Police Vision for 2014, according to 
which ‘Finland is the safest country in Europe, which is guaranteed by a police force 
that is professional, eager to serve, reliable, co-operation-oriented, and efficiently 
organised’. The essential elements in the social efficacy of police operations are the 
citizens’ confidence in the police and the status of the safest country in Europe. In the 
police strategy for 2008–2012, the key areas and operational policy outlines include, as 
the first item, the prevention of crime, disturbances, and accidents in co-operation with 
other authorities and organisations.  
2.5.5. Provisions concerning Rescue Services preparedness and prevention work 
Fire safety in buildings is regulated by building regulations within the administrative 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment. The prevention of fires and other 
accidents, rescue operations, and civil protection are provided for in the Rescue Act and 
the Rescue Decree. Rescue operations refers to measures to be taken urgently for the 
protection and rescue of people, property, and the environment; the minimisation of 
damage; and the alleviation of negative consequences in cases of accidents or threats 
thereof. On the basis of these provisions, the Ministry of the Interior has issued further 
decrees, regulations, and instructions.  
According to the Rescue Act, buildings that are at special risk are obliged to draw up a 
rescue plan. Accordingly, the polytechnic had in April 2008 updated its rescue plan for 
accidents and threatening situations in normal and exceptional circumstances.  
The Ministry of the Interior has issued an order concerning the decisions on the service 
level in the area. According to the order, all Rescue Services areas are obliged to draw 
up service level decisions on the prevention of accidents, the arrangement of rescue 
services, and civil protection. Based on these provisions and the above-mentioned order, 
the Rescue Department of Southern Ostrobothnia had a valid service level decision for 
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2007–2008 in place, approved by the board of the Rescue Department of Southern 
Ostrobothnia on 12 December 2006. 
Concerning fire inspection, the Ministry of the Interior’s fire inspection instructions 
were valid at that point. These were based on the Act on Rescue Services, preceding the 
Rescue Act. The Ministry of the Interior has issued a decree on the marking of 
emergency exits and another decree on the marking and lighting of emergency exits in 
buildings. 
The general principles of preparedness for accidents are laid down in preparedness 
instructions. The service level decision of the Rescue Department of Southern 
Ostrobothnia outlines the regional organisation of the Rescue Services and its 
objectives. Instructions on fire brigades’ smoke diving operations are given in smoke 
diving instructions, which can be applied in smoke diving and other rescue diving 
operations alike. According to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, smoke diving 
involves special risk factors, such as the possibility of accidents or occupational 
diseases, which demand special care and competence. 
The planning and preparedness obligations concerning evacuations are laid down in the 
Rescue Act and the Government Decree on Rescue Services. Regional rescue 
departments are charged with drawing up, in co-operation with the other municipalities 
and operators in the region, plans concerning civil protection and evacuation. 
Evacuation is also included in the obligation concerning the drawing up of rescue plans 
for residential buildings, business enterprises, institutions, and similar buildings. Further 
specifications are given in the Ministry of the Interior instructions on the planning and 
implementation of population evacuations. On the basis of these instructions, the 
Rescue Department of Southern Ostrobothnia had drawn up, on 14 March 2006, an 
updated evacuation plan for Kauhajoki, which was approved by the municipality’s 
executive board on 27 March 2006. Evacuation is also included in the polytechnic’s 
rescue plan.  
Proceeding from the Rescue Act and the Government Decree on Rescue Services, the 
Ministry of the Interior has issued instructions on accident alerts and the relaying 
thereof to the Ministry of the Interior, state provincial offices, and the Accident 
Investigation Board. 
The purpose of the Rescue Equipment Act is to ensure that all Rescue Services 
equipment is safe and appropriate for its purpose. It also states that the correct 
installation, maintenance, and inspection of rescue equipment guarantees that it works 
efficiently and reliably. In this context, Rescue Services equipment refers to 1) fire 
detection equipment to be installed in buildings, other equipment used to indicate 
potential hazards, and alarm and warning equipment; 2) in-built fire-extinguishing and 
smoke extraction equipment; 3) first-aid extinguishing equipment, such as hand 
extinguishers and fire-smothering blankets; and 4) products used to mark and light 
emergency exits in buildings. 
Emergency response services are provided for in the Emergency Response Centre Act, 
which is applied to the organisation of Emergency Response Centre activities and 
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emergency response centres for the Rescue Services, the police, and Social Welfare and 
Health Services, as well as emergency calls and alerts. The Emergency Response Centre 
Administration has published a guide for emergency response centres on the 
classification of missions. 
2.5.6. Provisions concerning Emergency Medical Services preparedness and 
prevention work 
The obligation of Finnish municipalities to provide ambulance services is based on the 
Primary Health Care Act. The same act obliges municipalities to maintain medical 
rescue services and a level of preparedness to transport patients that is commensurate 
with local circumstances. The Decree on Ambulance Services specifies the duties of 
health centres and hospital districts, and it provides definitions of emergency medical 
services and both basic- and paramedic-level ambulance services. The decree also 
obliges hospital districts to steer and supervise paramedic-level ambulance services 
within municipalities’ areas of operations. The Hospital District of Southern 
Ostrobothnia has drawn up operation instructions for ambulance services and 
emergency medical care provided outside hospitals. Additionally, the hospital district 
has issued separate instructions for major accidents, concerning command relationships, 
communications, and the duties of various health care personnel. 
2.5.7. Firearms legislation 
The firearms legislation valid at the time of the Kauhajoki school shootings dates from 
1988, after which the act was amended to a certain extent. According to the Firearms Act, 
the following activities are subject to authorisation: transfer and import to Finland; transfer 
and export from Finland; transit for commercial purposes or trade; and acquisition, 
possession, and manufacture of firearms or of firearm components, cartridges, and 
especially dangerous projectiles. According to the Firearms Act, a licence or permit for 
these activities may be granted if there is an acceptable reason for granting the licence or 
permit, and if there is no reason to suspect that the licence or permit, or the objects 
acquired or possessed under it, would be misused. 
According to the Firearms Act, the permit for the acquisition of a firearm or a component 
thereof is granted by the police department for the applicant’s municipality of residence. 
The acquisition permit also entitles the applicant to the temporary possession of a firearm 
or firearm component. The application for a permit must be submitted to the police 
department in person. The permit is granted for a maximum period of six months. 
According to the Firearms Act, an acquisition permit may be granted for the following 
purposes of use: 1) shooting of animals permitted by hunting legislation; 2) target shooting 
or practice; 3) work where a weapon is necessary; 4) a show, filming, or a corresponding 
presentation; 5) keeping in a museum or a collection; 6) keeping as a souvenir; and 7) 
signalling.  
An acquisition permit may only be granted for a firearm or firearm component that, on 
the basis of the number of cartridges in the magazine, the calibre, or other properties, 
and with regard to the purpose of use indicated by the applicant, is not unnecessarily 
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powerful or efficient, and which is suitable for the purpose of use stated by the 
applicant. 
According to the Firearms Act, an acquisition permit may be granted to a person who has 
reached the age of 18 and who, on the basis of his or her state of health and behaviour, is to 
be deemed suitable for possessing firearms or firearm components. With the consent of 
parents or guardians, a permit may, however, also be granted, for shooting of animals 
permitted by hunting legislation or for target shooting or practice, to a person who is 15 
but not yet 18 years old and who otherwise fulfils the requirements set for an acquisition 
permit applicant. 
A possession permit for a firearm acquired under the acquisition permit must be applied 
for within 30 days of the acquisition. The permit is granted and revoked by the police 
department for the applicant’s municipality of residence. A possession permit is usually 
granted indefinitely, but for a special reason it may also be granted for a fixed term. 
An acquisition or possession permit may be revoked if the permit holder is guilty of an 
offence indicating violent behaviour, drug-related crime, or another offence that proves 
him or her to be unsuitable for acquiring or possessing firearms, firearm components, 
cartridges, or especially dangerous projectiles. An acquisition or possession permit may 
also be revoked if the permit-holder has violated the permit terms or otherwise shown 
disregard for compliance with the provisions on firearms, firearm components, 
cartridges, or especially dangerous projectiles. 
According to the Firearms Act, the police shall, without delay, make a decision on taking 
temporary possession of the objects if there are reasonable grounds to suspect misuse of a 
firearm, firearm components, cartridges, or especially dangerous projectiles, or if a 
procedure for revoking a related permit has been initiated. Additionally, a policeman 
shall take a firearm, firearm components, cartridges, or especially dangerous projectiles 
away from their holder if there is an apparent risk of misuse. The policeman shall, 
without delay, notify the police department for the place in whose territory the objects 
have been confiscated from their holder, or the police department for the 
permit-holder’s place of residence, of their confiscated. 
The Police Act entitles the police to acquire information from other authorities 
concerning the permit-holder’s state of health, use of drugs, or violent behaviour if there 
are grounds to suspect that the permit-holder no longer fulfils the requirements for 
holding a firearm permit. The decision on the acquisition of secret information is always 
made by an officer.  
In autumn 2007, the Ministry of the Interior issued instructions for the standardisation 
of firearm permit procedures. The purpose of the instructions is to ensure that the 
firearm permit procedure is the same in all police departments, and that all applicants 
and permit-holders are treated equally in accordance with the principles of good 
governance.  
According to the instructions, one of the key objectives of the permit procedure is 
prevention of the serious consequences of the misuse of a firearm, and firearm offences 
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in particular. The instructions on the standardisation of firearm permit procedures focus, 
for example, on an individual’s suitability for a firearm acquisition or possession 
permit, and the suitability of the firearm for its stated purpose of use.  
They also briefly deal with the suitability of a firearm for shooting practice or training. 
According to the instructions, in some shooting sports, a large magazine capacity is 
required, whereas in others, such as precision shooting, a smaller magazine capacity – 
usually five rounds – is sufficient. 
On the basis of the Firearms Act and the Ministry of the Interior's instructions, in total, 
49,322 firearm acquisition permits were granted in the approximately 11 months that 
separated the Jokela and Kauhajoki school shootings. Most of these, some 40,000, were 
for shotguns, rifles, and small-bore rifles. There were 7,525 permits granted for 
handguns. Of these, 3,057 were for pistols, 2,920 small-bore pistols, 933 revolvers, and 
615 small-bore revolvers. The firearms used in the Jokela and Kauhajoki school 
shootings were small-bore pistols. In total, in early 2009 there were 591,714 shotguns, 
410,915 rifles, 251,531 small-bore rifles, and 29,724 combination weapons in Finland. 
Additionally, there were 109,013 pistols, 103,594 small-bore pistols, 25,355 revolvers, 
and 13,735 small-bore revolvers. All told, there were 1,574,731 firearms in the police 
firearms registry, excluding the firearms used by the authorities and the Defence Forces. 
Finland is among the top five countries in the world in terms of guns in proportion to 
population. 
In the time between the Jokela and Kauhajoki school shootings, 3,041 firearm 
possession permits, in total, were revoked. More than 2,300 of these were for shotguns, 
rifles, or small-bore rifles. Approximately 600 possession permits for handguns were 
revoked. Of these, 280 were for pistols, 201 for small-bore pistols, 80 for revolvers, and 
45 for small-bore revolvers. 
2.5.8. Rules, regulations, and instructions concerning computer games and the 
Internet 
Western democracies recognise the principle of freedom of speech, which extends to 
individual citizens, civic groups, the mass media, and the Internet. Governments aim to 
eliminate harmful and damaging content through legislative means, regulation of the 
media, and self-regulation. In comparison, for example, to our western neighbour 
Sweden, there is little of the comprehensive and wide-ranging media policy in Finland 
that is so much in evidence there. Owing to its nature and global scope, controlling the 
Internet has proved difficult and in some respects even impossible both in Finland and 
elsewhere.  
The penal provisions on, for example, child pornography, racism, and defamation are 
also applied to Web activities. The authorities have extensive rights of access to 
electronic communications identification data, and the so-called Lex Nokia, enacted in 
2009, provides employers too with this right of access to some extent. The Coercive 
Measures Act and the Police Act grant the authorities the powers to track down the 
perpetrator of a criminal act committed on the Web as long as the provisions of the law 
are fulfilled. 
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Legislation 
The content in publishing and programme activities is regulated by the Act on the 
Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, which became effective in 2004 and 
repealed the Act on the Freedom of the Press and the Broadcasting Liability Act. It is 
based on the concept of medium neutrality, which means that the liabilities and 
responsibilities of the person or body maintaining the medium are the same regardless 
of medium. With regard to the Internet, the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of 
Expression in Mass Media mainly applies to network publications, which refers to a set 
of network messages, arranged into a coherent whole comparable to a periodical, from 
material produced or processed by the publisher.  
The use and operation of electronic communications networks is provided for in such 
laws as the Communications Market Act and the Act on the Protection of Privacy in 
Electronic Communications. The Communications Market Act addresses matters such 
as the liabilities and duties of telecommunications enterprises in offering electronic 
communications network services. The Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic 
Communications deals with the confidentiality of electronic communications, the 
handling of electronic communications identification data, and electronic 
communications’ information security. 
The electronic communications operator’s and administrator’s responsibility for the 
information provided via their services is provided for in the Act on the Provision of 
Information Society Services. According to said act, the service provider is not liable 
for the content of the information transmitted if he or she does not initiate the 
information, does not select the receiver of the transmission, and does not select or 
modify the information contained in the transmission.  
A court may order a service provider to disable access to information stored by him or 
her if the information is clearly such that its continued availability to the public or its 
transmission is prescribed as punishable or a basis for civil liability. If a court has 
ordered the service provider to disable access to the information stored by him or her or 
if the service provider is notified of a copyright or related rights infringement, the 
service provider shall, to avoid liability for the content of the information provided by 
him or her, act immediately and without delay.  
Thus, it is an established principle of the current legislation that the service provider or 
operator is not liable for the content of the information. Neither is the operator 
responsible for the content or required to supervise it. The operator is under obligation 
to remove content only if it is made known to him or her that the content is illegal. The 
potential illegitimacy of the content is always determined by a court of law at the 
request of the police. In a case such as this, it is possible for the court to pass judgement 
in less than 24 hours. The police will inform the relevant telecommunications 
enterprises of any material to be deleted.  
Child pornography and racist content are an exception. If the content includes 
pornographic images depicting a child, violence, bestiality, or incitement to racial 
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hatred, the service provider shall, by law, immediately disable access to any such 
information on his or her server. 
Self-regulation 
Established in 1968, the self-regulatory body for mass media content and so-called good 
journalistic practice is the Council for Mass Media in Finland. The members are 
journalists and representatives of publishers and the general public, and the council’s 
task is to provide interpretation of good journalistic practice and to defend the freedom 
of speech and publication, mainly through actions submitted by the general public. The 
Council for Mass Media in Finland published ‘Guidelines for Journalists’, drawn up by 
the Union of Journalists in Finland. The guidelines were last revised in 2005, and the 
decisions of the Council for Mass Media in Finland are based on these. They cover all 
aspects of journalistic work in newspapers, on the radio, on television, and on the 
Internet.  
Internet content that is deemed harmful is overseen also by the Ethical Committee for 
Premium Rate Services, the Ethics Working Group of the Finnish Information 
Processing Association, the Council of Ethics in Advertising, the Consumer Agency, 
and the Consumer Ombudsman. Finnish operators jointly released a so-called 
Netiquette document, which provides parents with tips on how to supervise their 
children’s use of the Internet, warns children themselves of the dangers associated with 
the Internet, and guides them toward responsible use of the Internet.  
In recent years, the Internet has played an increasingly important role in communication 
studies in comprehensive schools and upper secondary schools. Instead of focusing on 
techniques of Web behaviour, the trend is more and more toward responsible use and 
production of content. 
Online discussion sites 
There are numerous discussion boards available on the Internet, and this type of 
interaction has quickly become extremely popular. The publisher of a network 
publication may, in addition to the published material, operate discussion boards or host 
other material for which the publisher acts as a transmitter. The discussions on the 
discussion boards cover a wide spectrum of topics, ranging from social issues to 
personal matters. 
There are a great many discussion boards, of various types, both in Finland and abroad, 
and the operators’ rules governing moderation vary greatly. On some sites, the 
participants use their real names, but usually people are not required to reveal their true 
identity. Some services require registration, but in practice it is impossible to control the 
authenticity of the registration data. Many discussion boards do, however, have their 
own set of rules concerning, for example, use of a false identity, threatening behaviour, 
harassment, and inappropriate language. However, a participant can simply start using a 
discussion board that has fewer restrictions. There are no general or universally applied 
principles for discussion board supervision or verification of identity, and the staggering 
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number of messages alone makes it extremely challenging in technical terms to 
supervise discussion boards or forums. 
In recent years, traditional discussion boards have been replaced by various virtual 
communities, such as IRC Gallery, Habbo Hotel, Facebook, and MySpace, for example, 
whose popularity has increased dramatically. In practice, these are global and virtual 
meeting places where it is possible to engage in conversation, play games, or share 
images or any other content. The rules of these communities vary. People do not always 
reveal their real identity in the virtual world, with the exception of small communities 
with a limited number of users. Assuming virtual identities, the authorities, such as 
youth leaders, psychologists, and the police, have also gradually started to participate in 
virtual communities, where they follow the same rules as everybody else. 
The right to express one’s opinion anonymously is an essential part of the freedom of 
speech. For this reason, the means to supervise Internet discussions comprehensively 
are limited. The Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications 
provides for protection of some communication systems, such as telephone, e-mail, and 
voice mail communication, which makes them better protected than the messages on 
discussion forums. According to the Finnish Constitution, everyone’s private life, 
personal honour, and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed, and the secrecy of 
correspondence, telephony, and other confidential communications is inviolable. 
Games 
According to the law, computer, console, and video games are defined as interactive 
audiovisual programmes and as such are exempt from mandatory inspection. However, 
all games distributed in digital format must be submitted to the Finnish Board of Film 
Classification to be classified in accordance with the scheme of recommended age limits 
or a binding age limit. The recommended age limits involve ages 3–16 years, and the 
binding age limit in question is 18. Most games are classified according to the 
Pan-European Game Information age rating system. Such games are automatically 
approved and registered by the Finnish Board of Film Classification. If a game has not 
been classified according to said system, a Finnish age limit label is required. In other 
words, every game must be classified on the basis of its harmful effects. The lower age 
limits are usually recommendations, but the age limit of 18 is always binding. In 
practice, the observance of the age limits is up to the parents or guardians of a minor. 
The Finnish Board of Film Classification has the right to demand the inspection of a 
game if it is likely to contain material harmful to a child’s development. Should they 
deem it necessary, the importer or producer of a game may also have it inspected. If the 
Finnish Board of Film Classification inspects a game, the age limit becomes binding, 
and distribution to a person who has not reached the required age is illegal. Only 
so-called utility programmes – such as educational programmes – and online and 
Internet-downloadable games are exempted from this requirement. 
Computer games can be played on individual computers or game consoles, but 
nowadays more and more players engage in playing against each other and/or in teams 
with other players online. Some of the games are ‘edutainment’ games, offering an 
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educational element, whereas others are purely for entertainment. The same rules that 
apply to all Internet content apply to these games. 
In addition to entertainment games, money games, where winning is based on chance, 
have become increasingly popular in recent years. Participation in these games is not 
without cost. Operating, marketing, or otherwise promoting gaming activities in Finland 
without a licence is forbidden by the Lotteries Act. In practice, such games can be 
played via foreign Internet services. 
2.5.9. Provisions concerning psychosocial support  
Psychosocial support refers to activities that aim to prevent, limit, and alleviate negative 
psychological consequences of a major accident or other traumatic incident. 
Psychosocial support is provided for in the Rescue Decree. According to the decree, the 
authorities and institutions responsible for various administrative sectors in 
municipalities and joint municipal authorities shall, in co-operation with other experts, 
provide psychosocial support and services for those who have been involved in an 
accident. 
The terms of psychosocial support are not fully established yet, as, in addition to the 
psychological support offered by the Church and other operators, also social work and 
social services can be considered to belong in this category. Furthermore, the concept of 
victim remains undefined to some extent. The term ‘victim’ traditionally refers to those 
who die or are injured in an accident or a corresponding incident, but also those who are 
involved in the situation but do not sustain physical injuries can be considered victims. 
Additionally, there are often many indirect victims.  
A document published in 1998 addresses psychosocial support and psychosocial 
services in relation to traumatic incidents. The same issues are discussed in a 
memorandum submitted by an expert working group in 2006, which focuses on major 
accidents.  
According to a working group memorandum published in 1998, relief work can be 
divided into four stages: 1) preparation, 2) rescue and recovery, 3) reparation, and 4) 
reconstruction. Psychosocial support and services vary with the situation and stage. In 
the preparation stage, a plan of action is drawn up and personnel are trained. The rescue 
and recovery stage includes the provision of immediate psychological first aid. The 
reparation stage consists of the provision of information and counselling, crisis 
interventions, and support for the victims and their families. Finally, the reconstruction 
stage involves follow-up and, if necessary, long-term psychosocial support. The 
memorandum states that every citizen who has been involved in an acutely traumatic 
incident has the right to receive psychosocial support and services. This also applies to 
Finnish citizens who are involved in accidents abroad. These services are free of charge.  
The expert working group submission in 2006 offered detailed recommendations, one 
of which was that the status of crisis teams be guaranteed and established through 
legislative action. The working group stated that the appointment of crisis team 
members should be made through official channels, the teams should be provided with 
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the necessary resources, and contact details should be kept up to date. According to the 
memorandum, the tasks of local crisis teams include:  
- The assessment of the need for crisis relief and the availability of resources in 
a major accident 
- The provision of immediate psychological first aid 
- Crisis interventions that support coping with the situation, aimed at families, 
extended families, and schools and other communities 
- The identification of those in need of further support and referring them to 
appropriate services  
- Informing the health centres and crisis teams in the victims’ places of 
residence of the need for crisis relief 
- Ensuring that the alert system is functional. Constant training and 
communication between the crisis teams and those in the first line of crisis 
relief is necessary to bring this about  
The memorandum provides a detailed description of the various aspects of psychosocial 
support both during the incident and after it. The description is based on a theory, on the 
stages of psychological adaptation, according to which an individual goes through 
several stages of recovery after a traumatic crisis.  
Psychological first aid (for the shock stage) during weeks 0–1 consists of active 
listening, including being there and being available, restoring the feeling of control over 
one’s life, practical help, and provision of comfort. The victim should not be left alone. 
Particular attention should be paid to children, adolescents, those suffering from mental 
health problems, and other special groups. Every effort should be made also to identify 
those in need of more extensive assistance or actual psychological treatment.  
Early intervention (in the reaction stage) during weeks 2–4 will help the victims to face 
what has happened as well as the emotions and reactions arising from this. Guidance 
and counselling should also be provided during this stage to facilitate coping with the 
crisis. Early interventions are community, group, or individual interventions, and they 
are aimed at families, including extended families, as well as school, work, or other 
communities. According to the working group, the crisis workers should actively offer 
their help, and those who do not wish to receive it can always turn it down.  
The third stage is crisis and trauma treatment (the processing stage). If an individual 
who experienced a traumatic event still shows symptoms three months after the event, 
there is a real risk of the condition becoming chronic. According to the recommendation 
of the working group, these individuals should always be provided with the necessary 
and appropriate after-care treatment. The responsibility for the provision of continued 
treatment lies with the official health care system. According to the working group, 
professionally led peer support is an excellent form of support in this stage, and it has 
yielded good results, provided that the participants share the same traumatic event and 
the groups are homogeneous. Professional supervision is, however, a necessary 
condition for successful peer support. Currently, no national authority is responsible for 
the provision of this form of support, but, according to the recommendation of the 
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working group, it could be part of the Social Insurance Institution of Finland’s 
discretionary rehabilitation.  
The working group drew attention especially to psychosocial support provided for 
children and adolescents. Children and adolescents are particularly vulnerable to 
traumatic experiences, and, in comparison to adults, the risk of disturbed development is 
far greater with them. The working group proposed that a special section on 
psychosocial services for children and adolescents be included in local and regional 
emergency plans. The emergency plans of schools, day-care centres, and similar 
institutions should include unit-specific crisis plans. The general principles of 
psychosocial support for children and adolescents are similar to those employed with 
adults, but the special needs of children and adolescents must be met in provision of this 
support.  
In December 2009, the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health published its new 
guidelines for psychosocial services. Additionally, the Finnish medical society 
Duodecim published a guide in 2009 for psychological first aid, entitled Hädän hetkellä 
(‘In the Hour of Need’), which provides information on how to encounter and help 
people who have experienced a traumatic event.  
Provisions concerning the activities of the Church 
In December 2005, the General Synod approved the document General Instructions for 
Emergency Planning for the Church and Instructions on Drawing up a Parish 
Emergency Plan. 
The instructions were distributed to church councils, parish councils, and the joint 
church councils of parish unions. According to the instructions, the parishes are under 
obligation to carry out their basic duties in all circumstances. To be able to do this, each 
parish must have a valid emergency plan in place. The plan specifies the emergency 
arrangements for the parish in case of social disturbance or exceptional circumstances. 
The instructions emphasise the importance of co-operation in drawing up the emergency 
plan and in planning the emergency arrangements. Each deanery must have a team, 
appointed by the provincial dean, to co-ordinate emergency planning. Diocese cathedral 
chapters, in turn, co-ordinate and supervise the emergency planning carried out by the 
parishes in their region. A copy of the parish emergency plan is sent to the cathedral 
chapter, where it is inspected, and, if necessary, the parish is requested to provide 
additional information. 
In 2005, the General Synod published the guide Henkisen huollon toimintaohje 
seurakunnille (‘Instructions for Parishes on the Provision of Psychological Support’). At 
the end of these instructions, which focus on emergency planning in parishes, there are 
nine proposals for action concerning the organisation of psychological support. 
Additionally, in 2004, the General Synod issued instructions on how to encounter grief 
in a booklet called ‘Onnettomuuden tapahduttua – suruhartauden toteuttaminen’ (‘After 
an Accident – Organising a Memorial Service’).  
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2.5.10. The Policy programme for the well-being of children, youth and families 
In addition to two other policy programmes, the government launched in 2007 the Policy 
programme for the well-being of children, youth and families. The programme is based on 
the Development Programme for Child and Youth Policy 2007–2011, approved by the 
government in 2007. Both policy programmes focus on preventive work among young 
people. The aim is to enhance co-operation and co-ordination among various 
administrative sectors in matters concerning the well-being of children, youth, and 
families. The more recent policy programme is divided into three key areas: a child-
oriented society, the well-being of families with children, and the prevention of 
marginalisation. Additionally, the knowledge base on the well-being of children and youth 
will be developed further, and assessment of the effects on children of decision-making 
will be promoted in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
The aim is to allow children and young people to make their voices heard and to promote 
opportunities for their participation in decision-making. Enquiries made in early 2009 
revealed that the degree to which children and young people are allowed to make their 
voices heard varies a great deal in Finnish municipalities. In only around 30% of the 
municipalities was the situation considered excellent. The Youth Barometer also shows 
that the development has not been favourable in all respects in terms of the inclusion of 
youth in decision-making and the promotion of communality.  
The policy programme aims to make more low-threshold services available and to increase 
openness in all activities, which should lead to better life control and the prevention of 
marginalisation spanning generations. The aim is to create a service system that supports 
communal bonding for children and youth, and thus build a seamless network that 
promotes their well-being.  
In the policy programme, the reduction of violence aimed at children and youth is visible 
through an extensive network with an emphasis on preventive work, including such 
operators as youth workers, schools, family centres, and families. In 2009, the interim 
report on the implementation of the government programme stated that, so far, little 
information is available on violence aimed at children. A study on child victims conducted 
in 2008 did, however, add to the knowledge base to some extent. The last such study had 
been carried out in 1988.  
The programme aims to increase the opportunities available to children and youth for 
leisure activities, and to enhance their inclusion in sports, art, and culture, all of which are 
important aspects of general well-being. The means employed to meet these objectives 
include support for schoolchildren’s morning and afternoon activities, club activities, basic 
art education, hobbies, and civic activities.  
Additionally, the policy programme aims to enhance media literacy among youth and 
Web-based support for their well-being and inclusion. In recent years, the Ministry of 
Education has provided support for the development of youth work carried out through the 
Web. According to the 2009 interim report on the implementation of the government 
programme, municipal information and counselling services are available for young people 
in 240 Finnish municipalities, and some 75% of Finnish youth have access to these 
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services. In accordance with the national core curriculum, one of the key objectives in 
basic education has recently been the development of media literacy skills. 
2.5.11. Internal security programmes 
A safer community – the Internal Security Programme 2004 
The first Finnish internal security programme was completed in summer 2004. The aim of 
the programme was to create, for the first time, a cross-administrative, multi-year 
development plan for the enhancement of internal security. The government ratified the 
programme with its decision-in-principle of 23 September 2004, and the programme thus 
received the support of the higher political echelons. The programme was prepared by 
seven drafting committees, each focusing on a different area. The preparation work was 
supervised by a steering group, consisting mainly of key personnel from various ministries. 
The ministerial group for the programme consisted of the Minister of the Interior as chair 
and three other ministers as ordinary members. 
The programme assessed the current state of internal security in Finland, defined the key 
objectives, and presented 79 proposals for action. According to the general objective of the 
programme, Finland was to be the safest country in Europe by 2015. This would be 
guaranteed by a well-functioning public sector with its focus on preventive work. 
High-quality internal security services that meet people’s security expectations would be 
ensured by co-operation between public authorities and contacts with interest groups and 
the private sector. Marginalisation was seen as the key challenge. Other challenges were 
described as posed by everyday security, accidents, the growing impact of ‘hard crime’ led 
from abroad, the vulnerability of the information society, and issues of prevention of 
terrorism. Toward the end of the programme, a number of other threats to security were 
listed whose development into serious threats was considered possible. One of these 
threats was the increased use of firearms in criminal activity.  
Measures that have a bearing on school shootings are discussed mainly in the section 
concerning work to prevent crime and public disturbances. The key measure was to 
provide young people in danger of becoming marginalised with special forms of youth and 
social work that enhance young people’s integration into society. Other measures included 
the development of early intervention, local security plans, pupil and student welfare, and 
24-hour social services. What was considered particularly important was ensuring the 
healthy and safe development of children through prevention of the marginalisation of 
families. In terms of the social security of children and youth, schools, the Youth Services, 
and operators organising sport and other leisure activities were considered to play key 
roles. Marginalisation and exclusion from society were considered mainly a result of 
unemployment, poverty, inequality, the insufficient integration of immigrants into Finnish 
society, illness, and substance misuse. 
The programme has been implemented through cross-administration co-operation, and its 
implementation and results have been monitored according to the methods and timetables 
specified in the programme. According to a follow-up report completed in May 2007, 
some progress had been made toward the objectives concerning the prevention of 
marginalisation, and security was increasingly seen as a factor that has a bearing on 
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people’s well-being. There was still a lot of work to be done to reach the objectives, 
however. The objectives set for the amount of violent crime had not been reached yet 
either. One of the aims of the policy programme was to increase co-operation, where some 
progress was found to have been made, in spite of the fact that no additional resources had 
been made available. 
Safety first – the Internal Security Programme 2008 
The drafting of the second internal security programme was initiated in August 2007, and 
the government issued a decision-in-principle on it on 8 May 2008. The proposal for the 
programme was drawn up through extensive co-operation under the auspices of the 
Ministry of the Interior. The management team for the drafting process consisted of six 
ministers and the permanent secretaries of five ministries. The drafting process was 
supervised by an extensive steering group, led by the Ministry of the Interior’s permanent 
secretary. The management team and steering group also had a secretariat at their disposal. 
The drafting work was carried out in seven expert groups, each of which also submitted a 
separate final report. 
The objective for the second internal security programme was still for Finland to be the 
safest country in Europe by 2015. Social exclusion was still considered to be the biggest 
threat to internal security. Other challenges included the number of accidents, relations 
between population groups, violence, major accidents, the vulnerability of society, 
cross-border crime, cybercrime, and terrorism and violent radicalisation. According to the 
programme, one of the threats related to violence was that the level of violence would 
grow because of increased apathy toward violence, greater social inequality, growing 
violence in close relationships, the binge-drinking culture, and technological advances. 
Of the possible effects of technology, the programme mentions online harassment, 
bullying, and sexual abuse. Additionally, technological development may lead to a 
weakening of social contacts, which, in turn, could lead to loss of a sense of community. 
Ratified six months after the Jokela school shootings, the programme covered no threats 
or challenges that could be identifiably connected with school shootings. 
The programme outlined, in total, 74 measures for the maintenance and improvement of 
internal security. The common objectives and measures focused on:  
− The prevention of social exclusion and the harmful effects of alcohol 
− Training and competence improvement 
− The development of internal security research 
− The improvement of situational awareness 
− The improvement of local security planning 
− The improvement of security and safety through environmental design 
Particular objectives focused on:  
− Improving safety in the home, during leisure time, and in moving about 
− Improving the security of immigrants and ethnic minorities 
− Reducing violence 
− Boosting competitiveness by increasing business security   
− Preventing major accidents and environmental disasters 
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− Ensuring border security, the prevention of illegal immigration, and customs 
security 
− Preventing human trafficking and related crime 
− Fighting organised crime 
− Addressing cybercrime and prevention of risks associated with Internet use 
− Combating terrorism and preventing illegal extremist activities and violent 
radicalisation 
The prevention of social exclusion was mentioned in the section that dealt with 
prevention of the harmful effects of alcohol. This section listed seven measures, one of 
which was the enhancement of early intervention. The aim in early intervention is to 
prevent the marginalisation of children and youth and their being recruited into criminal 
activities. The programme also recommends the provision of support for sparsely 
populated areas, the development of workshop activities for young people, and the 
creation of potential for NGO activities for prevention of the marginalisation of youth. 
It was decided to include information on violence and how to intervene in it in school 
curricula at all levels of education. To enhance preparedness for accidents and other 
situations, a joint national programme for security exercises was to be drawn up. To 
enhance situational awareness of the operating environment, it was decided to develop 
cross-administrative-boundary situational awareness further. The data thus produced 
can be utilised in local security planning, for example. Five measures were presented for 
the development of local security planning. 
The measures recommended in the programme for the reduction of violence focus on 
increased security awareness education, providing the victims with the necessary 
assistance, establishment of the cause of all deaths of children under two years of age, 
addressing sexual violence, and dealing with violence in close relationships and 
families. The measures mentioned in conjunction with information networks were to 
ensure the up-to-dateness of legislation and the means of investigation, enhance police 
resources, increase reporting activity, and ensure the necessary resources for the 
prevention of cybercrime. Terrorism-related measures included thorough examination, 
by the authorities and through research, of the factors contributing to violent 
radicalisation, along with creation of the structures necessary to combat it.  
2.5.12. The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society 
On 23 November 2006, the government made a decision-in-principle on keeping the 
functions vital to society secure in all circumstances. The vital functions discussed in 
the strategy include, among others, the maintenance of internal security and, at the same 
time, the population's capability to function and psychological crisis tolerance. The 
decision-in-principle outlines the responsibilities and duties of the various ministries’ 
administrative arms both in disturbances and special situations amid normal conditions 
and in exceptional circumstances. 
The strategy also outlines the principles governing state crisis management. As the 
vulnerability of society increases, it is essential that initial situation management and the 
co-ordination of various administrative sectors’ operations in unexpected and rapidly 
developing special situations be implemented without undue delay. A necessary condition 
for successful situation management is the existence of a crisis management model that is 
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familiar to all relevant operators and has also been the subject of sufficient drills. The 
principle of legality and the statutory division of duties among various administrative 
sectors are to be observed in crisis management. The division of responsibility and 
procedures for operations in normal conditions are to be retained for as long as possible. 
The level of integration and management is determined by the seriousness and 
extensiveness of the circumstances. Situations are to be managed according to an 
anticipatory approach, and sufficient resources are to be employed immediately. A 
flowchart of state crisis management is shown in Picture 9. 
 
Picture 9. A flowchart of state crisis management. 
A competent authority initiates measures in accordance with instructions and informs the 
preparedness organisation of the relevant administrative sector. The competent ministry 
then takes charge of the process and, if necessary, co-ordinates the co-operation of various 
ministries. The Prime Minister’s Office ensures that a competent ministry has been 
appointed. Additionally, the Prime Minister’s Office provides support related to situation 
picture, status, and communications matters. 
The permanent co-operation bodies include the meetings of ministries’ heads of 
preparedness, which are chaired by the government’s security manager, and meetings of 
permanent secretaries, which are chaired by the secretary of state, appointed for the 
duration of the prime minister’s term of office. The measures taken by various 
administrative sectors and, if necessary, business enterprises and NGOs are integrated and 
co-ordinated in the meetings of permanent secretaries. In operational activities, the meeting 
of heads of preparedness provides support for the permanent secretaries. 
The state crisis management model has been tested both in drills and in real-life situations. 
In conjunction with the Kauhajoki school shootings, the situation was addressed at the top 
level of the crisis management model in its early stages when the prime minister, the 
chairmen of government parties, and the relevant key ministers convened to discuss the 
situation. The process was then continued at the level of work by heads of preparedness. 
Government plenary session or government negotiation session 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
Meeting of the permanent secretaries 
Meeting of the heads of preparedness activities 
Competent authority 
Initiates measures and reports
Supports
Supports
Prepares
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2.5.13. Provisions concerning communications in public administration 
There are numerous provisions concerning or touching on communications in public 
administration, such as the Act on the Openness of Government Activities, the 
Constitution of Finland, the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass 
Media, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Copyright Act, the Personal Data Act, the 
Emergency Powers Act, and the Defence Act. Especially in the 2000s, visions and 
practices concerning communications have been outlined in the following documents: 
‘Recommendation for Public Information in State Administration’, 2001; the 
Communications Plan of the Prime Minister’s Office, 2004; ‘State Administration 
Communications in Crisis Situations and Exceptional Circumstances’, 2007; the section on 
communications in ‘The Implementation of State Crisis Management Model in Regional 
and Local Administration’, 2008; and the practical instructions based on these 
publications. The Monitoring and Assessment Group for Communications in State 
Administration has conducted strategic analyses of communication in various ministries by 
interviewing political and administrative leaders and by analysing strategic 
communications operators. Common themes that have emerged in these analyses include 
the clarity of communications and guaranteeing the receipt of messages. 
With regard to municipal level, the Communications Guide for Municipalities was 
published in 2004. The Localfinland.fi Web site provides instructions and visions 
concerning municipal communications. Approximately half of Finnish municipalities have 
drawn up such a plan. Municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants have been more 
active in drawing up a communications plan than have the smallest municipalities. 
The basic idea behind all vision reports is quite similar. They all see the objectives and 
principles for operation of communications as being based on basic human rights, such as 
freedom of speech, the right to education, rights of participation and inclusion in 
decision-making, legal protection, and the right to a language and culture. The function of 
communications in public administration is to inform the population of official activities.  
Communication plays an increasingly important role in society, which is likely to increase 
the expectations of the population in terms of information. Each authority has an obligation 
to handle communications appropriately within its administrative sector. Communication 
is an essential element in the handling of various matters. Accordingly, communications 
form part of the duties of every civil servant, not just PR officers. Communications must 
be reliable, quick, regular, and systematic. The role of the media is important, but those in 
public administration also need to communicate directly with the population. Public 
information should be based on the needs of the recipients. The underlying principles are 
the openness of government activities and the interactive role of communications. The 
Internet provides a more natural and interactive medium for this than before. 
The importance of the key principles of communications in public administration is 
highlighted in crisis situations and disturbances. The administration needs to be able to 
respond quickly and as openly as possible to the increased need for information on the part 
of the media and the population. Society is more vulnerable than before; therefore, it is 
imperative to be able to operate also in special situations that arise suddenly and 
unexpectedly. Whether a situation is led on local level or co-ordinated on regional, 
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ministerial, or governmental level is dependent on the seriousness and extensiveness of the 
circumstances. The main responsibility for local communications lies with municipalities, 
local authorities, and joint municipal authorities (such as hospital districts and regional 
rescue departments). 
It is vital, particularly in crisis situations, that the population be informed quickly and 
reliably. To minimise damage, it is important to give instructions that are clear and 
appropriate for the situation at hand. As the need for information increases and the general 
communications atmosphere changes, authorities must be able to co-operate with other 
authorities in their sector of administration and other key operators. A written 
communications plan, which clearly outlines the forms of co-operation and the authorities 
responsible for communications, must be drawn up for special situations. 
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3. OTHER STUDIES 
3.1. Violence in Finnish society 
Finland has one of the highest homicide rates in the European Union. According to a 
study investigating homicide in Finland, published by the National Research Institute of 
Legal Policy in 2008, twice as many homicides per capita are committed in Finland than 
the average in other EU member states. The data in the publication are based on data 
gathered by the National Research Institute of Legal Policy, the Police College of 
Finland, and the Ministry of the Interior's Police Department for the Finnish Homicide 
Monitoring System (FHMS) between 2002 and 2007. The data include only homicides 
actually committed, not attempted homicides or other acts of violence. On average, 
some 120–130 homicides are committed in Finland every year. There has been a slight 
decrease in the number of homicides over the last decade. In comparison to global 
statistics, the number of homicides is Finland is quite low, however. 
Finnish society as a whole cannot be considered more violent than any other Western 
European society. The high homicide rates in Finland, on which the perception of 
Finland as a violent society is based, are mainly explained by the violent behaviour of 
one social group. Working-age men commit most of the aggravated homicides in 
Finland. In 90% of the homicides, the perpetrator is male, and the clear majority (70%) 
are committed in private homes. Most homicides are committed on weekends. Most of 
the perpetrators have become marginalised in terms of working life – only one in five 
takes part in working life. The number of homicides committed by people in working 
life is at the same level as in other Nordic countries. In terms of acts committed by other 
socio-economic groups belonging to the active population, Finland differs little from 
other Nordic countries, where the social structure and population are similar to Finland. 
There are great regional differences in homicide rates in Finland. 
There is no single, easily identifiable explanation for the exceptional distribution of 
perpetrators in Finland. The current situation is the result of several factors. Homicide 
rates were at their lowest in Finland in the 1960s. The current trend of high homicide 
rates started in 1969. The age distribution of those who commit most of the homicides 
has also changed over the last 50 years, with most homicides nowadays being 
committed by middle-aged perpetrators instead of those in their 20s or younger. 
It is typical of Finnish violence that, in most cases, the perpetrator and the victim knew 
each other, at least on some level, before the act. In approximately 85% of the cases, the 
victim is the perpetrator’s spouse, other relative, or acquaintance. The perpetrator and 
the victim are often around the same age, except in cases of homicides committed by 
relatives. In more than 45% of the homicides, there had been some form of violence or 
threatening behaviour between the perpetrator and the victim, and in 70% there had 
been some sort of anticipatory symptoms. Most cases, 81%, involve a single perpetrator 
and a single victim. Multiple victims are involved in less than five per cent of 
homicides. 
Most of the homicides occur in the context of drinking-related quarrels (26%), 
relationship problems (16%), jealousy (14%), or a mental disturbance (13%). An 
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estimated 23% of the homicides in the database were pre-meditated. Compared to those 
of other EU countries, suicide rates are also high in Finland. Even though suicide 
committed by young people has been on the decrease in recent years, the rates are still 
higher in Finland than in other EU countries. What makes Finland unique is that, unlike 
in other countries, suicides are not publicly condemned. 
In seven per cent of the homicide cases in the database that had been solved, the 
perpetrator had killed him- or herself after, including immediately after, committing the 
deed. As in other Nordic countries, a slow change has been evident in the Finnish 
homicide structure. The number of homicides committed by relatives and family 
members has decreased slightly, while the number committed by acquaintances has 
increased.  
Alcohol plays a major part in Finnish violence. In almost 80% of homicides, the 
perpetrator was under the influence of alcohol. In most cases, the perpetrator was in an 
advanced state of intoxication. Several victims were also under the influence of alcohol. 
The increased use of alcohol has had a slight effect on alcohol-related violence, such as 
restaurant violence. Almost 70% of the perpetrators had a history of violent behaviour, 
which in many cases had been alcohol-related. 
With regard to milder forms of violence, it seems that the victims are most often young 
people. A comparison between cities of similar population reveals that Finland is no 
more violent than any other EU country. On the whole, there is more violence in cities 
than in rural areas, but violence in rural areas is more often alcohol-related than in the 
cities. The authorities, however, learn of violent incidents committed in rural areas a 
greater proportion of the time than of those committed in cities. 
Most homicides (approx. 40%) in Finland are committed with an edged weapon or by 
assaulting the victim without use of a weapon (approx. 25%). A quarter of homicides by 
males are committed without a weapon. Although the number of firearms in proportion 
to the population of Finland is high, the number of violent acts committed with a 
firearm is no higher in Finland than in other countries in Western Europe. In recent 
years, 16% of all homicides in Finland were committed with a firearm. Seven per cent 
of all homicides were committed via a firearm. About 41% of the handguns used in 
criminal activity had a valid permit. In 58% of all homicides committed with a firearm 
in recent years, the perpetrator did not have a valid permit for the firearm. In two thirds 
of the homicides carried out with a firearm, the victim was killed with a single shot. 
In the past few decades, regional differences in the number of homicides committed in 
Finland have become bigger. In the provinces of Eastern Finland and Northern Finland, 
the number of homicides in proportion to population is not only higher than in the rest 
of the country; recently, it has taken a slight upward turn as well. 
The Second World War did not have an identifiable effect on the development of the 
structure of violence in Finnish society. The violence statistics clearly show that the 
generations that lived through the Finnish wars of 1939–45 were not exceptionally 
violent. In theory, the male generation that fought in the wars should, statistically, have 
been at its most violent in the decades following the wars. However, the 1950s and 
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1960s were the most violence-free decades of the entire 20th century in Finland in terms 
of homicides and also milder forms of violence in proportion to population.  
In the past few decades, new forms of violence have emerged also in Finland. The new 
forms of communication created by the information society have led to new threats of 
violence. The general tendency to extend and subdivide the concept of violence makes 
comparisons with older statistics more difficult. With regard to the entire population, 
the amount of actual physical violence has not increased; what has changed, however, is 
the kinds of situations perceived as threatening and how often they are reported. The 
increasing coverage of crime news in the media and the fact that it tends to focus on 
violent crime may have had an effect in the increasing number of people who are 
frightened of violence. One form of violence that can be singled out is violence aimed at 
women at work, which is clearly on the increase, particularly in the nursing sector. 
Generally speaking, it would appear that Finland is no more violent than other countries 
in Western Europe. The crime rates for more serious forms of violence are higher, 
however. 
3.2. Homicides committed by young people in Finland 
The number of homicides committed by persons who have not reached the age of 21 is 
quite small in Finland – usually less than 10 per year. Most of these are committed by 
19–20-year-olds. Milder forms of violent crime are usually more common among young 
people. Homicides are most often committed by middle-aged males, but, in proportion 
to age group size, the most homicides were committed by 21–24-year-old males. The 
differences in homicide rates between the various age groups among 21–44-year-old 
males have been very small in the past few decades. Depending on the year, there has 
been considerable variation in terms of the age group that has committed the most 
homicides. 
In Finland, the amount of juvenile violence is partially linked to economic trends. There 
is an increase in the amount of juvenile violence during economic upswings, while there 
is a decrease during economic recessions. One quarter of the homicides committed by 
young people are linked to some other form of crime, such as property offences, 
burglaries, or robberies. About 12% of all the homicides in the database were linked to 
some other form of criminal activity. In proportion to population, the number of 
homicides committed by young people is no bigger in Finland than in other Nordic 
countries or in Western Europe. 
Most homicides committed by young people are alcohol-related. Some 80% of the 
juvenile perpetrators of homicide in recent years were under the influence of alcohol 
when committing the crime. The homicides typically committed by young people are 
different from the average in Finland in terms of their circumstances and manner of 
execution. In homicides committed by young people, the perpetrator often does not 
know the victim personally. Additionally, some kind of weapon or other instrument is 
used more often, and the crimes are more brutal than are homicides committed in other 
age groups. On the whole, homicides committed by young people are more surprising 
and the victims selected more randomly than in older age groups. 
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Most juvenile perpetrators of homicide often share a history of early substance misuse, 
an underprivileged childhood, violent behaviour, and mental health disorders. In most 
cases, at least one parent is a problem drinker. Even though there is no evidence of 
violent behaviour being hereditary, one in 10 juvenile perpetrators of homicide have a 
relative who has been convicted of homicide. A significant proportion of them also have 
relatives who were victims of homicide. 
Criminal offences committed by young people – including violent crime – are 
committed as groups more often than in other age groups. Furthermore, the sites of 
homicides committed by young people are more public than for older age groups, which 
means that the acts are more public and the number of people involved in them, either 
directly or indirectly, is large. Therefore, this type of crime affects the surrounding 
community in different ways than do homicides committed in private homes. 
3.3. Violence in the life of Finnish youth 
An analysis of the Jokela school shootings, published by the Finnish Youth Research 
Society, emphasises the importance of multidimensional concepts of violence in 
research into school shootings. The WHO (World Health Organization) defines violence 
as existing in three dimensions: self-directed violence, interpersonal violence, and 
collective violence. It is also essential to differentiate between the various forms of 
psychological and physical violence, which are often intertwined. Violence may be 
easily identifiable, such as physical violence between individuals or groups. Violence 
can also take other, less easily identifiable forms and be embedded in social structures 
or institutions. Examples of this kind of framework are the school as an institution and 
Web communities.  
According to a survey conducted by the Police College of Finland and the National 
Research Institute of Legal Policy, children and young people face violence more often 
than adults do. In most cases, the perpetrator and the victim are the same age. Youth 
research suggests that violence may enhance a young person’s membership in a group 
and the feeling of belongingness. In this form, it does not necessarily define the 
activities of the group; instead, it may be random. Violence can also be the determining 
factor in the way hierarchies are formed among young males. It is believed that friends 
who have a reputation for being violent, or even guns, make one safe. In some cases, 
violence is viewed as a way to rectify injustices suffered in everyday life, or to resolve 
situations involving violence in families, for example. This kind of action is often the 
last resort for young people who cannot find any other way to solve a problem.  
Violent crime is gender-specific, which is also borne out by reports on school shootings 
abroad. In analysis of the connections between gender and violence, it is justifiable to 
use the term ‘misguided masculinity’ to refer to the way boys become socialised into 
being tough and defending themselves with violence if necessary. Men and boys 
develop a tough shell, an armour, that on the one hand protects them but on the other 
isolates them from intimacy and caring by preventing them from expressing their 
feelings of uncertainty. Also girls and women sometimes adopt this ‘shell’. The 
gender-specific character of school and other violence should be taken into account in 
preventive work. 
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In terms of the gender-specific nature of violence, special attention should be paid to 
situations where males’ masculinity is challenged or disparaged. This can take the form 
of insults from friends, parents, or teachers, or any situation where a boy or man feels 
that he is incapable of meeting expectations related to his masculinity. Violence can be 
a way to prove one’s masculinity to oneself and to others, or to show that everything is 
under control. Thus, violence can be employed to enhance a male’s masculinity when 
his image as a male capable of making his own decisions has, for one reason or another, 
been called into question.  
According to data from various countries, the threshold for seeking help and support for 
violence-related problems is lower for women than for men. According to a study 
carried out in Finland in 2009, 85% of the customers in support services for victims of 
crime were female. By contrast, there is little information available in Finland on the 
consequences of violence faced by men. Male-on-male violence is not always even 
considered a crime; instead, it is often seen as part of growing up to be a man. This is 
why many men feel they do not need help or support in dealing with their experiences 
of violence. 
Violence should always be seen as part of the culture and social context surrounding it . 
This is connected to the observation that most school shootings occur in small localities. 
The explanation offered for this is that in a closely-knit community, it can be more 
difficult for an individual to be different or stand out than in an urban environment. This 
can make the challenges to a male’s masculinity even more demanding. The Finnish 
Youth Research Society publication on school shootings shows that an atmosphere 
demanding uniformity places certain limitations on the kinds of support youth who feel 
they are somehow different manage to get for their identity.  
According to Finnish youth who participated in a research project funded by the EU, 
school violence is clearly a problem but school conflicts often go unnoticed and are not 
necessarily dealt with in an appropriate way. A research report on the violence faced by 
children and youth, conducted by the Police College of Finland and the National 
Research Institute of Legal Policy, states that the sexes differ significantly in terms of 
the site where the violent act was committed. About 12% of the violence faced by girls 
occurred in schools, with the remaining 88% occurring elsewhere. The percentages for 
boys were 31% and 69%, respectively. This shows that boys face violence at school 
clearly more often than girls do. In a study conducted by the Mannerheim League for 
Children, schoolchildren were asked whether they had been subjected to violence at 
school in the past 12 months. About 24% of the boys and five per cent of the girls said 
they had. These studies also show the gender-specific nature of school violence: boys 
are targeted by violence more often than are girls.  
On the basis of interviews of 13–16-year-olds conducted in Eastern Finland, local youth 
violence can be seen to depart in many respects from the characteristic features of cases 
that have been in public discussion. School shootings or other extreme acts of violence 
do not feature prominently among the topics discussed by young people. Instead, the 
topics that emerged in the interviews included non-physical violence, gender roles, 
immigrants’ experiences, acts of violence that went unnoticed, the insufficient measures 
taken by schools to deal with violence, and the unclear limits of bodily integrity. 
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In Finland, civic organisations have to a large extent been responsible for addressing the 
social problem of violence that affects the lives of young people. On the national level, 
there are few models for operation, and little training available, in Finland for the 
treatment of perpetrators and victims of violence. Nowadays, people report violence 
more often than before, however, which has resulted in more cases being processed by 
the authorities, even if the amount of violence has not, according to victim research, 
increased in Finnish society. 
3.4. School shootings as a phenomenon 
3.4.1. Special characteristics of school shootings 
One of the facts that has emerged in discussion on school shootings, both in Finland and 
abroad, is that a multidisciplinary and multi-perspective approach is necessary for 
understanding the complex phenomenon of school shootings. Therefore, it is necessary 
to approach school shootings as a social and communal phenomenon and from a 
far-reaching perspective by considering all the different factors as a whole, instead of 
looking for individual explanations. Consideration of the backgrounds and motives is 
not aimed at finding justification for the act; instead, the purpose is to determine, in a 
preventive sense, the factors that increase or decrease risks. 
The factors that have an impact on school shootings can be divided into four 
dimensions, which are mutually complementary. 
1. The dimension of life cycle: the growth and development of a child and a young 
person and the individual and social factors involved in it; the strategic 
transitions in life 
2. The dimension of youth culture: peer relationships and belonging to a group vs. 
feelings of loneliness and disconnectedness; habits; social factors related to 
individuality and communality 
3. The dimension of culture: cultural-historical characteristics as well as those 
typical of modern culture, such as globalisation, individualisation, virtualisation, 
and commercialisation; violence as a culture-bound way of solving problems  
4. The dimension of society: structural factors and those related to living 
conditions, such as phenomena and factors associated with social inequality; 
political decision-making; the functionality of the system supporting the 
well-being of youth and families 
The perpetrator in both the Jokela and Kauhajoki school shootings was a young person. 
The perpetrators were part of the community, which has caused considerable concern as to 
the well-being of the entire age group. This also generated public discussion, not only on 
the relationships among youth but about those between adults and youth as well. There is 
indeed a lot of room for discussion on whether this phenomenon says something special 
about youth, the youth of today, and relationships between generations. In general terms, 
many problems attributed to young people are actually determined by what was considered 
right or wrong, good or bad, moral or immoral at any given point in time. These 
perceptions have driven the control and support measures aimed at young people that have 
been considered problematic in one way or another. 
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What makes studying the phenomenon in depth particularly challenging is the young 
age of the perpetrators. This is because youth is considered by some people to be a 
period of growth and maturing, while others see it as a time of instability and rebellion 
against authorities. Furthermore, there is always a special responsibility and anxiety in 
the background when one is dealing with young people. On one hand, youth are seen as 
a threat to public order and the continuity of society, but young people emerge at the 
same time as particularly vulnerable victims of social problems.  
School shootings are a multidisciplinary and extensive subject of research. Foreign 
research into school shootings has shown that the creation of profiles on the individual 
level is insufficient. Likewise, control or support measures that are carried out at the 
individual level were also considered insufficient.  
Several terms are used to refer to school shootings in international studies and reports. 
Rampage-type school shootings refer to attacks that are aimed at institutions and where 
victims are incidental. Another type is targeted school shootings, where the attack 
focuses on a selected target. The target may be a school, a person working at a school, a 
group of students, or an individual student. The concept of ceremonial violence has 
been used to refer to a school shooting that imitates a previous school shooting by 
following a similar pattern. Thus, a school shooting can be a kind of initiation ritual into 
the community that idolises school shootings.  
Study of school shootings highlights several questions, such as whether a single 
shooting occurring in a school is related to this phenomenon or whether there have to be 
multiple victims for a shooting to constitute a school shooting. Or whether the 
randomness or symbolic meaning of victims is related to this phenomenon while the act 
itself is planned and premeditated. Alternatively, can the phenomenon include an 
element of personal revenge on a specific victim? Is this just a logical continuation or 
culmination of other school violence?  
An incident involving firearms on the University of Texas campus in 1966 has 
traditionally been regarded as the prototype for all subsequent incidents, but this 
interpretation can be called into question. In this incident, a marine and university 
student climbed into a tower on the campus, killing 14 people and wounding more than 
30. Prior to this, he had killed his mother and wife. Eventually, he also shot himself. 
The autopsy revealed that he had a malignant brain tumour. It is unlikely that he was 
seeking publicity through his act; instead, he was probably suffering from a serious 
mental disturbance. Still, the incident may have inspired others to emulate him.  
Following the Texas incident, school shootings have occurred at least in the United 
States, Sweden, Germany, Bosnia, Australia, Argentina, Canada, Israel, and Finland. 
The largest number of lives was claimed in the Virginia Tech school shootings in the 
USA in 2007, where the perpetrator killed 32 people and, eventually, himself. Also in 
the USA, the Columbine, Colorado, school shootings in 1999 are often considered the 
archetype of recent school shootings. In this incident, two students killed 12 students 
and a teacher.  
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One reason the Columbine incident has received so much publicity in the context of 
school shootings may have been that the killers created a kind of media strategy 
beforehand and endeavoured to convey a message. The killers left behind a number of 
tapes on which they justify the act they were about to commit. Additionally, one of the 
perpetrators had published his views on a Web site. The two were positively seeking 
publicity and got what they wanted. The killers, who belonged to the majority 
population, were figures young people could relate to, and they created a cultural 
screenplay wherein a bullied underdog turns the relationships of power upside down. 
The opportunities available for the dissemination of information via the Internet have 
been multiplied since the Columbine incident, and these opportunities have indeed been 
used extensively.  
3.4.2. School shootings in Finland 
Two school shootings had occurred in Finland prior to the Kauhajoki incident. The first 
occurred in an upper-level comprehensive school in Raumanmeri in 1989, where a 
14-year-old schoolboy shot two students during the first lesson of the morning, fleeing 
the scene soon thereafter. A motive, experienced on an individual level, could be 
established for the shooting. The student told the police that the motive had been 
bullying. This incident is not usually remembered very well, and it is indeed quite 
different in nature from the next school shooting, in Jokela. The Raumanmeri killer was 
not seeking publicity, the victims were not random, and the shootings were not 
politically or ideologically motivated in any way.   
The school shootings in Jokela on 7 November 2007 left deep scars in the collective 
memory of the nation. According to the investigation report, they had many similarities 
with school shootings abroad. The shootings were meticulously planned, the perpetrator 
had been interested in earlier school shootings abroad, he was seeking publicity, and he 
modelled his act on the Columbine school shootings. The Kauhajoki school shootings 
just added to Finns’ feelings of insecurity. This was no longer an isolated incident.  
3.4.3. The background to school shootings 
In 2000, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation published a report on school killers’ 
background. The U.S. Secret Service, for its part, published in 2002 a report that 
provides an analysis of 37 school shootings and their background. Additionally, some 
books on school shootings have been published, the most often quoted among them 
being a volume written by a U.S.-based research team in 2004.  
The studies have, among other things, attempted to create a profile of a person who 
might commit a school shooting. This profile could then be employed to identify 
potential school killers. According to various reports, however, it has proved impossible 
to compile a reliable profile in advance. Profiling might easily lead to innocent people 
being branded as potential school killers. It also problematically reduces the 
phenomenon to individual level and provides actual school killers with a screen behind 
which to plan their act.  
Some factors in school killers’ backgrounds are strongly over-represented. In a 
scientific sense, these could be referred to as strong links or correlations, which do not, 
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however, enable us to identify a potential school killer in advance. In other words, we 
may look into school killers’ backgrounds to determine the common factors, but we 
have to bear in mind that not all people with the same qualities or experiences are 
potential school killers. The method of profiling was initially developed to be utilised in 
determining the psychological characteristics of a perpetrator after he or she has 
committed the crime.  
No single underlying factor – or even general cause-and-effect relationships, for that 
matter – for school shootings has been discovered so far. On the whole, it is difficult to 
pinpoint factors in human development that are both absolutely necessary and sufficient 
for predicting an event. It is, however, possible to isolate individual and social factors in 
school shootings that increase the risk of a similar incident.  
According to a U.S.-based research team, the factors common to all school killers 
include the following:  
1. The perpetrator feels marginalised or excluded from his community. 
2. The perpetrator has psychosocial problems and is vulnerable as an individual, 
which is exacerbated by the perpetrator’s poor skills in dealing with problems. 
3. There exists a cultural model providing the means and a form to a phenomenon 
that in this case involves the idolisation of guns and attacks as a way out of the 
perpetrator’s marginal position. This type of problem-solving may be inspired 
by media products, such as violent films, or other school shootings.  
4. The perpetrator had violent visions and produced violent material, or displayed 
other warning signals that were not noticed early enough or were not dealt with 
appropriately. 
5. The perpetrator had a gun or easy access to guns. 
There are some points in the Secret Service report with special relevance for the 
Kauhajoki school shootings and therefore worth mentioning here. First of all, school 
shootings are usually committed in the daytime and the school is often in a small 
locality. The act is not committed on the spur of the moment; instead, it is usually 
planned in advance. In four out of five cases, the perpetrator leaked details of the event 
to an outsider, and in a few cases another young person assisted the killer in planning 
the deed. Those in the know were usually young people. The victims typically did not 
receive direct threats. One of the victims may have been selected in advance, while the 
others were collateral victims.  
Even though the perpetrators do not share a common profile, there are a few things that 
are over-represented in the background of American school killers. All of the attackers 
were male and students or former students at the school they attacked. The perpetrator 
was often a teenager, or at least aged between 11 and 21. According to another report on 
American school shootings in 1999–2007, this phenomenon cannot, however, be 
considered to involve only teenagers or young people on the verge of adulthood. In the 
United States, in three cases out of 12 the perpetrator was 21 or older. Likewise, in the 
incidents that occurred outside the USA, in three cases in 11 the perpetrator was aged 21 
or older.  
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According to the Secret Service report, nearly all (93%) school killers had aroused 
anxiety in other people before the incident, and many of them had faced bullying or 
rejection or had been harmed in some way. The majority (78%) had suffered from 
depression and had had suicidal thoughts or attempted suicide. Almost all of them 
(98%) had suffered a serious loss immediately prior to the incident. These losses 
involved a close relationship or the perpetrator's status in the eyes of others, such as 
public humiliation. Approximately one third had a history of violent or criminal 
behaviour. However, the public misconception that the perpetrator is always a loner and 
without friends does not seem to be correct. Only about 12% were without any friends 
whatsoever, and approximately one third were withdrawn by nature. The Secret Service 
report offers scant information on school-related factors or family backgrounds. 
Some analyses emphasise certain risk factors related to personality and the maturation 
environment that are known to be linked to juvenile delinquency. The school killers do 
not seem to belong to this group. The typical school killer may have a middle-class 
background, he may not belong to an ethnic minority or be poor, and his school 
performance may be average or even above. Instead, the school killers considered were 
often a target of violence or discrimination at school, had an exceptional interest in 
weapons and violence, were interested in death-related themes, and suffered from 
depression. A school killer’s aggression is often considered to be instrumental, which 
means that the act is planned in advance and a certain outcome is expected. In addition 
to negative feelings, the act may be tinged with positive emotions such as pleasure or 
satisfaction. The aggression in this case is not characterised by a loss of self-control. 
The perpetrators’ family backgrounds are not homogeneous, but some of their parents 
clearly did not know what their children were doing, where they spent their time, or 
what their interests were. These parents are often emotionally distant, are not very 
interested in their children’s lives, and belittle their own significance or the importance 
of showing interest in their children.  
Some studies also analysed schools with an increased risk of a school shooting. There 
are two kinds. At one extreme is a school with clashes among pupils, organised gang 
activities, teachers who are dissatisfied and feel powerless, insufficient co-operation 
between the school and parents, serious disturbances, unclear authority relationships, 
fear, school drop-outs, and a large number of schoolchildren whose performance is 
poor. The other extreme is an elite school dedicated to academic success, where the 
existence of problems is denied or they are downplayed. The students do not feel 
attached to their school, and safe relationships are not valued. Both school communities 
suffer from a lack of clear and efficient plans for the prevention of bullying and 
intervention in it. To analyse schools as the scene for school shootings, we need to 
analyse the social atmosphere in schools, which means that we should approach schools 
as a key venue not only for learning but also for growing up and making friends.  
3.4.4. Young adulthood and school shootings  
Young adulthood is a difficult subject of research, because many background factors 
have not become established yet. For example, the study of isolated phenomena, such as 
well-being or deprivation, is not enough to explain inequality among young adults. It 
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seems that young adults’ choices in terms of education, work, and family are becoming 
ever more individual, and these often remain in constant change until the individual 
reaches the age of 30.  
The Kauhajoki school killer was aged 22, in many ways at a delicate stage in life. The 
same goes for the 18-year-old Jokela school killer. In 2007, the Finnish Youth Research 
Society published a report on research into welfare services for young people. 
According to the report, it seems as if the current service system of the Finnish welfare 
state does not meet the support needs of young people. This has been brought about by 
the extension of adolescence, more complicated transitions, and the changing living 
environment. Young adults are no longer recipients of youth work and child welfare 
services, even though the Youth Act applies to young people up until the age of 29.  
On the basis of statistical data, it seems that communal ties are weakening, especially in 
the lives of young adults. The 2007 Youth Barometer shows that seeing friends 
becomes clearly more infrequent around the age of 20: 76% of 15–19-year-olds see 
their friends almost daily, while the corresponding percentage for 20–24-year-olds is 
only 47%. In a Stakes (now the National Institute for Health and Welfare) survey, 
schoolchildren and students were asked how many friends they had with whom they 
could confidentially discuss personal matters. According to the survey, a significantly 
larger percentage of boys than girls in comprehensive school and upper secondary 
school had no close friends.  
According to the 2008 Youth Barometer, 20–24-year-old males feel less attached to 
their school, home community, or family than other age groups. Young men’s 
emotional ties to their family and school are weaker than those of women in the same 
age group. Thus, it seems that the communality of young men on the verge of adulthood 
is fragile, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The same applies to membership in 
society at large, which is also affected by youth unemployment. Young men also drop 
out of school more often than women do, which is especially evident in polytechnic 
education.  
According to youth barometers, contentedness with one’s life situation takes a plunge at 
around the age of 20; 20–24-year-olds are also less content with their state of health 
and, most of all, their financial situation. This is not just young adults’ personal view: 
the fact is that the risk of low income is at its highest in the 16–24-year-old age group. 
Within the age group of young adults, the risk of poverty has increased for single 
parents and single-person households. Also, 20–24-year-olds are the least content with 
their education. With age, they become less content with their leisure time while their 
job satisfaction increases. In terms of well-being, young adults are easily caught in the 
middle: they have yet to establish their status in the education and labour market, but 
the pressure is immense, and the networks of childhood or early adolescence are not 
there to support them anymore. 
The 2007 Youth Barometer shows that 42% of 20–24-year-olds feel that there is a gap 
between the younger and older generations, while that sentiment is shared by only 33% 
of 25–29-year-olds. From the viewpoint of young adults, the risk of generations failing 
to understand each other is considerable.  
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Unfavourable circumstances do not cause a cause-and-effect chain reaction in the years 
to come, although several studies clearly show that various factors in childhood and 
adolescence do have an impact on the course of one's life. Furthermore, we must bear in 
mind the difference between factual and subjective deprivation: an individual may 
appear marginalised and rejected in many areas of life without actually experiencing 
feelings of anxiety or of losing control. This difference is especially noticeable in young 
people.  
3.4.5. Assessment of the seriousness of school threats 
In total, 225 threats against schools were recorded in the police information system 
between the Jokela school shootings and April 2009, half of which led to a criminal 
complaint. The number of threats seems to increase significantly a few months after an 
incident, which is also borne out by the increased number of threats received after the 
Kauhajoki school shootings. The fear aroused by these threats is very real, as the 
occurrence of another attack is considered most likely after a school shooting. Another 
school shooting did indeed occur in Winnende, Germany, on 11 March 2009, some six 
months after the Kauhajoki incident. The death toll in this incident was 16, including 
the perpetrator.  
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation introduced in its report a model that can be 
utilised to assess the seriousness of a school threat. The author points out, however, that 
the assessments are not necessarily applicable to all situations. This method of 
assessment can be applied to situations where a pupil or student has made a direct or 
indirect threat against a school. It is necessary to become familiar with the pupil’s 
personality traits, behaviour, and background before an assessment is made.  
In assessment of a threat, attention should be paid to the following:  
1. The student leaks information on his intentions – in other words, reveals clues, 
intentionally or unintentionally, to thoughts, fantasies, or attitudes that point to 
the use or idolisation of violence at school. The leakage may occur in writings, 
poems, videos, pictures, or tattoos, for example.  
2. The student has a low tolerance for frustration. He is easily hurt and feels that an 
unforgivable injustice has been done to him.  
3. The student is depressed, which may manifest itself in various ways. The student 
may show signs of physical fatigue, has a dark outlook on life, or loses interest 
in activities he once enjoyed. The student may display unpredictable and 
uncontrolled bursts of anger, behaving aggressively and violently. He may also 
suffer from sleep and eating disorders.  
4. The student may display signs of a narcissistic personality: he is self-centred, 
embraces the role of a victim, lacks insight into others’ feelings, and may be 
either extremely thick-skinned or thin-skinned in responding to criticism. The 
student appears unconcerned about anyone else’s feelings or treats them with 
contempt or ridicule. He may view other people as ‘non-persons’ or objects to 
be thwarted, and they have absolutely no value whatsoever in his eyes. He has a 
sense of superiority to others and expects special treatment or consideration. The 
student shows an exaggerated, even pathological, need for attention. He refuses 
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to take responsibility for his actions and externalises blame by faulting other 
people, events, or situations.  
5. The student lacks resiliency, and his conduct may veil low self-esteem. The 
student may appear arrogant, but in reality he uses this to conceal his feelings of 
worthlessness.  
6. The student consistently behaves as though he feels different or estranged from 
others, and he can be profoundly lonely even though he may have friends; in 
other words, he is alienated from his community.  
7. The student often expresses intolerant attitudes towards religions and ethnic or 
other minorities; he also appears rigid and opinionated.  
8. The student’s humour is constantly inappropriate. His jokes are insulting, mean, 
or macabre.  
9. The student demonstrates an unusual interest in school shootings and other 
heavily publicised acts of violence.  
10. The student may be drawn to negative, inappropriate role models such as Hitler 
or others associated with violence and destruction.  
11. The student’s behaviour and interests have undergone a change. The student has 
taken up shooting practice.  
12. The student has recently suffered a loss, such as the end of a love relationship.  
13. The student has joined a Web community idolising violence.  
According to the report, the student’s family background is characterised by a lack of 
intimacy, a turbulent parent–child relationship, and a lack of supervision. The parents do 
not, for example, monitor the student’s use of the Internet, and they accept pathological 
behaviour as normal. The family has often or recently moved, and the student has access to 
guns. Typical school-related problems include a lack of discipline, insufficient or 
inequitable punishments, students’ inequality, and an inflexible culture. Additionally, a 
code of silence may prevail in a potentially problematic school community; in other words, 
the students are afraid to talk about their observations.  
In the report, threats are classed in four categories: direct, indirect, veiled, and conditional 
threats. A direct threat refers to a situation wherein the threat identifies the target, the time, 
and the manner of execution. An indirect threat suggests the possibility of an act being 
committed. An example of an indirect threat could be: ‘I could do that if I wanted to.’ A 
veiled threat leaves it to the reader or listener to interpret the message, an example being: 
‘The world would be a better place without you.’ A conditional threat is the type of threat 
often seen in cases of extortion cases: ‘If you do not pay me a certain sum of money, I will 
blow up the school.’  
Threats can be analysed also according to the level of risk. With a low level of threat, the 
threat is vague, unrealistic, and lacking in detail. The student may, for example, threaten to 
shoot a teacher because of poor marks without actually intending to follow through on the 
threat or without having access to a gun. A medium-level threat is more direct and 
concrete. Wording in the threat suggests that the threatener has given some thought to how 
the act will be carried out. There may be a general indication of a possible place and time, 
but no concrete plan exists. There is no strong indication that the threatener has taken steps 
by, for example, acquiring a firearm permit. There are indications, however, that the 
threatener is serious.  
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A high-level threat is direct, realisable, and detailed. There is a plan, and the threatener has 
taken direct steps toward carrying out the deed, by acquiring equipment and practising, for 
example. The more direct and detailed the threat, the more serious is the situation. In this 
case, the police had better intervene immediately. 
The Finnish Psychological Association studied a protocol developed in Germany for the 
assessment of the threat of violence in schools. The protocol is based on a report prepared 
by the U.S. Secret Service. The main objective is to assess the level of threat and to make 
decisions on further steps to be taken. The assessment is carried out in a meeting chaired 
by an expert. The participants include individuals who know the threatener personally, the 
persons targeted, and persons who are authorised to intervene. The objective is to draw up 
a plan of action with the purpose of increasing the feeling of security at the school, to 
support the desperate student, and to make him stop his threatening behaviour. 
3.4.6. Background data on school threats 
The school threats made in Finland after the Jokela school shootings were distributed 
evenly among all five provinces. The absolute number of threats was smallest in Lapland 
and the Province of Oulu, which is probably explained by the lower population density. 
The threats were similar in all parts of Finland. They threatened individuals or groups 
mainly orally, via the Internet, or via another medium. Some threats had been written on 
school walls or furniture. In many cases, educational institutions were temporarily 
evacuated. 
Within the limits of their resources, the police have attempted to identify the persons 
behind the threats, interrogated them, and performed house searches. The police have also 
talked to parents and teachers. In a few cases, the threatener has been referred to health 
care services, and at least in one case a child welfare report was submitted. Many 
threateners had access to guns, which were duly confiscated. Many threats included 
references to the Jokela school shootings. Another factor attesting to the impact of the 
Jokela incident is that there was a significant increase in the number of threats received 
around the anniversary of the Jokela school shootings. 
Many threats were nothing but misjudged humour and, apart from an educational 
discussion, required no official action. In the more serious cases, the threatener had access 
to a gun that enabled him or her to realise the threat.  
Immediately after the Kauhajoki school shootings, the police commenced a Web 
investigation, as a result of which several screen names associated with school shootings 
and related material were found. The police were assisted in this by e-mail tips from 
anxious citizens. The police characterised the persons behind the screen names as seriously 
planning a school shooting and undertook similar measures against them as were taken 
against those who made threats targeting schools. The police have the powers to take the 
necessary measures to prevent a criminal act. Police activities are, however, hampered by 
the fact that preparation for the commission of homicide does not constitute a criminal act. 
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3.5. Marginalisation and discrimination  
In the investigation concerning the Jokela school shootings, the killer was found to be 
marginalised in quite a special way, which was the combined result of several factors. The 
Kauhajoki school killer had more social contacts than the perpetrator of the Jokela school 
shootings did, but he has also been characterised as a reserved personality. The fact that he 
often changed schools as a result of moving to another locality probably undermined his 
sense of belonging to a community. 
Marginalisation, or social exclusion, refers to being deprived of significant relationships 
and the various functions of life, as well as being in a marginal position in a community 
and society. According to objective indicators, marginalisation is often defined as multiple 
deprivation, whereas its opposite, well-being, is traditionally defined as the satisfaction of 
needs or the possession of various resources. Nowadays, a lack of participation and social 
inclusion is also associated with marginalisation.  
In the past, the preferred term was ‘alienation’ in its various forms. One of the main forms 
is so-called self-alienation. This refers to a psychological state wherein an individual 
becomes distanced from him- or herself, his or her character, and even his or her existence. 
The individual gradually loses his or her sense of proportion. Depending on the theory, the 
causes of alienation have been explained in various ways.  
Man has an innate need for survival, a need to get along, and to feel he is in control of 
his own life. He also has the need to be part of a social group and to take his place as a 
sovereign member of a human community. One of man’s developmental needs is to 
become psychologically of age and to realise his potential to the full. The process is 
long, and sometimes also difficult. Even many adults have not completed this process, 
mainly because of various relationships. We need safe and close relationships in which 
we feel accepted to grow into good human beings. If this development is significantly 
hampered, the end result may be self-alienation and, eventually, marginalisation. 
Unfavourable circumstances and relationships may result in a marginalisation process 
that starts in early childhood and lasts a lifetime. An individual is most likely to become 
permanently marginalised if he or she drops out of school and fails to learn the skills 
necessary, for example, in seeking employment. Many people can and want to, 
however, endeavour to repair the psychological damage through psychotherapy, 
psychoanalysis, or some other method that supports the individual’s inner growth. 
Changes in personal circumstances, such as new relationships or meaningful hobbies, 
may have a crucial role in improving the situation. With adults, marginalisation may 
manifest itself in the form of unemployment, which naturally can be relieved through 
new activities and hobbies. 
Defining and measuring marginalisation is difficult, as it is influenced by what is 
considered important and why at any given point in time. Traditionally, young adults’ 
marginalisation has been measured by the degree of their exclusion from education and 
working life, although, according to the Youth Barometer, youth themselves see this 
differently. They consider a lack of friends the most important cause of marginalisation. 
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According to them, marginalisation is closely linked to social exclusion in everyday 
situations.   
Marginalisation and discrimination in early childhood education and schools 
A child may become a target of discrimination as early as in early childhood education. In 
day-care centres, it usually takes the form of a child being excluded from a group; in other 
words, other children refuse to play with him or her. Research shows that a child who has 
been excluded from a group in day-care centre is also more likely to face similar exclusion 
at school. The risk for an excluded child of becoming a target for bullying or violence is 
also higher.   
In schools, discrimination may manifest itself as the bullying of an individual who is 
considered somehow different. He or she may face ridicule or even violence. Other 
students may also adopt an indifferent attitude towards this student and behave as if he or 
she did not exist. People are increasingly vulnerable to marginalisation in transitions 
involving failure, such as the loss of a relationship.  
If a student has become or is in the process of becoming marginalised, he or she may 
start behaving in a manner that will only add to his or her problems. The student may 
find it difficult to observe the rules of the school, which may lead to failure and negative 
feedback. In this case, there is a real danger of the student losing hope and becoming 
depressed. He or she may also adopt a negative outlook on life. The student may 
become inward-looking in a destructive way, which may ultimately lead to suicide. The 
student may become even more alienated from his or her fellow students as the 
student’s self-esteem is extremely low. The student may feel there is no purpose to his 
or her life. 
A marginalised individual may join a community or circle of friends for whom the 
values and norms are completely different and with whom he or she can find a new 
purposefulness to his or her life. This process may, of course, be reversed, and it may be 
the membership in a certain group that can lead to alienation from the mainstream 
culture. A member of such a subcultural or counter-cultural group may display the kind 
of arrogant and aggressive mode of operation and behaviour that has been witnessed in 
conjunction with school shootings, for example. When marginalisation has reached this 
point, an individual may feel he or she has nothing to lose anymore. The individual may 
feel he or she can gain the respect of others by committing an act admired and approved 
of by the group. This brings a new purpose to his or her life, even if it is considered 
criminal in the mainstream culture. 
School as a social environment 
School is the place not only for learning but also for growing up and creating friendships, 
both of which have a significant role in the development of children and youth. In 
comparison to other countries, the learning outcomes of the Finnish school system are very 
good, but in terms of school satisfaction and well-being Finnish youth are near the bottom 
of the list among OECD countries. 
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Many studies indicate that a positive school and class atmosphere correlates with good 
school performance and high self-esteem. By contrast, a negative atmosphere is linked to 
stress and psychological problems. The most important factors affecting the atmosphere in 
a school are the school’s values, leadership, positive feedback for children and youth, 
social inclusion of the children, and factors related to psychological safety – such as the 
prevention of and intervention in school bullying. Schools are in a key position in the 
prevention of youth depression and delinquent behaviour. Young people need personal 
positive feedback, and it can prove rather challenging to offer this equally to all students, 
especially in large units. 
Communal spirit and caring about others is learned first and foremost by doing things 
together and getting to know each other. Common activities outside lessons contribute to 
this much more than ordinary lessons do. According to research results, social support is 
also a communal matter: the social support provided by the school community has a 
positive impact on the well-being of young people regardless of the extent to which the 
students themselves feel they are receiving support. One report on school shootings, 
published by the Finnish Youth Research Society, states that the development of school 
culture through increased dialogue between youth and adults is an essential security factor. 
The same point is emphasised by a working group studying school security in the United 
States.  
According to the Finnish Youth Research Society study, pupils should feel they are being 
taken seriously, their identity and dignity are respected, they are listened to, and they have 
an opportunity to make their voices heard. With respect to lessons, this could mean that 
students are given more opportunities to participate in the course of the lesson. It is also 
essential to pay attention to interaction outside lessons. School clubs, for example, are a 
way to increase social interaction between students and teachers. Multi-profession 
operating environments can also provide comprehensive support for students and 
contribute to the creation of open interaction. The methods of communal support 
developed in youth work could be utilised also in a school environment.  
3.6. Mental health disorders in adolescence 
Covering the years between puberty and approximately the age of 22, adolescence is a 
challenging stage of development, which in its own right is often considered a risk factor 
for various disturbances in the psychological development of a young person. The 
diagnostics are also particularly difficult, as risk behaviour, mood swings, and behavioural 
changes are part of adolescent behaviour in general. Finding a study place, moving out of 
the childhood home, and getting started in working life are potentially difficult stages for 
young people on their way to becoming independent. These stages are particularly 
challenging for those young people whose childhood was marked be insecurity. Another 
challenging stage for young people is military service. Approximately one in five young 
men fails to complete his military service. One in 10 of those called up for service either 
receives a postponement or is exempted from service permanently. Likewise, one in 10 
of those who have already started their military service fails to complete it. 
Approximately half of the exemptions or service interruptions are based on mental 
health reasons.  
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An estimated 20–25% of young people suffer from a mental health disorder. Typically, 
they may suffer from several disorders simultaneously, such as depression and a substance 
abuse problem. This may lead to the underlying illness remaining undiscovered; instead, 
just one of the symptoms or problems is identified. The most common problems affecting 
young people are substance abuse problems, depression, eating disorders, and conduct 
disorders of varying extents. Suicide attempts and suicide, criminal behaviour, and the 
outbreak of severe illnesses such as schizophrenia occur more infrequently.  
Substance abuse disorders in adolescents 
About 5–10% of adolescents suffer from harmful substance abuse or substance 
dependency. The substance in this category most often used by Finnish adolescents is 
alcohol. The most significant risk factor for the development of a substance abuse disorder 
is to start its use at a young age. The drinking habits of those who started their use of 
alcohol before turning 15 are more intoxication-oriented, and they often also display 
problem drinking behaviour later in life. 
Substance abuse is linked with mental health problems. For example, it is typical of those 
who suffer from mood disorders, attention deficit disorder, bulimia, or schizophrenia. On 
the basis of clinical experience, it has been concluded that the substance abuse behaviour 
of a young person suffering from mental health problems may be some sort of 
self-medication – in other words, he or she attempts to alleviate the symptoms through 
substance abuse. Research data on this remain insufficient, however, and it seems probable 
that the relationship between substance abuse disorders and mental health disorders is 
complicated and case-specific. There is also some evidence indicating that substance abuse 
may cause a variety of mental health problems, such as anxiety or depression. 
Depression and self-destructiveness in adolescence 
At its mildest, depression is characterised by a temporarily depressed mood, whereas at its 
most severe it leads to depressive states, in which the depression lasts longer, is more 
severe, and also includes other symptoms and reduced ability to function. In the 
classification of diseases, depression is classified according to its severity, with the purpose 
of thus being able to distinguish between normal reactions and disorders that require 
medical attention. A depressed person may display self-destructive behaviour. 
Self-destructiveness refers to thoughts, tendencies, or behaviours that involve a 
life-threatening risk, self-destructive thoughts, suicide attempts, and suicides. Indirect 
self-destructiveness is characterised by long-term risk behaviour, which may be conscious 
or subconscious. Examples include reckless behaviour in traffic; substance abuse; 
dangerous hobbies; and problems in taking care of oneself, such as insufficient nutrition or 
untreated illnesses.  
In Finland, suicide rates are clearly higher than in EU or OECD countries in general. What 
is characteristic of Finland is the large percentage of males – in particular, young males – 
among suicide cases. Of all Finnish males who die at age 35 or younger, one in three has 
committed suicide. Some 10–15% of all young people have serious and recurrent suicidal 
thoughts. According to WHO statistics, Finns aged between 15 and 24 are significantly 
more prone to suicide than are their counterparts in other Nordic countries. The motives 
behind suicide attempts vary, as does the seriousness of the intention. Risk factors include 
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cultural and social factors, internal disturbances in the family and childhood experiences, 
personality-related factors, and psychological disorders and illnesses.  
The cultural and social risk factors include rootlessness, identity problems, weak social 
status, and non-mainstream sexual orientation. In Finland, this phenomenon may also be 
linked to a kind of cultural script on suicide as the ultimate problem-solving tool. Risk 
factors within the family include a parent’s psychological illness, a previous suicide or 
suicide attempt within the family, substance abuse problems, family violence, 
mistreatment or neglect of children, frequent moves, rejection of a child, and other 
problems related to family interaction.  
Personality-related risk factors include aggressive behaviour, antisocial behaviour, a 
tendency to be easily disappointed, a poor sense of reality, feelings of inferiority and 
insecurity, and rejecting or provoking behaviour. The most common psychological 
disorders suffered by persons who have attempted suicide include depression, anxiety, 
drinking problems, personality disorders, and – particularly among girls – eating 
disorders. These disorders may often coincide. Of all males who committed suicide, one 
in two had a drinking problem. Male alcoholics are especially suicide-prone in situations 
where even the final significant relationship has ended.  
Risk factors that predict suicide are the expression of suicidal thoughts and previous 
self-destructive behaviour. Most of those who committed suicide tried to communicate 
their intentions to people around them in one way or another, but the messages were not 
interpreted correctly. There is usually a triggering factor that causes suicidal thoughts to 
evolve into a concrete suicide plan, leading eventually to a suicide attempt. Suicide is 
almost always the end result of a long process, although young people have a tendency 
to put their thoughts or plan into action at an earlier stage than adults. 
Of all mental health disorders, it is severe depression that is most closely linked with 
suicide. According to data collected in Finland, depression patients typically employ some 
other means than their own medication to commit suicide. About 25% of those who 
committed suicide suffered from psychotic disorders. Suicide is also committed by people 
with personality disorders involving accumulating difficulties and negative changes in 
their lives. The term ‘personality disorder’ refers to a mental health disorder wherein a 
person’s abnormal personality traits adversely affect his or her life and social relationships. 
Concomitant illnesses, such as depression and substance abuse in particular, worsen the 
prognosis and increase the risk of suicide.  
In Finland, there has been a reduction in mortality from suicide, from 1,500 in 1990 to 
approximately 1,000 in 2006. Improved diagnostic capabilities and better treatment are 
believed to have had a significant impact on the reduction of suicide. New-generation 
antidepressants are also believed to have a positive effect, even though there is no clear 
scientific evidence of this as yet. Data gathered in Finland show that maintenance 
treatment with antipsychotic medication significantly lowers the risk of suicide in patients 
suffering from psychosis. 
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Schizophrenia and schizoid disorders 
Classified as a psychosis, schizophrenia usually breaks out in early adulthood and 
occurs in both men and women. Psychosis refers to a mental disorder wherein an 
individual loses his or her sense of reality and finds it difficult to distinguish between 
what is real and what is fantasy. Schizophrenia is regarded as a severe mental illness 
affecting approximately one per cent of the Finnish population at one time or another in 
their lives. It is particularly common in young people and people of working age, as 
men typically succumb to it between the ages of 20 and 28 and women between 24 and 
32. The causes of schizophrenia are far from unambiguous, and it is impossible to point 
to any single factor behind it. Schizophrenia is regarded as a disease of the brain 
affecting an individual’s mental activity.  
Brain damage caused by a lack of oxygen during pregnancy or birth may increase the 
risk of the outbreak of the disease. Another potential cause for the outbreak of 
schizophrenia is influenza during pregnancy. Owing to hereditary factors, schizoid 
patients are more vulnerable and prone to develop the disease under stress or in crises. 
Experiences during childhood and adolescence may lead to earlier onset of the disease 
or make it more severe. Young people prone to schizophrenia are often more sensitive 
in their relationships. This type of person is prone to develop symptoms of the disease 
when moving out of his or her childhood home, or starting to study or work in a new 
environment. The psychosis often also breaks out for the first time during the recruit 
stage in military service. Thus, schizophrenia develops as a combined result of 
biological susceptibility and various stress factors.  
Schizophrenia in young people would seem to be on the decrease in Finland. However, 
it is typically the early stages of the psychosis or symptoms predicting a psychotic break 
and affecting an individual’s ability to function that are detected in adolescence. The 
most common predictive symptoms include anxiety, depression, mood swings, apathy, a 
shortened attention span, work-related difficulties, sleeping problems, lack of appetite, 
weakening of ability to function, and social withdrawal. The person may also become 
more impulsive or aggressive.  
Additionally, young persons may suffer from a schizotypal disorder, involving 
inappropriate emotions, strange behaviour or appearance, or worsening relations with 
other people. They may also experience cognitive disorders of varying degrees, such as 
unusual beliefs or vague, stereotypic thinking. Schizoid personality, on the other hand, 
is halfway between a personality disorder and a schizophrenic psychosis. It is 
characterised by abnormal cognitive processes and emotions that resemble 
schizophrenia proper. The emotions of an individual suffering from schizoid personality 
may be cold or inappropriate and involve inappropriate laughter, for example. His or her 
behaviour is strange or unusual, and the patient may also suffer from paranoid or 
otherwise abnormal thoughts. The patient’s speech may be incoherent or repetitive, and 
he or she may also show a superficial and stereotypic interest in religion, philosophy, or 
abstract topics. Any psychotic-level symptoms are at most temporary and passing.  
The psychotropic medication most commonly used by young people 
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In the treatment of mental health disorders in young people, comprehensive psychosocial 
rehabilitation has a key role, and, unlike for adults, medication plays a secondary role. The 
occurrence of harmful side effects is also more common in the treatment of young people. 
The SSRI medication used in the treatment of depression and anxiety has been found to 
increase the risk of self-destructive behaviour in adolescents in particular. This type of 
medication can be used by adolescents only under supervision.  
Alprazolam is a benzodiazepine drug used to relieve anxiety and excessive worrying, 
especially if these are accompanied by depression. It also is used in the treatment of panic 
disorders. Alprazolam is addictive and must not be mixed with alcohol. Its side effects 
include tiredness, sleeplessness, depression, agitation, and aggression.  
Suitable medication for adolescents suffering a first episode of psychosis consists of 
neuroleptics, such as haloperidol or risperidon, which are also used to treat attention deficit 
disorder in children. The medication should always be phased out but only after a long 
period with no symptoms. After the first episode of psychosis, the medication should be 
continued for at least two years.  
3.7. Research data on the development of children and adolescents and the risk 
factors involved 
Studies conducted in England have contributed significantly to our understanding of how 
the innate qualities of a child and the environment interact in quite a unique way. 
Naturally, the genetic inheritance of a child has an impact on his or her development, but 
the interactive and physical environments also play an important part.  
Children are particularly sensitive in receiving stimuli from their environment. Depending 
on biological factors, children also shape their environment and seek stimuli differently. 
Combined with a maturation environment where favourable factors prevail, a child’s 
inborn sensitivity may promote exceptionally positive development. On the other hand, in 
combination with unfavourable factors in the growing environment, it is decidedly a risk 
factor in an individual’s development.  
The most important risk factors in the development of children that emerge in long-term 
studies are the quality of parenting skills and parents’ educational philosophy. Five 
factors have been found to be linked with antisocial development in a parent–child 
relationship: lack of supervision, inconsistent and harsh punishments, marital conflicts, 
rejection of the child, and lack of interest or participation in the activities of the child. 
Factors that seriously endanger the development of a child in general include neglect 
and abuse, family violence, and parents’ substance abuse and mental health problems. 
Experience of early losses and divorce have an adverse effect on children’s 
development, and children living with a single parent, for example, have a significantly 
higher risk of developing a psychological illness. Furthermore, they also have a higher 
risk of substance abuse and attempting suicide. With boys, the risk of mortality is also 
higher. In comparison to the majority of the population, the risk of premature death is 
many times greater for a child or adolescent who has been taken into care. The risk is 
equally high for boys and girls. Long-term institutional care started at an early age is 
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clearly another risk factor in the development of a child, and it has been found to make 
parenting later in life more difficult for the individual in question.  
Parenting skills do not remain constant; instead, they are dependent on the family 
situation and the parents’ psychological resources. Outside the family, the current 
circumstances in society, the effects of which the parents transmit to their children, also 
have a significant impact on parenting skills. Poverty has been shown to be a risk factor 
in the development and marginalisation of children and adolescents. According to a 
long-term study, parents who are experiencing financial difficulties become impulsive 
and rough with their children and are not able to provide them with the support they 
need. Additionally, fathers’ unemployment has been found to have a correlation with 
their sons’ increased substance abuse. Their school performance also suffers.  
Group sizes in day-care centres and schools influence the development of children. 
Large groups may lead to a poor classroom atmosphere, which, in turn, may lead to an 
increase in psychological disorders. It is therefore not surprising that after the home, the 
most important factor in the development of a child is school. As children grow, their 
social networks outside school become more extensive, and friendship assumes an 
increasingly important role. 
The great significance of early childhood experiences in terms of the development of a 
child is explained by the fact that a child's brain is extremely adaptable. Early 
experiences modify the structure of the brain, and these changes have a tendency to 
become permanent. During early childhood, a child also creates internal behavioural 
patterns, which have an effect on how the child interprets interpersonal communication. 
Painful experiences lead to the emergence of protective mechanisms, which then 
prevent the child from having new experiences. This is why insecure children often 
behave in a manner that creates a negative response in parents, teachers, and other 
children. Negative responses reinforce children’s negative behavioural patterns.  
Serious, long-term school bullying has been found in many studies to have a connection 
with symptoms of depression, marginalisation, and feelings of hopelessness. The 
consequences of bullying may follow the victim well into adulthood. The symptoms 
displayed by a child who has been subjected to constant harassment are similar to those 
displayed by a victim of violence or a person who has witnessed a violent incident. 
Additionally, a constantly bullied child may adjust his or her internal model for 
interpreting interaction in such a manner that the child becomes sensitised to interpret 
any type of interaction as negative. This is why it is extremely difficult for a bullied 
child to eliminate the situation on his or her own.  
Research shows that putting a stop to the bullying is not enough; special attention must 
be paid to the treatment of potential mental health problems. What also needs to be 
understood is that the problem is in the community, not the individual. The situation 
becomes even more difficult if the victims are branded as psychologically or socially 
disturbed and are transferred to another group while the rest in the community continue 
as before. So, bullying is clearly a group- and community-level problem, which usually 
involves a twisted power struggle. Bullying can be used to seek status, popularity, or 
attention within a group. The so-called silent condoners or bystanders are the ones who 
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allow the bullying to go on. The bully does what his or her audience allow him or her to 
do.  
3.7.1. Explanatory models for juvenile delinquency 
There have been numerous attempts to find explanatory models for juvenile delinquency. 
The attempts have focused, for example, on the individual level, psychosocial dimensions, 
and the relationship between the individual and society. One of the most recent 
explanatory models is the viewpoint of cultural criminology, where the object of study 
is the relationship between human societies, crimes, and crime control. This model also 
attempts to enhance our understanding of the individual and the cultural meanings of 
committing a criminal act in a certain historical context. As this phenomenon is 
perceived differently by youth and adults, this approach emphasises young people’s 
own views of crime, which otherwise are in danger of being ignored by adults.  
According to a National Research Institute of Legal Policy publication, the explanatory 
models that attempt to shed light on the sociological causes of crime are the strain theory, 
social control theory, social learning theory, and labelling theory. The strain theory 
emphasises the conflict between an individual’s aims and the means for reaching them as 
one of the underlying causes of crime. This model explains the criminal acts committed by 
adolescents in relation to their poor social status, poor economic prospects, and the various 
negative experiences they face in the course of their lives. These negative experiences may 
relate to violence, various types of loss, feelings of injustice, frustration, or changes in their 
lives (such as the termination of a friendship, relationship problems, or moving house). 
Feelings of injustice may also arise from the fact that the media offer everybody the same 
ideals of prosperity and success, while financial, regional, and social differentiation make 
it impossible for many young people to attain these ideals. There is another explanatory 
model related to the strain theory, according to which subcultures may develop their own 
systems of values and morality, based on crime and violence. Just as in the strain theory, 
here the underlying cause may be frustration brought about the marginalised status of 
one’s own reference group. 
According to the social control theory, the risk of crime increases in a situation where 
an individual’s social ties to his or her community are severed. In this situation, efficient 
social control is aimed outside the individual, at the other operators in his or her 
community. To understand this theory fully, we need to make a distinction between 
official and unofficial social control. Official control refers to the norms of society, 
from school rules to the penal code. Unofficial or informal control is more vague, but it 
still pervades all activities. The social support and control provided by one’s friends or 
parents is an example of unofficial social control.   
According to the social learning theory, criminal behaviour is learned through direct or 
indirect interaction with the society around us, via social networks, the media, and the 
Internet, for example. Learning refers to both the techniques of committing a criminal 
act and the motives, attitudes, and justification related to it.  
According to the labelling theory, the motives behind a criminal act and its justification 
are affected by an individual or group being labelled somehow deviant. This label may 
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adversely affect the individual’s identity and perception of the self, as well as the 
individual’s social status at school or in the labour market. This may result in the 
individual becoming marginalised, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of him or her 
committing a criminal act. 
Models for the psychosocial development of criminality are based on long-term studies, 
wherein the development of the same individuals is monitored from childhood to 
adulthood. Researchers have been especially interested in violent crime. Like the risk 
factors related to the development of a child, the risk factors in the development of a 
criminal relate to the personal qualities of the child, family factors, school-related risks, 
the individual’s circle of friends, and the influence of the environment at large (as in the 
living environment, the media environment, and society in general). Of the factors 
related to the child, the ones that are commonly mentioned include neurological 
damage, a strong temperament, hyperactivity and impulsiveness, fearlessness, 
irritability, aggressiveness, behaviour problems that manifest themselves as defiance, 
and learning difficulties.  
The mother’s diet, smoking, substance abuse, or stress during pregnancy may affect the 
child’s health and produce symptoms even in the long term. Children whose mothers 
smoked during pregnancy are more likely to display antisocial behaviour or suffer from 
attention deficit disorders. Birth complications resulting in neurological problems may 
have an indirect effect on criminal development through learning difficulties, for 
example. The mother’s age is also a factor, and there is a connection, for example, 
between teen pregnancy and the child’s later chronic behaviour problems and criminal 
behaviour.  
Within the family, the same factors that are harmful to a child’s development in general 
are the ones that predict the child having a criminal record later in life. Factors that are 
harmful to a child’s development include a cruel upbringing, rejection, neglect, parents’ 
substance abuse and mental health problems, and family violence. Adult perpetrators 
often have experiences of having been seriously mistreated in their childhood. These 
experiences are often underreported: according to studies, some 40% of victims do not 
report documented assaults. The explanation offered for a mistreated child developing 
into a mistreating adult is trauma. The individual undergoes a change, and the victim 
becomes an attacker; the frightened child becomes a frightening adult.  
A divorce as such does not increase the risk of a child becoming a criminal. Still, the 
risk of violent, repeated crime has been found to be twice as high for men whose parents 
have divorced. The corresponding risk is eightfold for men whose mother was a single 
parent at the time of the child’s birth. Fatherlessness is a recurrent theme in many 
studies exploring the factors behind violent behaviour of men. However, the link 
between a child’s behavioural problems and subsequent criminality is dependent on the 
family circumstances before the divorce and after it. Serious conflicts within the family 
and parents’ antisocial behaviour are clearly more significant factors than divorce is.  
An unstable family situation; parents changing partners; or negative life events such as 
accidents, losses, or parents’ unemployment may lead to the development of 
behavioural problems and subsequent criminality. Instability may be created by frequent 
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moves, for example. It has also been found that frequent changes of custody or 
placement during childhood have an adverse effect on a child’s development and make 
it more difficult for the child to build safe attachment relationships.  
The attachment relationship theory suggests that an attachment relationship in childhood 
is followed by similar relationships in adult life. According to this theory, a child 
becomes safely attached to his or her parent when the parent interacts with the child 
tenderly and warmly in a predictable manner. A lack of such experiences leads to an 
insecure attachment model. In this kind of model, an individual’s perception of him- or 
herself may be negative, and the child may feel that he or she is not worth caring for. 
Neither does the child feel able to turn to anyone else or show his or her needs or 
feelings. This kind of situation involves serious development-related risks, such as an 
increased risk of self-destructive behaviour and marginalisation, as well as inability to 
feel empathy. Attachment relationship disorders typically span generations, leading to a 
situation within the family where the disorder is considered normal behaviour in close 
relationships. 
It is alarming if a child learns that certain feelings cannot be expressed without the 
parent responding aggressively, or if the child cannot trust his or her own observations 
of the environment – i.e., if the child is lied to or manipulated. This type of environment 
when one is growing up may lead to a distorted picture of close relationships. This can 
manifest itself in adulthood as psychopathic behaviour, wherein a seemingly adaptable 
individual has a twisted relationship with the people around him or her, resorting to 
pretence and lies. 
Not all children exposed to risk factors in the environment where they grow up become 
criminals, however. The child may be protected by his or her individual qualities and 
positive life events, such as performing well in school, finding a good hobby, or 
therapeutic intervention. Additionally, the child may be protected by a safe attachment 
relationship with someone other than his or her parents, such as another relative or a 
foster parent. The child’s circle of friends can also have a positive impact on his or her 
development.  
3.7.2. Why would a young person commit evil acts? 
On the basis of research, it seems that the essential risk factors involved in the 
development of criminality are quite well known. When one investigates the factors 
underlying a school shooting, the picture is somewhat different, as a school killer is not 
always a marginalised or aggressive young person. Compared to fisticuffs, for example, 
the violence in these extreme cases is often totally different in nature. Instead of feelings 
running high, the violence is based on meticulous planning. In some cases, it has been 
shown that the perpetrator bore a grudge against at least some of the victims and the 
shootings have been interpreted as an act of revenge committed on behalf of an individual 
or a community. Innocent bystanders who just happened to walk in or even friends have 
been killed in many school shootings. The representative of an institution, such as a head 
teacher, may also become a victim. Thus, a victim may not necessarily be a specific target 
of the act; instead, he or she might be just part of a mission aimed at the killing of as many 
people as possible.  
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People are constantly faced with situations where they have to exercise their conscience, to 
make a judgement between good and evil. In a situation such as this, an individual reflects 
on his or her thoughts and actions from the viewpoint of another person or a moral system. 
Most people identify with the common good and generally know when they are acting 
rightly or wrongly. The perpetrator of a violent crime may also know he or she has acted 
wrongly and regret it. Most school killers idolised earlier school shootings. For a young 
person to be able to kill several age peers and adults in his or her own school, he or she 
must have identified with a moral code according to which the act is in some way justified. 
Evil has become a good, desirable, and heroic thing. When a young person idolises evil, he 
or she has undergone a moral inversion, or, in other words, the young person has embraced 
an inverted moral system. The question arises of how and why a young person embraces 
evil.  
Every person has an individual temperament and personality, which are affected by the 
maturation environment in particular. We learn and develop through conditioning and 
reinforcement, which means that our brain develops for what it is used for. Excessive 
computer use and exposure to violent material, as well as the resulting lack of social 
contacts, may lead to a distorted view of the world. In this situation, the difference 
between a violent computer game and reality may become blurred.  
In social learning, an individual identifies with a person with a stronger or higher status 
than him- or herself, the first such people being the individual’s parents and later ones 
being a teacher, a coach, a friend, a film star, a sports hero, and/or a community. In 
extreme circumstances, a child can identify even with the person abusing him or her, or a 
violent custodian. When a person is overcome by fear, he or she may identify with the 
perpetrator rather than the victim in order to cope with the situation. 
Social interaction is all about people caring for one another, which entails having the 
ability and resources to be considerate toward others, the ability to wish others well, and 
the ability to act in a constructive way. Part of caring is the ability to feel guilt and to take 
responsibility for one’s actions. In recent years, psychiatric research has focused on 
mentalisation, an increasingly important element in the healthy psychological development 
of an individual, which refers to taking an interest in another person’s mental processes, 
feelings, and experiences. Mentalisation is what makes us human, as it enables an 
individual to reflect on what is going on in another person’s mind, his or her intentions and 
emotions, and the individual’s part in the other person’s suffering. If this interest in another 
human being is absent or is not fully developed, a result may be a disturbed view of the 
world, difficulties in social interaction, and violent behaviour.  
Our ability for mentalisation is something that develops only in interaction with other 
human beings, and the early childhood years are crucial in terms of this development. 
When a parent is there for the child and shows an interest in the child, this development 
takes place of its own accord and without special attention being paid to it. Together 
with the parent, the child learns to identify various feelings in him- or herself and other 
people. The child learns how moods and emotions interact between two human beings, 
how to share emotions, and how to become understood. The child also learns the 
distinction between him- or herself and another person, as well as that between the real 
and the imaginary. As yet, there is, however, not enough data on the circumstances in 
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which mentalisation abilities that have already developed may become damaged. 
According to research, the ability for mentalisation develops throughout life, but it is 
particularly vulnerable to damage as a result of rejection or cruelty experienced in 
childhood or adolescence. Additionally, certain mental health disorders, such as 
depression, borderline personality disorder, or a psychosis, may be linked to poor 
mentalisation ability.  
Defective mentalisation ability may result in a young person identifying with evil and, 
simultaneously, a community of evil. The identification may be caused by the young 
person becoming distanced from the community he or she lives in, such as a school. The 
young person no longer cares about the community, and he or she feels that the 
community does not care about him or her either. This young person seeks other 
communities, where he or she can find objects for identification, feel part of a group, 
and contribute to the community. In a community such as this, a young person may 
believe he or she will gain admiration and publicity by committing an act such as a 
school shooting. 
Our new perception of evil acts and the idolisation of the committing of evil acts can be 
explained in part by cultural factors, such as the increasing plurality and 
individualisation of society. As it becomes increasingly difficult to agree on common 
criteria for what is right and what is wrong, or what is good and what is evil, we may 
start looking for morality within ourselves, our feelings, and the media environment. 
This means that the responsibility for the creation of an identity rests more and more 
often on the shoulders of a young individual. In extreme cases, an evil act may be 
construed as a means of self-expression, even a solution or an answer. 
The tension between good and evil is also an important issue in religions. Religious 
phenomena may involve fascinating, earthshaking, and sometimes even frightening 
experiences of holiness. The essential point here is the extreme character of these 
experiences. In secularised cultures and societies, people frequently seek extreme 
experiences in, for example, sports, which often involve danger, overcoming one’s fear, 
and similar extreme experiences. If this kind of channel or hobby is not available, a 
young person may end up looking for the excitement of danger and passionate, extreme 
feelings in evil phenomena. The young person may regard a particular phenomenon as a 
promise of a mysterious power reminiscent of the holiness of a bygone era. Thus, 
interest in evil may be deeply rooted in our culture, a phenomenon wherein a young 
person experiences something that is larger than life and earthshaking. A young person 
may not feel drawn to good or doing good, as these things do not always seem to be 
meaningful enough or are not accompanied by the kind of publicity that makes one feel 
powerful.  
3.8. The Internet, Web communities, and games 
There are various angles from which to view children and adolescents’ relationship with 
the Internet. Sociologists focus on the fact that for those youth who use it often, the 
Internet offers a channel for social participation and information on things to which they 
otherwise would not have access or be interested in. Young people not only use the Web as 
a source of information more often than older people do; it also comes more naturally to 
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them. Thus, a medium that young people find interesting provides them with information, 
familiarises them with the values of their society, and offers them a channel for social 
participation and communal behaviour even when communication between generations 
does not work well or is non-existent. The Internet also provides us with new opportunities 
for education, new encounters, and the availability of support for young people. 
There is a lot of variation in how intensive Web communities are. In most cases, using 
them is easy and harmless but time-consuming. Examples of these communities include 
Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Habbo Hotel, YouTube, and Wikipedia, all of which have 
millions of users. There might also be a certain amount of defiance and testing of one’s 
limits involved in the use of these global communities, and also smaller, local ones, by 
children and youth.  
The use of the Internet is not without its problems. Several studies have been conducted 
within the EU area concerning children and youth as Internet users, participants, and 
operators. These studies have focused on how they incite people to commercialism, 
aggressive or self-destructive behaviour, pornography, racism, or misanthropy. The 
Internet offers an opportunity to join local or international communities that embrace these 
things. If the use of the Internet is excessive and other social relationships are few, the risks 
increase significantly. Web communities have capitalised on the special qualities of this 
new medium effectively, so addictive relationships are created easily.  
The means suggested by the latest research for minimisation of the harmful effects of the 
Internet are along the same lines. At the societal level, it is hoped that legislation might 
prove effective in controlling content providers, whereas the media education given in 
schools and the guidance provided for parents are aimed at young Internet users. Owing to 
the network’s international nature, controlling the Internet is difficult. Therefore, 
inappropriate content must be combated by emphasising information and individual 
responsibility. Most researchers warn against categorical rules and regulations, as they 
only serve to widen the gap between generations, among other things. 
As digital games grow in popularity, they have become a subject for research. The roots of 
game research lie in the games people played in historical cultures, as well as the cultural 
history of games such as chess. The development psychological and social meanings of 
games have been studied in the fields of educational sciences, psychology, and social 
psychology. Along with the advances made in digital technology, researchers have started 
to study games from the perspectives of information technology and planning sciences.  
Studies of the relationship between violent games and violent behaviour have often yielded 
different conclusions on the harmful effects, usefulness, and meanings of games. There are 
political tensions in this field of research, and research data have been used to justify legal 
action to limit the playing of games or to defend its current status. In the U.S., numerous 
claims for damages have led to a situation where views have become polarised in public 
discussion on games. In Sweden too, there has been heated public discussion on the effects 
of games. In Finland, the discussion has not become quite as polarised. Here, the 
researchers to a large extent agree that children must be protected from violent game 
entertainment aimed at adults, for example.  
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So far, there has been little research into the practical utilisation and effects of PEGI, the 
Pan-European Game Information system. Another subject in need of further study is the 
game-playing habits of children and youth of varying ages. For example, it would seem 
that in studies, 10-year-old boys with a poor relationship with their parents are more 
vulnerable to the effects of games than are girls in the same age group or slightly older 
boys. There is no certainty as to the direction of the cause-and-effect relationships, 
however. Some studies indicate that the excessive playing of games that focus one-sidedly 
on violence may reinforce violent patterns of thought or action. When assessing the effects 
of violent games, we should bear in mind that the player also actively creates meanings for 
the game. Focusing on, for example, social or strategic dimensions, the player may be able 
to see through the surface structure of the game, and violence may lose meaning 
altogether. 
3.9. The connection between the media environment and violent behaviour  
The effects of communication – and media violence in particular – on children and youth 
has been studied since the 1920s. Not only educators but also advertisers and producers of 
propaganda have been interested in the effects of the media, which are generally believed 
to be significant. Traditionally, educators have been the most suspicious of newcomers in 
the media. In terms of violence, this has applied to films, comics, television, video, and 
now the Internet and computer games. A medium that the adult population does not know 
well is bound to cause concern. 
Originally it was believed that the effects of the new media would be extremely strong, and 
the hypodermic syringe theory was born. According to this theory, receivers of media 
content would unquestioningly accept the message conveyed by the media and change 
their opinions and behaviour accordingly. The other extreme in the theory was reached in 
the U.S. in the 1960s with the so-called catharsis theory. This theory suggests that viewers 
who watch violent films or television programmes undergo an emotional cleansing as a 
result of watching these programmes. They do not need to engage in violent behaviour in 
reality, because they can sublimate their need to use violence into the experience of 
receiving the programme. Both schools of thought still have their supporters, but the main 
focus of research is elsewhere nowadays.  
As our knowledge of the effects of the media has increased, so our views of them have 
become more complicated. The main line seems to follow the view that it is extremely rare 
for media content to have a direct and immediate effect on the behaviour of the recipients. 
There have been a few isolated but well-publicised cases where such effects have been 
observed, especially in children and youth who use violent media excessively and 
one-sidedly, and whose other social networks are weak and non-stimulating. Most 
receivers of media content compare their media experiences to the environment they live 
in and media content alone does not change their behaviour or opinions. 
However, repetitive and polyphonic media suggest and create an agenda in the mind of 
the receiver. The receiver finds the things and phenomena conveyed by the media 
important and feels the need to comment on them. While concentrating on this, the 
receiver ignores many other things as if by accident. The media alone cannot define the 
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receiver’s comments; instead, the receiver brings his or her life experience, 
environment, and knowledge into the process.  
This has led to a situation where people’s opinions on distant countries and people are 
based more on media content than on their opinions on things they can easily check in 
their environment. They are forced to base their opinions solely on images of distant 
places and people created by the media. Similarly, children or youth who are often 
exposed to violent material may start to see violence as a way to solve problems, either 
for themselves or in their environment. This effect is multiplied if a child lives in an 
environment with many risks. For example, a child who has been subjected to family 
violence interprets human interaction differently from a child who has grown up in a 
safe environment. 
Conducting both laboratory-type and statistical research, experts have found links 
between excessive consumption of violent media content and increased aggressiveness. 
Friendliness and the willingness to help other people are diminished, and the young 
person becomes inured to violence, which enables him or her to watch ever more brutal 
violence. The person’s views of what is right and what is wrong may also become 
blurred. Individuals have a tendency to end up watching exclusively violent scenes 
particularly if their environment or life situation is difficult. For example, games that 
seemingly contain a lot of violence may, for the players, promote the communal and 
interactive sides of a subculture. The various therapeutic and hate communities active 
on the Internet operate in many dimensions but follow their own sets of rules. 
The basic problem in studying the effects of media on individuals is that even study of 
the short-term effects of violence is possible only in laboratory-type conditions that are 
somehow unnatural by default. Conducting research into the long-term effects is more 
difficult still. We constantly experience, see, and receive various influences both 
consciously and subconsciously, and it is simply impossible for researchers to isolate all 
influences from outside the media entirely.  
Instead of dealing with structural violence or analysing the causal relationships of and 
reasons for violence, the media, to a large extent, just show us aggression and individual 
acts of violence. Research has also shown that excessive reporting of violent incidents 
may create, in the minds of the general public, the illusion that we are living in a much 
more frightening society than we actually are. Thus, at issue is also the nature of media 
content and how it is selected. 
There is a link to both terrorism and school shootings here. Individual events are widely 
publicised, and the perpetrators are consciously seeking publicity. Therefore, the 
existence of the media as such can act as both an incentive and a demonstration of how 
to commit these acts. The increasing significance of the Internet has created global 
communities with their own rules and ethics: their sympathy is on the side of not the 
victims but the members of the community who share the same ideals. Often, 
communities even compete with each other in the significance of their acts. Videos and 
messages that were once removed from the Internet appear again every time a new 
school shooting or act of terrorism is committed. In the investigation of school 
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shootings, many killers were found to have consciously sought publicity, but it is 
difficult to establish a direct connection between media content and the shootings.  
3.10. Crisis communications in the era of the Internet 
In conjunction with the natural disaster in Asia in 2004, it transpired that most ministry 
and official Web sites as well as other public information channels were unidirectional. 
Phone lines were jammed, and even if a citizen managed to get through, the message he 
or she was conveying was not passed on. Neither did the Web sites provide a column 
for citizens who wanted to learn either about the consequences of the event or, for 
example, where they could get after-care for their injuries. The basic idea behind the 
official information services was that the media would act as a buffer between the 
authorities and the citizens. The event also revealed that public information services for 
citizens are usually unidirectional, from the authorities to the citizens. In less than five 
years, a noticeable change has taken place – at least formally. Today, the Web sites of 
all Finnish ministries and other authorities feature a link that citizens can use to contact 
the relevant authority directly. 
The problem was not solved in its entirety, however, as was seen in conjunction with 
the events in Kauhajoki. A person who had engaged in online discussion with the 
perpetrator had, before the school shootings on 18 September 2009, left a message on 
the police Web site, to say he was concerned about the perpetrator and his gun. The 
message was anonymous and did not identify the perpetrator by name, but it did provide 
the police with a link to the perpetrator’s profile on a Web discussion forum. The 
anonymous message was overlooked, however, partly because, owing to virus 
protection, the official dealing with the message on the following day did not have 
access to the Web site linked to. After the school shootings, the National Police 
Commissioner received e-mail reminding him of the earlier message. This message too 
was overlooked.  
When asked about this, the police commented that hundreds of people contact the police 
in situations like this, and that most e-mail messages are either irrelevant or even 
inappropriate. This in undoubtedly true, as research in Finland and abroad clearly shows 
that the increase in opportunities for contacting the police lowers the threshold for 
sending a message. Still, the police should have a system for handling and analysing 
Internet messages from the general public. This system should remain operational also 
in crisis situations. This was one of the aims of the crisis communications instructions 
ratified in 2007. 
It has been alleged that two friends of the perpetrator had sent the police a message, 
saying they were concerned about the perpetrator and his gun. This message was never 
sent to the police, however. 
3.11. Identification of young people’s problems and cross-generation communication 
Prediction of school shootings has proved impossible, but, with the benefit of hindsight, 
it has in many cases been possible to find indications of the perpetrator planning the act 
beforehand and dropping hints on his intentions to people around him. In FBI reports 
and elsewhere, these hints are referred to as leaks, as described above. In school 
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shootings both in Finland and abroad, it has turned out that it was other young people 
who had the most up-to-date information on leaks and made the most accurate guesses 
on the perpetrator’s potential intentions. 
Not only leaks but also school shootings as a phenomenon raise questions on 
cross-generation communication or, more precisely, the lack of it. Even though Finland 
has an extensive system of indicators and statistics in place, that still fails to point out all 
relevant details and problems in young people’s daily life. According to well-being and 
youth studies, what we need is information-gathering methods of a type that can record 
young people’s experiences and hopes that remain outside statistics, surveys, monitoring, 
and other official methods of gathering data. 
In recent years, the promotion of cross-generation dialogue has been emphasised in 
Finland. In 2007, the government ratified the Development Programme for Child and 
Youth Policy, which was prepared by an extensive team of experts. The Youth Act of 
2006 obliges authorities to provide all citizens aged 29 and younger with opportunities to 
participate in the handling of local and regional matters. The new Child Welfare Act, for 
its part, emphasises the importance of the social inclusion of children and listening to 
what they have to say. Listening to what children have to say also has a prominent 
position in the government’s Policy programme for the well-being of children, youth and 
families.  
In practice, the acquisition of silent information on the everyday life of Finnish youth is 
hampered by the fact that, because of problems in interaction and a lack of trust, this 
information is generationally differentiated. The flow of information in various 
institutions has been found to be hindered by the diversity of secrecy regulations and, in 
particular, difficulties in the interpretation thereof. Furthermore, the flow of information 
between various institutions has its own difficulties. Examples of this include the flow 
of information between school and youth work, as well as the differences between 
official information and information provided by the general public. 
According to various youth studies, the status of Finnish youth is poor in cross-generation, 
everyday decision-making, at both local and national level. In the 2008 Youth Barometer, 
young people were asked whether they felt they could really have their say in matters 
concerning their municipality of residence. Only one fifth of them felt they could 
participate sufficiently, while 42% were of the opinion that they could not make an impact 
in practice. This was in spite of the fact that, according to the Youth Barometer, their 
eagerness to participate in decision-making is not diminishing – far from it.  
Their opinions on the attitudes of the decision-makers in their municipality or city 
towards young people as co-operators do not seem to be very flattering, either. One in 
six felt that decision-makers regarded young people as potential discussion partners or 
decision-makers in relation to all or almost all matters. One in 10 was of the opinion 
that young people are not taken seriously in decisions on any matters. Accordingly, we 
need to pay special attention to both the factors hindering young people’s participation 
in decision-making and actual obstacles to this, such as the attitudes of grown-ups, 
which can be considered a major one. The frustration experienced by young people 
when faced with these difficulties in making their voices heard does not necessarily lead 
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them to look for alternative channels of participation in decision-making. Quite the 
contrary, as a matter of fact.  
All too often, young people are left on their own with their problems, which often 
involve negative emotions. For example, studies of experiences of racism show that 
young people seldom share their experiences of segregation with their parents or even 
their friends. According to these studies, young people would rather turn to other adults 
than their parents for advice if such a person is available. The studies also show that 
young people often find it easier to discuss their problems with their friends than with 
their parents.  
According to a comparative Nordic study, Finnish children and youth have fewer 
contacts with adults than Norwegian or Swedish children and youth do. Additionally, 
Finnish children and youth’s opinions of their parents and adults in general are more 
critical than those in our neighbouring countries. According to a study on school 
communities, violent behaviour and mental health problems are partly caused by 
insufficient social capital, which is often accompanied by lack of inter-generation trust 
and interaction. The 2009 Youth Barometer shows social confidence to be unequally 
distributed, with those youth whose parents lack a vocational qualification clearly 
displaying less confidence in their contacts with other people. The effect of this on the 
youth is as strong as their own level of education. 
We know quite a lot about the complicated relationships between the problems facing 
young people in Finland, such as the link between depression and delinquent behaviour. 
Still, the comprehensive prevention and treatment of these problems, as well as the open 
flow of information, is not as structured as it could be. An example here is 
multi-profession student welfare work, which in conjunction with the investigation of 
the Jokela school shootings was found to have room for development. Official 
information is not stored in a single database, and the local information on young people 
that remains outside official channels – in civic organisations, for example – is not 
utilised effectively enough. Our picture of young people’s problems may remain 
scattered and kaleidoscopic, and there is a real risk of information on, for instance, 
young people’s everyday lives and relationships being overlooked. 
In the Kauhajoki school shootings, the perpetrator’s close friends and schoolmates had 
some clues as to the perpetrator’s everyday problems, which he had told them about or 
which had surfaced during their time spent together. These young people knew the 
perpetrator had a gun, and he had hinted at his intentions, even if an offhand manner and 
later downplayed. His friends had been concerned about the gun and told him as much. 
This information was never passed on to grown-ups, however. Neither did any of the 
adults who were close to the perpetrator have an idea that he had sought help from 
municipal mental health services a couple of months prior to the school shootings. The 
student health care services staff at the perpetrator’s school were likewise unaware of 
this piece of information. 
In an FBI report on school shootings, the term ‘code of silence’ is used to refer to the 
phenomenon of young people’s unwillingness to share with adults information that 
might facilitate prevention or early intervention. This is explained by the fact that young 
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people do not feel that cross-generation relationships are safe or confidential enough, or 
they may feel that sharing the information with adults might have an adverse effect on 
their status in the community. Breaking the code of silence is crucial for prevention of 
acts of violence that have already proceeded to the planning stage, which is clearly 
shown by the fact that in most of the incidents in the U.S. that were prevented, the hint 
was submitted by a young person. With reference to this, a study commissioned by the 
Finnish Youth Research Society stated that, in addition to the security plans in schools, 
we should also endeavour to move the entire school culture in a direction more 
conducive to the social inclusion of youth and cross-generation dialogue. This might 
help us to break the code of silence, both in traditional communication and online. This 
means we should try to encourage more trustful relations between young people and 
adults in a way that would be identifiable as such also by young people.  
3.12. Defining communality 
A community is made up of people who have something in common. This common 
thing might be, for example, membership in a family, tribe, or nation. A common goal 
may also be the unifying factor behind a community. Membership in a community can 
be natural, compulsory, or voluntary. A family is an example of a natural community. 
The membership of, for example, a municipality or state may be compulsory. Voluntary 
communities include NGOs and parishes. Different communities play different parts in 
a person’s life. 
Membership in a community is an important factor for any individual and his or her 
development and life. Communality is based on man’s innate need for interaction with 
other human beings. A child does not develop into a social individual unless his or her 
interaction and contact with his or her mother and other educators has a sound basis. 
Family is the foundation on which our community, communality, and social skills are 
based. In addition to family and relatives, friends are important for a human being, as 
we have the need to share our joys and sorrows with someone. Additionally, children 
and youth form groups with others their age in playgroups, play communities, and 
school. An individual grows up, develops, and functions in a community and a group. 
Those who share an ideology or have a similar set of values or beliefs join together to 
form churches or political parties, for example. People also join together to look after 
their interests through NGOs, interest groups, or movements. While studying, a young 
person is a member of a school community and a circle of friends. Likewise, we are part 
of a community at work. Hobbies and leisure activities also bring people together in 
sports clubs, for example. Alongside the development of interactive media, our sense of 
community has gradually started to change. People move and travel more frequently 
than before and also are often active in various Web communities. Communality has 
become more global and, simultaneously, more differentiated. 
Those participating in the activities of the community feel a sense of unity, which is 
essential to any well-functioning community. The identifying features of the 
development and realisation of a communal spirit include the presence of people, 
dialogue between individuals, time spent together, staying in a shared space often, and 
the birth of a common tradition. What is necessary for the development of a communal 
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spirit and communality is the kind of interaction wherein an individual can feel he or 
she is accepted and valuable. An ideal community accepts and tolerates the differences 
between individuals and does not frown upon individuality.  
The members of such a community trust and respect each other in different ways and to 
a varying degree. Those who enjoy the confidence of the community are elected to 
represent it as elected officials, for example. This accumulation of confidence can be 
compared to the accumulation of property, and it is often referred to as social or human 
capital, in contrast to material capital. The use of social capital is ultimately use of 
power within a community. Accordingly, those who wish to gain power in a community 
endeavour to act in the best interests of the community, thereby gaining the social 
confidence of the members. Membership in various NGOs brings additional publicity, 
which, in turn, increases the community’s confidence in a person who performs his or 
her duties well. 
As a concept, a community is not the same as a society, which is more like an entity of 
formal, public economy-related organisations. A community is made up of people. A 
state can, however, also be considered a community, in the sense that its foundation is a 
people living in a certain area. There is a theory suggesting that communal spirit and 
team spirit are the binding force behind all communities and societies. At its most 
extreme, this phenomenon creates an us-against-them situation, which, of course, is all 
about attitudes toward strangers, aliens, or other nationalities in general. Historically, 
this attitude has been useful in terms of the survival of the community, leading to the 
birth of the concept of self-defence. This attitude still manifests itself in wars, the 
current ‘war’ against terrorism in particular: our side is good and the other side is evil. 
So, in addition to its positive qualities, communality does have its dark side – and it is 
sometimes very dark indeed, as witnessed by the Holocaust during the Second World 
War.  
3.13. Young people’s leisure cultures and the new communality 
As society develops, organisations where people simply spend time together are often 
replaced by official organisations, leading to interaction that is more official in nature 
and based on professional specialisation. Commerce and doing business has actually 
become a new way for people to meet, which can be seen in the increasing number of 
jobs available in the service sector. In young people’s lives, this phenomenon is 
represented by educational institutions. The organisation where family members spend 
time together – the home – is replaced by an official academic organisation – the school 
– where the parents’ role as an authority is now assumed by experts or teachers. In 
every school community, each class of students creates a communal phenomenon of its 
own, where young people can learn how to acquire social status. The better the 
integration from the home community into the status hierarchy of school and a new role 
succeeds, the easier it is for a young person to integrate into the new community and 
find gratification at school.  
The greater the difficulties a young person faces in trying to integrate into a school 
community and acquire a status among his or her schoolmates, the greater the risk of 
that student becoming alienated and being left outside this basic community. If a young 
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person becomes a target for bullying or is publicly humiliated, he or she may experience 
feelings of extreme alienation. Losing face, becoming a target for bullying, and being 
humiliated in public may wound a young person to the very core of his or her being. It 
can also lead to the individual’s integration into another, possibly subcultural or 
anti-establishment community. If a young person cannot fulfil his or her need for social 
interaction in a so-called normal community, the young person is likely to start looking 
for another community.  
A young person may become a member of another type of community even if he or she 
is performing reasonably well at school. This new type of communality can also take 
the form of a Web community, for example. It may also be based on a different set of 
values and ideology, such as misanthropy fuelled by the idolisation of violence or of 
games that contain violence, or a preoccupation with guns. The more deeply a young 
person identifies with this set of values and ideology, the greater the chance that he or 
she will start acting in accordance with the new set of values. The commission of a 
radical act may be the final rite of passage into such a community. It also offers the 
person committing it immortality in the eyes of the community or, by extension, via the 
media. 
The well-being and marginalisation of Finnish youth have been assessed on the basis of 
their integration into school and working life as well as the quality of their family 
relations. According to the Youth Barometer studies, young people consider lack of 
friends to be the most important factor behind marginalisation. They feel that, in terms 
of making it in everyday life, social skills are more important than participation in 
decision-making or cognitive abilities. These results highlight the importance of leisure 
as a significant factor in the well-being of Finnish youth. 
It is difficult to reach young people and their everyday life, communality, social 
inclusion, or leisure activities through statistics or political guidance. Youth studies 
show that, in addition to the increased importance of leisure, the opportunities and 
environments available for the young’s leisure time have multiplied and their active 
participation in leisure activities seems to accumulate. Those who are actively involved 
in NGOs, for example, are also active in other areas in their leisure time. The same goes 
for social networks, as those who often see their friends face to face also have an 
extensive social network online.  
In spring 2009, the Finnish Youth Research Network and the Advisory Council for 
Youth Affairs conducted a survey on young people. According to the results, a change 
is clearly taking place in the communality of young people in their leisure time, such as 
in seeing their friends and parents. Even though good friendships are still regarded as 
the foundation for social well-being, Finnish youth see their friends less and less often. 
This change is particularly noticeable among young people on the verge of adulthood, 
between the ages of 15 and 19. By contrast, indirect communication with peer groups is, 
with the introduction of the Internet and mobile phones, on the increase. All told, young 
people’s feelings of communality in terms of society, their municipality of residence, 
and leisure communities has been steadily declining during the 2000s. Additionally, it 
seems that the youth are less committed to these communities than before.  
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According to the survey, many young people feel they have few opportunities to 
participate in decision-making concerning leisure activities. Only about 10% feel they 
can really make an impact on which leisure activities are organised for them in their 
area. Youth in Northern Finland are the worst off in this respect. There is inequality in 
financial matters as well, as approximately one fifth say their participation in leisure 
activities is limited by their lack of money. This is caused by the fact that leisure 
services are increasingly provided by commercial enterprises and, accordingly, are not 
free of charge.  
Young people are clearly less committed to NGO activities, which may have a bearing 
on their well-being. What is particularly noticeable is that 10–14-year-old boys and 
20–24-year-old young men are less active in NGO activities. Additionally, the trend in 
NGOs is toward more free, project-style modes of operation. More than before, young 
people in NGOs increasingly want the organisations to accommodate their individual 
preferences and want to remain less committed. The decrease in participation in NGO 
activities was the greatest in the Helsinki metropolitan area, which is also an indication 
of the commercialisation and virtualisation of leisure activities. Commercialisation can 
be seen in the fact that nowadays shopping centres are the focal point for young 
people’s leisure activities. 
It has been suggested that a key factor in the reduction of school violence and, by 
extension, juvenile violence would be the provision of meaningful nurturing 
environments for young people also after the school day is over. ‘Meaningful’ here 
refers to a safe environment where young people are supported and inspired. In practice, 
this means more support for club and other hobby activities, as well as young people’s 
autonomous and youth-culture-related activities. This is considered especially important 
in areas where resources for leisure activities are scarce. In urban environments, there 
are plenty of opportunities to pursue various hobbies, but in small communities the 
schools, NGOs, municipal and parish youth work organisations, and sports clubs have a 
key role in the arranging of leisure activities. At issue here is not just the quality of 
leisure activity environments and peer relationships but also the promotion of good 
inter-generation relations. 
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4. THE CONDUCT OF THE MEDIA 
Research reports were prepared on the events in Kauhajoki both in the University of 
Tampere and at the University of Helsinki. The study of the conduct of the media is 
mainly based on these research reports and a few newspaper and other articles. 
The focus in the study was especially on the conduct of the media in the first few days 
after the incident. One report concentrated solely on the first 24 hours following the 
incident. Another covered the first 10 days and seven newspapers: Helsingin Sanomat, 
Hufvudstadsbladet, Ilkka, Iltalehti, Ilta-Sanomat, Pohjalainen, and Kauhajoen 
Kunnallislehti. Additionally, news and magazine programmes on all four television 
channels (YLE TV1, YLE TV2, MTV3, and Nelonen) during the week following the 
incident were analysed. The study also covered the Web versions of all the media 
mentioned above.  
Both studies presented a comparison of the conduct of the media in Kauhajoki to the 
conduct of the media in connection with the Jokela school shootings. There were clear 
differences in what the reporting mainly emphasised, but in the two cases the extent of 
the coverage was approximately the same. In total, 1,166 newspaper stories (in seven 
newspapers) were published in the 10 days following the Kauhajoki incident, while the 
corresponding figure for the Jokela school shooting was 1,335 newspaper stories (in 10 
newspapers) in three months. In both cases, most of the coverage was published in the 
week following the incident. After this, stories on the incidents were published only 
occasionally. This also means that the media did not pay much attention to the provision 
of after-care related to the incidents. On the whole, the Kauhajoki incident was covered 
least of all by Ilkka. This was a conscious decision on the part of the newspaper. 
Helsingin Sanomat, however, featured the Kauhajoki incident on its front page, along 
with a picture of the perpetrator. This was the first time since the early 2000s that the 
front page featured something other than advertisements. Back then, the news story was 
the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. 
One major difference between the coverage of the Jokela and Kauhajoki incidents 
seems to have been that in Jokela, all media – for the first time in the recent history of 
journalism in Finland – used their network services to publish the most recent 
information, following the principle ‘as much as possible and as soon as possible’. This 
created many problems among the editorial staff, as it was unclear who was responsible 
or in charge. In Kauhajoki – undoubtedly at least partly as a result of the criticism 
levelled at the coverage of the Jokela incident – the media, to some extent, took a step 
back. Naturally, material was published continuously on the Web, but the essential 
items were reserved for publication via the main medium. The fact that the distance 
between Kauhajoki and Helsinki is considerable could also be seen in two ways. On 
their way to Kauhajoki, media personnel had the time to work out their distribution of 
duties, so editorial command relationships were much clearer than in Jokela. Initially, 
field reporters were often less well informed of the overall picture than those back in the 
editorial office. For example, in the first stand-ups on the scene, the reporters simply 
repeated the information that had been relayed to them from Helsinki by phone. 
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On the whole, the corporations behind the operators in Kauhajoki were covered quite 
equally in the media. Among the police, publicity was shared equally by the National 
Police Commissioner, the National Bureau of Investigation, the situation command for 
police operations, the victim identification unit, and the PR officer. As the situation 
progressed, the National Police Commissioner, who had to deal with the widely 
publicised issue of the perpetrator’s firearm permit, bore the brunt of the media attack 
while the role of local operators became less prominent. In addition to the police and the 
representatives of the Municipality of Kauhajoki and of the polytechnic, the vicar, the 
parish PR officer, and a representative of the Finnish Red Cross were involved. The 
Jokela incident was still fresh in people’s minds, as witnessed by the fact that the youth 
work director of Tuusula Municipality was fourth on the list of operators to have 
received the most coverage. In the coverage of the Jokela incident, the victims were 
featured prominently. By comparison, in Kauhajoki the only representative of those 
involved in the incident was the maintenance man of the polytechnic, and even he 
disappeared from view after the second day. On the whole, the basic viewpoint in the 
media coverage was based on official information provided to the media by the 
authorities. 
Table 1 shows the operators who received the most coverage. By far the most coverage 
during the first two days was received by the perpetrator, who featured prominently in 
every fourth story. In Jokela, the perpetrator was covered even more frequently, as he 
featured in four stories in 10. The differences between these two incidents levelled out 
during the following week. The Kauhajoki gunman received approximately the same 
amount of publicity as the Jokela school shooter, even though the Kauhajoki 
perpetrator’s videos were not shown quite as frequently. This material was used most 
eagerly by the tabloids and the television channel Nelonen.  
Table 1 The operators who received the most coverage between 24 and 25 
September 2008 in the media material on the Kauhajoki school shooting, 
as found in a study conducted at the University of Tampere (n=465) 
Gunman  113 Church 16 
Police 63 Representative of another 
school 
14 
No actor speaking 47 Minister 14 
Representative of the school 36 Child / young person 12 
Other private person 21 School killer / threatener 12 
Representative of state 
administration 
18 Politician 12 
Outside the traditional media, there occurred a phenomenon that is well documented in 
conjunction with the coverage of school shootings abroad: when a similar incident takes 
place, the Web material and groups – so-called hate and comfort groups – associated 
with previous school shootings become active again. Much of the video material related 
to the Jokela school killer was removed after the Jokela incident, but some of it was 
uploaded again in connection with the events in Kauhajoki. This type of cyclic activity 
is likely to occur in conjunction with various dramatic events in our network society in 
general.  
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The eagerness of different media to publish the perpetrator’s name varied greatly. 
Initially, YLE was the least eager and Nelonen the most eager, but these differences 
evened out on the second day. The perpetrator was portrayed as a criminal, a victim of 
school bullying, and even a hero to certain Web communities, but the role of criminal 
was the most prominent. School bullying was not presented as the motive for the crime, 
but it could be interpreted in such a manner as to make the act somehow more 
understandable. The common features of Jokela and Kauhajoki were highlighted by 
showing pictures of both simultaneously that resembled each other as much as possible, 
and the Jokela incident was constantly linked with Kauhajoki in the coverage. For 
example, on the first day MTV3 kept repeating an insert showing children running for 
safety in Jokela. YLE, on the other hand, had an insert showing the Jokela gunman 
aiming and shooting at the viewer through a red frame in all its news broadcasts shown 
after 1pm on the day of the incident. What makes the YLE coverage interesting is that, 
although the company avoided excessive coverage of the gunman, it kept repeating an 
insert compiled from Jokela material. 
Some differences between the coverage of the Kauhajoki and the Jokela gunman are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Comparison of news coverage of the Jokela and Kauhajoki gunmen and  
 their acts, from a study conducted at the University of Tampere 
 Jokela Kauhajoki 
General image of the 
gunman 
Strange, withdrawn, intelligent, 
academically successful. Admired 
school killers. Recently underwent a 
change. 
Ordinary, inconspicuous.  
Average student, contradictory 
descriptions. Led a double life on the 
Web. The act came as a surprise. 
Gunman’s 
relationship with 
friends 
No friends, victim of bullying and 
discrimination. 
Victim of bullying, had friends 
nonetheless. 
Coverage of family The parents’ occupations and active 
participation in social matters. 
Next to nothing said about the family. 
Use of gunman’s 
material 
Plentiful, used often. Little material, a couple of pictures and 
video clips shown repeatedly. Different 
media used differently. 
Internet content used 
in coverage 
World view, ideologies, shooting. Shooting, misanthropic but no clear 
ideology apparent. 
Most newspaper articles were written in standard news style, especially in the first few 
days. There was little emotive content in the papers, and the reporters and 
photographers had – and this undoubtedly was mostly a conscious decision, with the 
criticism they received after the Jokela incident still fresh in their memory – distanced 
themselves, hiding behind a veil of professionalism. They tried to recount the events in 
a matter-of-fact style, and, as the victims were almost entirely left alone, they did in fact 
succeed in this to begin with. As the events unfolded, the balancing act between 
standard news style and flashy, emotive writing became increasingly more difficult, 
particularly for tabloid papers. Live newscasts took a more dramatic approach as they 
targeted politicians, who were treated to an array of difficult questions. 
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In comparison to coverage of the Jokela incident, one of the major differences was that 
in Kauhajoki, the journalists offered possible explanations, questions, and further 
discussion of the subject in addition to just reporting the incident. This is shown in 
Table 3. The list of topics covered was long: the conduct of the Kauhajoki Police 
Department in conjunction with the perpetrator’s firearm permit application process, 
firearm permits in general, and particularly the activities of the Minister of the Interior 
in relation to it, as well as school bullying and schools’ ability to support their students 
in dealing with their anxiety. In Jokela, the school shooting remained a ‘pure’ news item 
for several days more, with its details in time becoming more specific and filled with 
emotive descriptions of the scene. Speculation on the reasons behind the school 
shooting and its consequences started only later. 
Table 3. The occurrence of nine types of explanations given in the media for the 
Kauhajoki school shootings in the initial stages of news coverage, from a 
study conducted at the University of Tampere (n=425). 
Explanation Number % of 
explanations 
Firearms legislation and practices related to it  100 23.5 
Emulation of other school shootings 53 12.5 
Actions of the Minister of the Interior 53 12.5 
Conduct of the police officer who interviewed the perpetrator 53 12.5 
Deficiencies in mental health services and school health care 52 12.2 
The Internet, Web communities, and computer games 49 11.5 
The general atmosphere of society, lack of communality, and 
values 
29 6.8 
School bullying and other school-related factors 21 4.9 
Other media (film and music) 15 3.5 
The coverage of the Kauhajoki incident reflected the criticism aimed at the media after 
the Jokela incident and was therefore careful and avoided mentioning the victims. 
Afterwards, many journalists had the feeling, however, that they might have focused too 
much on the gunman in their effort to avoid emotive reporting. They also emphasised 
that it is the duty of a journalist to report what is going on in the world – even if the 
topic is unpleasant. In interviews, the journalists emphasised the relative nature of their 
professional ethics. They rejected traditional moral principles and emphasised the 
importance of an individual’s conscience. The variation in practices among media 
companies means that journalists end up working for the company whose moral codes 
are closest to their own. But it is also true that ‘house policy’, passed on as silent 
information, often has an impact on a reporter’s moral principles.  
All told, the publicity received by the Kauhajoki school shootings was more versatile 
and less emotive than the coverage of the events in Jokela. According to the study 
conducted by the University of Tampere, both were representative of the discreet crisis 
journalism of the 2000s, where the main focus is on public grieving and individualised, 
but still protected, death. The names of the victims of the Koivulahti flight accident in 
1961 and the Lapua explosion in 1976 were published immediately, along with details 
related to various persons. The death toll in the Estonia disaster in 1994 was so high that 
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the victims were not named. The names of those who were rescued were, however, 
published in the media. The names of the victims of the Konginkangas bus accident in 
2004 were published, but not as flashily or soon as was seen in earlier major accidents. 
However, the names of the victims of the Jokela and Kauhajoki school shootings were 
not published immediately after the accident. Some of the victims’ families announced 
the death of their loved one months afterwards. Even here, the decision was made by the 
families, not the media. This was also reflected in the fact that in autumn 2009, the 
media published the names of all the victims at the wish of the relatives, immediately 
prior to the commencement of the trial of the superintendent who had handled the 
perpetrator’s firearm application. 
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5. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. An analysis of the events 
Planning of the deed  
While committing the deed, the perpetrator phoned a friend, telling him he had been 
planning the deed for two years. He also left a note at home, saying he had been 
planning the deed since 2002. There are no direct references to the planning of the deed 
in any other written messages that were available for the police investigation.  
The perpetrator’s family and friends had been concerned about him already for some 
time, as he had been suffering from self-destructive thoughts and mental health 
problems. Additionally, not only did he show an interest in previous school shootings; 
he positively condoned them and identified with the perpetrators. He had also hinted at 
the possibility of committing an act of violence. As far as can be established, however, 
he had not told anyone about the deed he intended to commit. On the weekend 
preceding the deed, the perpetrator visited his home town. This can be assumed to have 
been some sort of last farewell, but there is little evidence to support this.  
The only concrete facts related to the perpetrator’s preparations for the deed concerned 
his acquisition of a gun in the preceding months and the video he shot in the schoolyard 
on the day before the shootings. Before purchasing the gun, the perpetrator went to a 
shooting range to practise shooting a few times with an air-gun. He also practised 
shooting with the small-bore pistol he had acquired. This shows that he engaged in 
recreational shooting at least to some extent, so the acquisition of the gun cannot be 
shown to have been definitely connected to the planning of the school shootings. 
There is no information on why he chose to commit the deed at that particular time. On 
the Friday preceding the deed, a grave candle had been placed near Kauhajoki Upper 
Secondary School, causing some anxiety and concern. The candle was probably not 
connected with the deed in any way, but, as the police investigated its origin, they 
learned of some shooting range videos the perpetrator had uploaded to the Web. As a 
result of this, the police attempted to contact the perpetrator already over the weekend. 
They managed to contact him on Monday but let him keep his gun. It is possible that the 
attention of the police made the perpetrator hasten the execution of his plan. If the 
perpetrator’s visit to his home town at the weekend is considered to have been a 
farewell, he was probably more or less determined to actually carry out the deed. The 
perpetrator was still totally unaware of the police trying to contact him at that point. 
Conclusion 1 
There is little information available on the planning of the deed. The perpetrator had 
been interested in school shootings for years already and possibly had been harbouring 
some kind of idea of the deed in his mind for a long time. The final decision to carry out 
the deed may have been made quite late, however – possibly in the preceding week or 
even as late as the preceding day. 
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Implementation of the deed 
Before committing the deed, the perpetrator had acquired a gun, cartridges, and petrol 
for lighting fires. He did not bring the silencer or the laser sight with him to the scene of 
the crime, however. On the morning of the day he was going to commit the deed, the 
perpetrator bought a hammer. He may have used it to smash the furniture, but it might 
also have been reserved for some contingency he anticipated. There was nothing 
unusual about the perpetrator’s clothing. 
He entered the school and the classroom where he committed the deed through the 
routes he normally used. He knew his study group would be taking an exam when he 
entered. Earlier that morning, the teacher and the students had made some changes to 
the schedule, however, such that some of the students had already left when the 
perpetrator entered. The perpetrator was seen to prepare himself for the deed in front of 
the classroom door. He entered the classroom and fired a few shots, but he soon 
returned to the corridor, possibly to load a new clip into his gun or to sort out a problem 
he might have had in using the gun.  
Having re-entered the classroom, the perpetrator fired lethal shots at the teacher and 
nine students. Despite having received life-threatening gunshot wounds, one of the 
students managed to escape to the corridor, where the perpetrator fired at her again. The 
shooting lasted for some 10 minutes, after which the perpetrator started moving around 
in the school building, starting fires and smashing furniture. The perpetrator did not 
manage to locate anybody else in the building, so the only gunshot wounds in the 
incident were sustained by the victims in the classroom and the perpetrator himself. 
Conclusion 2 
The perpetrator carried out the deed systematically and determinedly. Once inside the 
classroom, the perpetrator went on a rampage, attempting to kill everyone inside. All 
victims’ lethal wounds were sustained within approximately 10 minutes. 
Self-rescue 
As the perpetrator entered, there were 12 students and the teacher in the classroom. As 
the perpetrator returned to the corridor for a while, the teacher pushed against the door, 
trying to prevent the perpetrator from re-entering. The perpetrator managed to re-enter 
nonetheless. Three students survived the incident by remaining motionless behind some 
furniture. No-one managed to escape from the classroom during the incident. The three 
survivors managed to escape through the windows only after the perpetrator had left the 
classroom.  
Several students around the school reported having heard gunshots, shouting, and a 
rumble in the school. Some of them believed there was a drill of some sort in progress, 
while others thought the commotion was caused by an unusual type of lesson. Some 
students went together to see what was going on and found, among other things, 
cartridge cases on the floor. The maintenance man also arrived on the scene, and he saw 
the gunman in the classroom. Those who realised what was happening started to run 
away from the scene and managed to get other students and staff to join them. Some 
remained in classrooms or the corridor, however, and could not believe the incident was 
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real. Others went to fetch their belongings from other classrooms, in various parts of the 
building. However, everybody did leave the building eventually, the last of them when 
an announcement told them to do so. 
The school had valid rescue and crisis plans in place, and exit drills had been 
performed. The school clearly considered security a priority and was well prepared for 
various types of accident situations. Planning, drills, and the rapidly made 
announcement, in particular, facilitated the early exit of the students and staff and the 
commencement of official action. 
A school shooting situation was not among the risks listed in the rescue or crisis plan, 
and, accordingly, there was no operation plan available for this type of event. The 
exit-related events did not proceed unidirectionally or according to plan in all respects. 
Some confusion was caused by the fact that the Emergency Response Centre instructed 
the people inside the building to take cover behind locked doors, which had worked 
well in conjunction with the Jokela school shootings. The teachers decided, however, 
that it was best for everyone to leave the building. In view of the fires in particular, this 
proved to be the right decision in this case. 
The Rescue Act, school legislation, the National Board of Education instructions, and 
occupational safety regulations provide for the drawing up of safety plans. Since early 
2010, the Polytechnics Act also has obliged polytechnics to prepare for emergencies. There 
may also be other local safety planning rules and regulations pertaining to educational 
institutions. This may lead to several different plans being drawn up, some of which often 
overlap and may not cover all the relevant details. From the viewpoint of schools and the 
persons implementing the plans, the situation is rather confusing. 
Conclusion 3 
All those inside the building managed to exit rapidly enough to prevent the perpetrator 
from finding anyone else in the building after exiting the classroom where he had 
committed the shootings. The announcement that told everyone to leave the building 
was very clear and played an important role in the events. Some tardiness and 
unnecessary hazard was caused by the fact that many people initially refused to believe 
what was really happening. 
Conclusion 4 
Even though the polytechnic had engaged in extensive and meticulous safety planning, the 
rules and regulations providing for this planning are not explicit and uniform. 
Self-preparation and systematic preventive work may significantly enhance safety in 
educational institutions in general.  
Emergency Response Centre activities 
While the incident was in progress, one of the students managed to call the Emergency 
Response Centre very early on. Accordingly, the ERC received a lot of information on 
the events in the classroom and was able to raise the necessary alerts without delay. The 
student’s emergency call while the incident was in progress and keeping the line open 
while escaping was an important, determined, and brave act. The record of the phone 
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call was also an indispensable asset for the police in the ensuing investigation. It 
enabled the ERC to provide support for the caller and another student, who ended up on 
the riverbank after their escape. The ERC also received numerous other emergency calls 
from the school. 
Conclusion 5 
The ERC was informed of the incident in its initial stages and was, accordingly, able to 
summon numerous police, Rescue Services, and Emergency Medical Services units to 
the scene. The Municipality of Kauhajoki management and various administrative 
sectors were also informed of the incident without delay. 
Police operations 
The first police patrol arrived on the scene within 10 minutes of the alert. Having 
arrived on the scene earlier, Rescue Services units had already started to cordon off the 
area. The first police patrol approached the school building but had to turn back as the 
perpetrator fired at them at the main entrance. Having retreated to safety, the police set 
up a field command post some distance away from that of the Rescue Services. The 
police field commander did not set up a separate field command headquarters; instead, 
he led the situation independently for the duration of the incident. This caused some 
delays in reaching the field commander and in the organisation of certain activities. 
Inadequate situation management caused a delay in the rescue of the students who had 
escaped to the riverbank. 
When arriving on the scene, the police assumed there were still people awaiting rescue 
inside the school building. However, everyone had probably left the building by the 
time the first police patrol attempted to enter it. The police were left with cordoning off 
the area, entering the building to apprehend the perpetrator, and preventing the 
dangerous activity from continuing. As soon as more policemen arrived on the scene, 
two teams were formed. Having donned protective gear, the teams entered the building, 
where they made visual contact with the perpetrator some 30 minutes after they had 
received the order to enter. It was at this point that the perpetrator realised he had no 
options left and shot himself in the head. 
Once inside the burning building, the police teams were hampered by the lack of 
breathing apparatus and other fire-fighting gear. Later on, the Rescue Services provided 
the police with SCBA masks and a crash course in how to use them.  
Conclusion 6 
In the initial stages of the incident, there were few policemen available, so it was not 
possible for them to enter the school and terminate the activities of the perpetrator. This 
had no bearing on the number of casualties, however. As soon as the police teams 
caught up with the perpetrator, he shot himself in the head. 
Conclusion 7 
In terms of facilitating the flow of information related to the evacuation and the school 
facilities, it would have been helpful for the police to have had a joint field command 
post with other authorities. Police operations and the flow of information would have 
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been facilitated had the police field commander had other policemen to support him in 
leading the operation.  
Emergency Medical Services operations 
The fact that a local paramedic-level ambulance-driver was teaching at the polytechnic at 
the time of the incident significantly expedited the commencement of Emergency Medical 
Services operations. He immediately assumed responsibility for field operations, and it 
was on the basis of his reports that the Kauhajoki health centre and the hospitals in the area 
stepped up their level of readiness at an early stage. During the incident, ambulance unit 
personnel mainly prepared themselves to treat possible victims and guided students and 
staff to safety. 
The Emergency Medical Services field commander located a facility to which the rescued 
students and staff could be guided. He also contributed to the co-ordination of rescue 
operations and Emergency Medical Services operations. Thanks to the VIRVE connection 
between Emergency Medical Services and the health centre’s chief physician, the 
Municipality of Kauhajoki management team had the necessary situation picture at their 
disposal.  
In addition to the casualties, two students sustained physical injuries. The student who 
received a gunshot wound in the head was promptly directed into an ambulance and 
taken to hospital. The medical staff failed to locate the bullet or the wound immediately, 
but this did not cause additional harm to the student. The other injured student received 
wounds from the window glass when she escaped from the classroom, and these were 
soon treated by the ambulance-drivers and health care personnel. The other student who 
had to hide on the riverbank was also taken to the health centre. The events in the 
classroom and subsequent hiding in the little forest for more than an hour and a half 
were extremely distressing for the students, which the police and Emergency Medical 
Services personnel initially failed to appreciate in full. The police could have escorted 
the students from the riverbank earlier, and the rescue workers could have shown more 
consideration for what the students had just gone through. 
Conclusion 8 
There were only two physically injured patients, which is a low figure in relation to the 
extent of the incident. There was little for Emergency Medical Services personnel to do 
on the scene, apart from guiding students and staff to safety at the nearby commercial 
college, where an evacuation centre was set up. The first ambulance units arrived on 
the scene soon, and enough units were summoned there for the operation. 
Rescue Services operations 
Rescue Services personnel arrived quickly on the scene and, in co-operation with school 
staff and other authorities, were able to guide students into the commercial college 
building nearby. Rescue personnel also assisted the police in cordoning off the school 
building. Initially, the police and rescue personnel had to evacuate people and cordon 
off the area in the danger zone where they were exposed to gunfire. There were also 
numerous bystanders in the danger zone in the early stages. One of the fire engines was 
struck by a bullet fired from the school building, and protecting the personnel 
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performing the evacuation and cordoning off the area became an even higher priority 
for the police. 
Rescue workers had to wait for permission from the police to start fighting the fire and 
perform rescue operations. As there was no definitive information as to the number of 
possible perpetrators at this point, the first Rescue Services smoke divers were covered 
by armed policemen wearing SCBA masks. As there were numerous fires burning in the 
large and sprawling building, extinguishing the fires proved problematic, particularly in 
the old part of the building. Many doors were locked, all of which had to be broken 
open to secure the facilities.  
Conclusion 9 
The first rescuers on the scene started cordoning off the area on their own initiative 
already before the arrival of the police, which facilitated co-operation and expedited 
the commencement of other authorities’ operations. Other duties performed by rescue 
workers included guiding the evacuees into safety and extinguishing the fires. The 
threat of armed violence hampered fire-fighting and initially prevented it altogether.  
The Municipality of Kauhajoki 
Co-operation between the municipality management, the authorities, and the media was 
smooth. That the municipality management had the wisdom to utilise the Municipality of 
Kauhajoki preparedness organisation designated for exceptional circumstances in this 
special situation occurring in normal conditions may have contributed to this. The plans 
and the organisation had been revised and updated in conjunction with a preparedness drill 
in autumn 2007. The Emergency Powers Act, however, obliges municipalities and cities to 
prepare only for exceptional circumstances, or situations where general powers are 
insufficient. In this particular case, there were no problems in summoning the members of 
municipality management. A uniform, national system to alert municipal management 
does not exist, however. The availability of key personnel, substitute arrangements, and 
securing the uninterrupted flow of information vary from one municipality to another.  
Conclusion 10 
The Municipality of Kauhajoki’s management did well in activating its preparedness 
organisation for exceptional circumstances, even though the incident was a special 
situation in normal conditions. Accordingly, municipal preparedness should cover not 
only exceptional circumstances; all eventualities should be prepared for, which was 
already recommended in the investigation pertaining to the Nokia water crisis in 2007.  
Co-operation between authorities 
The authorities involved in the incident would have benefited from better knowledge of 
each other’s principles of operation and equipment. Rescue units provided support for 
police operations in the initial stages of the incident by assisting them in cordoning off the 
area. Before entering the school building, policemen were provided with Rescue Services 
respirators. Covered by the police, the rescue units started fighting the fires later on. The 
policemen had no previous experience in the use of respirators. Meanwhile, rescue workers 
were carrying out their mission in a new type of situation, which involved the threat of 
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violence. Joint training and drills for rescue and police personnel would have been 
advantageous. The practical operations of all authorities would have been greatly 
facilitated if better floor plans of the building had been jointly available. Additional 
problems were caused by the fact that school entrances were marked on the doors with 
different symbols from those used in the floor plans. 
While the incident was in progress, the authorities agreed on co-operation at field 
command level. Rules, regulations, instructions, or training does not sufficiently address 
matters related to the powers of various authorities and general leadership in a situation 
involving multiple authorities. As a result, command relationships, co-operation, and 
operational procedures are agreed upon as each situation develops, which cannot be 
considered a satisfactory solution. 
Rescue Department headquarters informed the Ministry of the Interior Department for 
Rescue Services of the incident, and they, in turn, contacted the Government Situation 
Centre, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, and the Ministry of Education. It took 
35–40 minutes for the information to go through the channels from the Ministry of the 
Interior’s Department for Rescue Services to the Government Situation Centre, but outside 
office hours it would probably have taken even longer. Quick contacts with higher 
authorities were essential for the commencement of support operations.  
Conclusion 11 
Co-operation between authorities was mainly agreed upon at field command level as 
the situation developed. In this particular case, the operations were successful, and any 
other measures taken by authorities arriving on the scene would not have reduced the 
number of casualties. Existing provisions do not specify in sufficient detail the duties of 
the authority in charge in all respects, and training for joint operations is insufficient. 
Victim identification and informing the families 
During the afternoon, the police and rescue workers joined forces in counting the number 
of victims in the school building. Meanwhile, school staff had managed to compile a list of 
all students who had, as far as could be established, been at school that day but who had 
not been contacted as yet. Owing to combustion gases, victim identification personnel 
were able to enter the school only at 6pm, and they started their work by examining one 
victim at a time. There were 10 bodies in the school building, the external examination of 
which took some eight hours. The identification was carried out in accordance with 
standard victim identification procedure. Some of the victims were badly burnt. As the 
external examination proceeded, the families of the probable victims were informed. It also 
took some time to find the contact details of the families. 
Conclusion 12 
In a public incident such as this one, the need for information on the part of the families 
of the victims and the perpetrator is urgent, so it is understandable that they wish to be 
informed as early as possible, even if the identification is not definite. The victims were 
identified in two ways. Firstly, there was a list of presumed victims whom the 
authorities had not managed to contact. The second method of examining the bodies to 
establish their identities was more reliable but also slower.  
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Health care operations 
In the first two hours, dozens of distressed people arrived at the Kauhajoki health centre. 
Some of these were young people evacuated from the school building, but there were also 
people whose next of kin had been there at the time of the incident. The health centre had 
to take special measures to organise the reception of such a large number of people. In all, 
more than a hundred people arrived at the health centre in the course of the day. Several 
hospitals were informed of the shooting, the fires, and potentially multiple victims, so 
they prepared, in accordance with their plans, to receive a large number of severely 
injured patients. Additionally, the hospitals prepared to send personnel to the scene.  
Conclusion 13 
In addition to the casualties and the perpetrator, who was still alive in the early stages, 
there were two persons with physical injuries. Accordingly, health care operations 
consisted mainly of the provision of psychosocial support. The Health Care Services 
personnel and structures were well prepared to treat even a large number of patients. 
Psychosocial support 
There was a need for psychosocial support immediately after the incident, and this need 
is likely to continue for years to come. Municipality management and health care 
authorities learned of the incident early on, and operations were commenced without 
delay. Located near the polytechnic, the health centre was able to send crisis relief 
personnel immediately both to the polytechnic and to the commercial college, where the 
evacuees were arriving. There were many people in need of psychosocial support arriving 
at the health centre. The same need was immediately felt in many other municipalities, as 
all of the victims and many polytechnic students lived outside Kauhajoki. The polytechnic 
also contributed to the provision of support, for its students and staff in particular.  
The evacuees’ passage to the evacuation centre at the commercial college was mainly free 
of problems, but there, as in the health centre also, the organisation of support – especially 
for the families – left much to be desired. The families were forced to go around the 
facilities in search for their loved ones and to take matters into their own hands in trying 
to find information in various places. They would have wished to be shown into a 
special room, where they would have had the opportunity to comfort each other and 
share any information they had on the victims. On one hand, those whose loved ones are 
missing should be cared for as a group, but, on the other, special information services 
should be organised for those who are indirectly affected by the incident. The 
involvement of the police in these activities is necessary, as they are able to both relay 
information and receive it from those who have first-hand experience, as well as collect 
contact details.  
Crisis psychologists, crisis workers, and other personnel from various organisations 
providing psychosocial support were involved in the operations. These workers came from 
primary health care services units in various municipalities, the specialist health care 
services of the hospital district, the Finnish Red Cross, the parish, and the psychologists’ 
preparedness group. Youth workers and social workers provided additional support. Some 
of those participating in the crisis work had been involved in provision of after-care for the 
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Jokela school shootings, which proved a valuable asset in the planning and implementation 
of operations.  
The first priority was the victims’ families, the perpetrator’s family, and those who had 
witnessed the events at close range, such as the three students who had managed to escape 
from the classroom. They all would have needed more help with various practical matters, 
such as learning how to get access to various services and filling in applications for 
damages.  
Others in need of psychosocial support included, most of all, the polytechnic, other 
schools, and the inhabitants of Kauhajoki but also, to a significant extent, those inhabitants 
of other municipalities who were shocked by the incident. Young people are particularly 
vulnerable. The incident also placed a considerable psychological burden on the support 
providers and other professionals who were involved in the incident. Finnish 
municipalities are obliged to make the necessary arrangements for the provision of crisis 
relief in various accident situations, for example. The fact that Kauhajoki and its 
neighbouring municipalities had previously engaged in co-operation in the provision of 
psychosocial support proved helpful in the commencement of operations. 
In practice, the expertise and resources available for crisis work were different in the 
municipalities involved, with the result that the level of support provided varied greatly. 
Small municipalities, in particular, did not possess the means to provide the necessary 
short- or long-term support. The focal point for the events was Kauhajoki, and it was from 
there that the entire relief effort was co-ordinated under the auspices of the Kauhajoki 
Project. The project was led by a hospital district director of nursing. A project plan was 
drawn up, and funding was applied for. Project personnel urged the crisis teams in various 
municipalities to contact directly those possibly in need of support and offer it to them. 
Additionally, the Diocese of Lapua established a project of its own. 
Conclusion 14 
The victims’ families considered the support provided by professional personnel 
important, but what they find especially helpful is peer support, which was something 
they would have liked to receive immediately on the day the incident took place. The 
need for both individual and supervised peer support will continue for years to come. 
Those involved in the incident did not receive the support they needed to take care of 
practical matters. 
Conclusion 15 
The resources and expertise available for the provision of psychosocial support were 
sufficient. However, the necessary command structure was lacking in a situation that 
involved several municipalities, authorities, and volunteer organisations. The situation 
was brought under control to a reasonable extent through the Kauhajoki Project and 
the funding it received. This arrangement had to be created while the incident was in 
progress, however. 
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5.2. An analysis of the background factors 
The target of the act 
The perpetrator had suffered from bullying both at school and in the army. The 
investigation did not reveal any indication of the perpetrator having been mistreated, 
bullied, or in other ways discriminated against at the polytechnic in Kauhajoki. On the 
contrary, he seemed to like it at the polytechnic and in Kauhajoki, and he had some 
friends there. There is no indication of the act being an act of revenge as such. The 
students who became the victims just happened to be in the same group and in the 
classroom at the time of the incident. As far as can be established, the perpetrator did 
not like the teacher who was in the classroom or the subject he was teaching, but 
presumably this fact had no bearing on the events.  
Conclusion 16 
The deed was primarily aimed at the perpetrator’s study group, even though the group 
did not, as far as is known, mistreat him in any way. The perpetrator also shot a friend 
of his. He moved around in the school building, firing shots here and there, and also 
fired at the policemen and other authorities in the vicinity of the school. 
The purpose of the act 
The perpetrator did not identify the purpose of the act, but he modelled the act on 
previous school shootings. In most cases, the immediate purpose of a school shooting is 
to kill a large number of people and to cause large-scale destruction. Some earlier 
school killers had strong views on society and some sort of belief, albeit poorly 
grounded, in making the world a better place through school shootings. The perpetrator 
of the Kauhajoki school shootings had not expressed any such views, even though he 
did repeat some of the phrases used by previous school killers. 
Conclusion 17 
Unlike for some earlier school shootings, no ideological background for the act has 
come to light, even though the perpetrator repeated some of the slogans used by 
previous school killers. 
Circumstances at home and social relations 
The perpetrator’s parents divorced when he was very young, and his father lived 
elsewhere. Because of the new family situation, the perpetrator’s contacts with his 
biological father almost came to an end, but the two resumed contact later, when the 
perpetrator had come of age. The perpetrator’s childhood family were his mother; the 
stepfather; and, later on, stepbrothers. The family moved quite often, apparently for 
work-related reasons.  
The perpetrator was particularly close to his brother, who died when the perpetrator was 
17. This was a heavy blow. Apparently, the perpetrator was also devastated by a traffic 
accident that occurred just prior to the school shootings. The perpetrator knew some of 
the young victims personally. 
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The perpetrator’s closest relationship was with his mother, with whom he did not, 
however, share all his thoughts and opinions. He has generally been characterised as 
reserved about his personal matters. He did have friendships, which he maintained quite 
actively. Some of his friendships went back a long time, while others were more recent. 
He went with his friends on cruises and to rock festivals, and he spent evenings with 
them. His hobbies included his computer and music. Shortly before his death, he took 
up shooting and went to shooting ranges with his friends, initially shooting an air-gun 
and later using a firearm of his own. 
Conclusion 18 
The perpetrator’s family cared for their son, and there is no reason to assume he was 
particularly lonely. However, he did have to face some losses and changes in his life, 
which are statistically known to increase developmental and behavioural risks.  
School attendance 
During the perpetrator’s nine years of comprehensive school, he changed schools six 
times in total, all of which were the result of moving house. After comprehensive 
school, he started vocational school but transferred to upper secondary school after only 
a week. He dropped out of upper secondary school during his first year, then managed 
to complete a three-year course in vocational school. After vocational school, the 
perpetrator started his military service, but his service was interrupted and he went to 
work in England. His last place of study was the polytechnic in Kauhajoki, where he 
had studied for more than a year before the school shootings. His polytechnic studies 
included a period of practical training in Hungary.  
As far as is known, the perpetrator liked it in Kauhajoki, but he had been a target for 
bullying in his previous schools. This bullying was reported by his mother and also a 
friend of his.  
Conclusion 19 
Changing schools several times during his childhood, frequent moves that continued up 
to his final years, and his experiences of being bullied probably made it very difficult 
for him to really put down roots in any community. He did have several friends in 
various localities, however, and he was in touch with them regularly. 
Military service 
The perpetrator started his military service two years before he committed the school 
shootings. As far as can be established, his motivation was initially high but his 
performance was not very good. The possibility of his service being interrupted was 
first discussed during a doctor’s appointment five weeks after he entered service. His 
service fitness classification was downgraded for psychological reasons, and his service 
was interrupted. He was to get a medical certificate by November 2008, when the 
possible continuation of his service was to be reconsidered. The perpetrator had said 
that he had problems in fitting in with the rest of the conscripts, which were manifested 
as bullying and a feeling of being an outsider. 
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Conclusion 20 
The perpetrator’s mental health problems were identified in conscripts’ health care. 
The psychiatric nurse recommended an appointment to see a psychiatrist. This 
appointment was never made, however; instead, the garrison doctor suggested that the 
perpetrator’s service be interrupted, which was also his own wish. The perpetrator was 
sent home, and the process and monitoring were terminated, with the result that the 
perpetrator was left to his own devices in this respect. 
Acquisition of the firearm 
The perpetrator became interested in recreational shooting a few months prior to the 
incident, and he went air-gun shooting with his friends at an indoor range in Kauhajoki. 
The perpetrator was granted an acquisition permit for a firearm for recreational shooting 
purposes, and he purchased a small-bore pistol on the Internet. The gun was delivered 
by post.  
Standard firearm permit policy requires that a newly acquired firearm be taken to the 
police department for initial inspection. The policeman who inspected the gun found it 
in accordance with the conditions laid down in the acquisition permit. The perpetrator’s 
behaviour in conjunction with the inspection was, however, considered somehow odd.  
The perpetrator went to the shooting range to practise shooting as many as several times 
a week, both alone and with his friends. On the weekend preceding the incident, the 
police were tipped off about some shooting videos the perpetrator had uploaded to the 
Web. Over the weekend, the police tried to contact the perpetrator at his home but failed 
to do so. The perpetrator was asked to report to the police department on Monday. He 
was interviewed, but the police found no grounds to confiscate his gun. The school 
shootings were committed the next day, Tuesday.  
Conclusion 21 
A school shooting on this scale, involving such a large number of casualties, would not 
have been possible without a gun. The permit conditions made it easy for the 
perpetrator to acquire a gun. Having seen the shooting videos on the Web, the police 
attempted to confiscate the gun on the Friday preceding the school shootings. The 
police had an opportunity to take temporary possession of the gun on Monday, but the 
policeman who made the decision did not find sufficient grounds to do this.  
Mental health and health care 
The perpetrator suffered from mental health problems, the first records of which dated 
from his upper-level comprehensive days, some 10 years earlier. According to these 
records, the perpetrator had suffered from anxiety attacks, panic symptoms, sleeping 
problems, and at times obsessive cleanliness. His military service was interrupted in 
autumn 2006 for mental health reasons. In January 2007, the perpetrator suffered from 
major anxiety, depression, and deep apathy, which seemed to have disappeared after he 
saw a doctor. The perpetrator clearly had a positive attitude to medical treatment, as he 
sought medical assistance in Kauhajoki on his own initiative. There he saw a depression 
nurse specialist, whose test forms indicate that the perpetrator was suffering from moderate 
152 
 
 
depression and drank heavily. At the request of the depression nurse specialist, a doctor 
prescribed medication for the perpetrator for both his depression and the anxiety attacks, 
but the doctor did not meet the perpetrator personally. According to the National 
Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health, a doctor may prescribe medication without 
meeting the patient in person if the doctor considers the information he receives for the 
prescription to be reliable, and if the patient does not object to the treatment. 
According to the other students, the perpetrator’s behaviour was normal, apart from the 
fact that lately he had started to become aggressive when under the influence of alcohol, 
saying strange things about, for example, school shootings. Other students had been 
sufficiently concerned about these symptoms to mention them to a teacher during practical 
training. Additionally, an acquaintance of the perpetrator conveyed his concern about the 
perpetrator to the police in an anonymous message, sent via the Internet. The message did 
not identify the perpetrator by name, so no further action was taken. The perpetrator’s 
parents and siblings had also been worried about his mental health status. He had 
expressed self-destructive thoughts in military service, in conversations with his sister, and 
in health care.  
In autumn, just prior to the school shootings, his school performance had deteriorated. 
Additionally, he was more often late for school and he left earlier. He also had some 
financial problems, which caused him a lot of anxiety. These financial difficulties were not 
insuperable in any way, however. He exhibited a certain amount of ambivalence both in 
his speech and in his actions. He behaved differently in different situations, and he got 
himself a kitten and some new furniture just prior to the shootings.  
The perpetrator’s life and, accordingly, his mental health were affected by several 
factors, including his infrequent contact with his father, being a target for bullying both 
in military service and at school, the loss of his elder brother, and frequent moves to 
new localities. The perpetrator had also experienced a threatening situation when 
queuing in front of a grill kiosk. His relationship with his girlfriend had recently come 
to an end, and the perpetrator had lost people he knew in a car accident.  
As far as is known, the perpetrator never talked about his feelings to anyone unless 
intoxicated. It seems that he was battling a mental illness he was himself aware of by 
isolating himself emotionally. He tried to lead a normal life, was planning his future, and 
tried to protect his family by not telling them about his problems. In the end, he could 
not control the situation anymore. 
Conclusion 22 
The perpetrator suffered from serious and manifold mental health disorders and 
received medication for his depression and anxiety. With the benefit of hindsight, it 
seems possible that the perpetrator’s symptoms were predictive of a more serious 
condition. In all likelihood, the perpetrator would have benefited from an examination 
performed by a psychiatrist prior to the prescription of medication.  
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A comparison with previous school shootings 
The Kauhajoki school shootings shared several features with previous school shootings. 
As in many previous cases, the perpetrator used a semi-automatic handgun and fuel. 
Another common feature was the fact that the perpetrator eventually committed suicide. 
As in this case, school shootings often occur in small localities that have a reputation for 
being communal. The flip side in small localities may be that, when they are compared 
to larger communities, the opportunities for self-fulfilment and room for being different 
are more limited.  
The fact that the perpetrator targeted his own school was also typical of school 
shootings in general. The perpetrator was a young male with symptoms of depression, 
self-destructive thoughts, and a fascination with previous school shootings. The 
perpetrator had been a target for bullying during his development. His school record 
was average or good. Outsiders had noticed a change in his behaviour, appearance, and 
interests. He had hinted at his intentions without ever actually referring to them directly. 
He had been repeating misanthropic phrases related to school shootings, acquired a gun, 
and practised shooting. To some extent, he was also seeking publicity for his act.  
Unlike many previous school killers, the perpetrator does not appear to have had a 
narcissistic personality or behaved arrogantly. Neither did he hold any particular 
worldview. He was also older than most school killers.  
In some respects, the perpetrator had certain factors in his background that increased the 
likelihood of him becoming a juvenile offender. These factors include mental problems, 
aggressive behaviour and substance abuse, loss of contact with his biological father, 
frequent moves, and negative life events such as the loss of a brother or being a target of 
bullying.  
On the other hand, the perpetrator was in many ways an atypical juvenile offender. In the 
years preceding the act, his relationship with his parents was good, and he liked it at his 
school, where his performance was well above average. He had also been seeing a 
psychiatric nurse. Therefore, he cannot be said to have been alienated in the traditional 
sense, even if he may have had feelings of being an outsider. 
Some of the perpetrator’s problems were common among those committing or attempting 
suicide. This act was different from suicide not only in that there were numerous other 
victims but also in that, traditionally, a Finn committing suicide is seldom seeking publicity 
with his act. Neither does somebody who is contemplating suicide often get him- or herself 
a new pet or new furniture just before committing the deed. 
Conclusion 23 
The manner of execution of the Kauhajoki school shootings and the perpetrator’s 
background shared numerous features with previous school shootings. No particular 
ideology or worldview behind the deed has come to light. The background factors to the 
deed display features typical of juvenile delinquency and suicides. 
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5.3. An analysis of communications and the media 
In an eventuality such as the Kauhajoki school shootings, it is the duty of the various 
operators involved to get the situation under control by minimising damage, assisting 
and supporting the victims and their families, and enhancing communality in society at 
large. When a society reaches the stage called the information society, communications 
and the media play a key role in these functions. Communication is not something just 
the media engages in, as the dissemination of information and discussion are vital in 
recovery from a crisis. 
The conduct of the media 
Media coverage of the Kauhajoki school shootings repeated the typical pattern of coverage 
of a sensational and dramatic event, based on the quick and reliable relaying of 
information.  
The effects of the Jokela school shootings were evident in the news coverage, as 
journalists attempted – consciously or subconsciously – to avoid the excesses they were 
criticised for in conjunction with Jokela. The coverage was clearly less emotive in 
content, and authorities were the main sources of information. Additionally, instead of 
continuously updated online journalism, primarily the main media were used in the 
coverage. In comparison to Jokela, media coverage of the events in Kauhajoki was, on 
the whole, relatively restrained and discreet. Some media could have exercised more 
restraint in their use of pictures and videos in particular. In one instance, a complaint 
was filed with the Council for Mass Media in Finland on the use of a particular video 
clip, but the complaint resulted in an acquittal. The complaint was filed on the grounds 
that the Nelonen channel included videos deleted from a Web service in its news 
broadcast to allow the audience to form a picture of the activities of the Kauhajoki 
police prior to the shooting. According to the Council for Mass Media in Finland, the 
video clips provided the audience with relevant information, which allowed them to 
better grasp the situation in its entirety. The Nelonen channel was acquitted. 
Even though the news media did not present the incident in an idolising light, the 
extensive coverage, focusing on the perpetrator, still created an image of him as a hero. 
This kind of interpretation is possible, especially as, according to many reports, 
extensive media publicity was exactly what many school killers were dreaming about. 
Some of the victims’ families were offended by the way the gunman was ‘turned into a 
hero’, while the media ignored the victims. However, focusing on the victims may 
involve unforeseen risks, as was seen in conjunction with the Jokela school shootings. 
Coverage of the perpetrator was no more extensive than in Jokela, but the audience was 
left with a different impression, as the focus was on the perpetrator and the authorities 
instead of the victims.  
There is an explanation to coverage focusing on the gunman: it is hardly conceivable 
that modern journalism, which relies heavily on instant reporting and new technology, 
would not report the activities of the main figure. The journalists did, after all, learn the 
identity of the perpetrator early on. In a way, official information also justified focusing 
on the perpetrator, since the perpetrator’s name was made public by a minister in a 
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media conference at 3pm. This happened before even the perpetrator’s parents had 
received confirmation of the fact.  
In the publication of names – whether of the perpetrator or the victims – the established 
practices of the media are in blatant disharmony with the general significance of the 
matter. What matters to society is that the perpetrator is apprehended and the families of 
the victims are informed as soon as possible. It is important to ensure that the victims’ 
families are informed before the names are released. Even after this, the names have 
little informational value. The victims or their families may not want publicity. On the 
other hand, publicity is exactly what the perpetrator is seeking, so it should not be given 
to him unnecessarily. There were significant differences in how and when the various 
media released the name of the perpetrator on the day of the incident. 
Publishing the names is a difficult professional dilemma for journalists, as is evidenced 
by the phraseology used in the Guidelines for Journalists published by the Council for 
Mass Media in Finland. This problem has become even more complicated with the 
advent of new technology, as it is easy nowadays for journalists to discover the relevant 
names through Web services. The ethical judgement of journalists and editorial staff is 
put to the test by any big, dramatic news event. More and more often, editorial staff face 
a situation where not publishing the name of, in particular, the perpetrator seems 
hypocritical. There were differences between various media in how and when they 
published the names related to the Kauhajoki incident, but on the whole it is safe to say 
that generally the coverage was reasonably balanced.  
The shadow of Jokela was still visible in the fact that, in addition to traditional coverage 
focusing on the events themselves, a new, less news-like type of reporting soon 
established itself. On one hand, the incident was repeatedly compared to the Jokela 
school shootings and the measures taken afterwards. But, on the other, journalists 
questioned the firearm permit application procedure, the position of the Minister of the 
Interior, and the planned school reforms alike. However, as in all major news events 
today, the media soon lost interest. The incident was not followed by public discussion 
or follow-up reports as it should have been. 
There were reports of some foreign media representatives behaving inappropriately in 
conjunction with the Kauhajoki incident. There are few facts on this, but what there is 
seems to support the studies that found the behaviour of journalists to be the more 
outrageous the further the everyday reality of local people is from the medium’s 
operating environment. These studies were also supported by the fact that the media that 
were geographically closest to Kauhajoki were very discreet in their coverage, even 
regulating the volume. They did not want to add to the anxiety they had witnessed 
firsthand.  
Conclusion 24 
The media had learned their lesson and did not repeat the excesses they went to in Jokela, 
either on the scene or in their news coverage. The coverage focused on the gunman, and 
mere description of what had happened was soon replaced by discussion of problems in 
Finnish society in general, though the latter never actually reached the depths it ideally 
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could have. The restraint the media exercised in their coverage of the victims was an 
example of responsible journalism. 
Conclusion 25 
It goes without saying that, in their reliance on instant reporting, the modern media treat 
school shootings in the same way as any other major news event. In covering and 
analysing this kind of event, journalism is itself part of the phenomenon, and its ethical 
responsibility is far greater than in many other cases. 
The Web environment 
Even though the perpetrator's use of the Internet was not as constant or intensive as that 
of the Jokela school killer, he still modelled his act on the modes of operation employed 
by previous school killers, which he had learned online. Both the Jokela and the 
Kauhajoki school killer familiarised themselves particularly with Web material related 
to school shootings. 
One of the effects of the Kauhajoki incident was that videos and other material that had 
already been deleted, referring especially to the Jokela school shootings but also to 
previous incidents, started showing up again even in the most popular Web services. 
Private computer users around the world typically upload material that has already been 
deleted to the Web when the material becomes topical again as a result of a new event. 
In a similar fashion, various Web communities – some of them full of admiration for the 
act, others focusing on shared grief and offering solace – sprang up quite soon after the 
incident.  
The re-emergence of old and harmful material is part of the circulation or cyclical 
operation so typical of the Web and other social media, and which is almost impossible 
to prevent. Young people’s Web activities cannot and must not be restricted through 
legislative means – after all, the Web is, on the whole, a useful source of information 
and entertainment, as well as a channel for social activities. Children and young people 
are more familiar with the versatility of the Web than adults are.  
We can make an impact on how people use the Web through the development of media 
literacy, a basic skill in society of our time. Systematic communication education as part 
of school curricula would promote critical and well-informed Web behaviour and 
educate young people to become more critical in their usage of the Web. Good Web 
skills also include the ability to use appropriate equipment, as well as the skill to filter 
and evaluate the information received. Media literacy is included in the 2004 National 
Core Curriculum for Basic Education as a cross-curricular theme in mother tongue and 
literature studies as well as art, but its effective implementation is still heavily reliant on 
the enthusiasm of individual schools or individual teachers. 
Conclusion 26 
The Kauhajoki school shootings led to the re-emergence of Web material related to 
previous school killers that had already been deleted or had remained in the shadow of 
other, more interesting material. The Web environment and its use might become an 
even more useful communal force and discussion platform through further development 
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of the media literacy of all generations. The presence of grown-ups on the Web is also 
absolutely necessary. 
The media and authorities 
Authorities’ media liaison during the Kauhajoki incident was relatively smooth for the 
most part, even though the media did find the co-ordination between the various 
authorities less than perfect at times. Media conferences were held regularly, and the 
journalists were provided with the necessary work space. The authorities aimed to relay 
all information as soon as possible and managed to avoid the kind of delays seen in 
Jokela. It has to be admitted, though, that in Kauhajoki, the authorities did have more 
time for planning and preparation, because most of the journalists did not arrive on the 
scene until a few hours after the incident. 
Many new instructions pertaining to communications in public administration have 
been issued in the 2000s. These instructions are new in terms of both their content and 
implementation, and they emphasise openness and the important role of 
communications in the work of all civil servants. Such instructions are, however, easily 
forgotten in a major crisis, as the various operators need to step up their standard 
activities and their information services simultaneously. Communication easily slips 
back into its traditional role of hierarchical provision of information, considered the 
exclusive domain of professional media officers. This was mostly avoided in Kauhajoki, 
even though not every authority managed to perform its duty in this respect, busy as 
they were.  
Conclusion 27 
The recent, extensive reform of communications ideology in public administration 
clearly had an effect on the way the authorities provided information during and after 
the incident. Further training is necessary, however, to enhance co-operation between 
various authorities and individual operators’ willingness to provide sufficient 
information.  
Authorities and the general public 
In terms of communications, it was the direct relations between authorities and the 
general public that caused the most problems in Kauhajoki. Caring for the victims’ 
families and keeping them informed were not fully co-ordinated either during the 
incident or after it.  
The use of the Web in public administration has greatly improved and become more 
versatile since the 2004 tsunami, which is, without doubt, largely the result of improved 
communications instructions. These instructions repeatedly emphasise that public 
administration entities must be able to communicate with the general public directly, not 
just via the media.  
Messages sent to the police by people who had known the perpetrator personally and 
were concerned about his gun received a lot of publicity in conjunction with the events 
in Kauhajoki. It appears that some of these messages were never actually sent, and one 
message, which did not identify the perpetrator, had been sent anonymously via the 
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police Web site. It was perfectly understandable for the police to ignore an anonymous 
message. After the school shootings, the National Police Commissioner received an 
e-mail message reminding him of a warning sent to the police earlier. This message was 
also ignored, and its origin was initially not confirmed. Information on the perpetrator’s 
problems, such as his substance abuse, acquisition of a firearm, mental health problems, 
and occasional aggressive behaviour when intoxicated was available from various 
sources. However, nobody had a comprehensive picture of the situation, and the 
individual pieces of information were not particularly worrying in isolation. The above 
does raise some questions on the flow and processing of information, however. 
Online communication has lowered the threshold for directly approaching not only 
various institutions and individual civil servants but also Health Care Services, Youth 
Services, or school personnel. Each day, authorities receive numerous messages, with 
many types of content. Most of them are undoubtedly inappropriate or meaningless. 
However, it is an established principle of good governance that messages from the 
general public generate some sort of response. What public administration needs to do 
today is to develop mechanisms to process and, if necessary, to forward initiatives and 
questions from the general public for further steps to be taken. The existence, made 
possible by technological advances, of a democratic channel from the general public to 
the authorities is not enough if the voice of the people and the channel available for 
them do not receive the respect they deserve. Neither is the Web alone sufficient to 
satisfy victims’ families’ need for information. 
Conclusion 28 
In terms of communications, the most urgent target for development in public 
administration is the enhancement of a direct channel for the general public, for use 
both in crisis situations and in normal conditions. The creation of a viable system for 
the analysis of messages sent by the general public would improve the flow of 
information, increase citizens’ opportunities for making their voices heard, and 
enhance the allocation work in the activities of various organisations. 
5.4. A summary of the key factors that led the perpetrator to commit the act 
That the perpetrator ended up committing a school shooting was the result of a long 
process involving many factors. No background factor or event ever justifies the kind of 
act the perpetrator committed. However, to facilitate preventive work in the future, it is 
useful to list certain things that may have increased the risk.  
The perpetrator had been suffering from various mental health problems for 
approximately 10 years, and his condition had taken a turn for the worse. He had a 
positive attitude to medical treatment but was not referred to a doctor. With the benefit 
of hindsight, it would seem that he would have benefited from a psychiatric 
examination and might have received some help with his worst problem. The factors 
that probably contributed to the perpetrator’s depression included being repeatedly the 
target of bullying, the break-up of his family, the difficulty – caused by frequent moves 
– he experienced in becoming integrated into a community, and the death of a brother 
he was particularly close to. His parents and friends’ concern did not reach those 
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individuals or authorities who might have been able to help him, or the messages did 
not trigger a sufficient response. 
In the light of the information currently available, it is impossible to establish beyond 
any doubt why the young man’s mental health problems were channelled into an 
admiration for school shootings and, eventually, led to him committing the deed. The 
act was modelled on previous school shootings the perpetrator had mainly read about on 
the Web.  
The perpetrator carried out the deed with a self-loading or semi-automatic firearm, 
which was small-calibre but still capable of inflicting serious damage. As is usual in 
Finland, he had no difficulty in acquiring the necessary permits for his gun. Without 
exception, a firearm has been used in all school shootings, and the use of one has 
become a model for those who admire and idolise school shootings. 
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6. MEASURES TAKEN 
The most extensive measures taken after the Kauhajoki school shootings were 
introduced within the framework of the Internal Security Programme. Various 
ministries drew up proposals for the enhancement of the implementation of the 
measures outlined in the Internal Security Programme. The ministerial management 
group for internal security discussed the proposals, then accepted them on 5 November 
2008. The measures were categorised as follows: 
1. The development and extension of authorities’ Web services aimed at young 
people 
2. The enhancement of communications between various authorities and the 
removal of possible obstacles 
3. More effective monitoring of the Web 
4. The development of local security planning 
5. Increased security education in schools 
6. Other proposals 
Other proposals included the appointment of a named police officer in schools, closer 
monitoring of violent Web games, the prevention of hate crimes, and co-operation with 
the media.  
In November 2009, the steering group for internal security and the ministerial 
management group for internal security discussed the follow-up reports submitted to 
them on the implementation of the measures. Measures already taken are listed in 
Appendix 2. Other measures, not directly related to the Internal Security Programme, 
include the following: 
− The Finnish Association of Fire Chiefs published its new Security Guide for 
Educational Institutions. 
− In November 2009, the Council for Mass Media in Finland appointed a working 
group to determine whether it is necessary to revise the Guidelines for Journalists 
document. The working group will submit its report by the end of April 2010. 
− The Current Care Guidelines for the treatment of depression were revised. The 
most essential new recommendations concern the prevention of depression 
through psychological interventions and improved living habits, the significance 
of exercise in acute care, and a wider spectrum of psychotherapeutic treatments 
that have proved effective. 
− The Government Decree on Family Centres, School and Student Health Care, 
and Preventive Dental Care for Children and Adolescents (380/2009) entered 
into effect in July 2009. The decree addresses identification of the need for 
special support and the provision of this support, the promotion of and support 
for mental health, and the prevention of school bullying.  
− In January 2010, the working group on the security of educational institutions 
published its report as No. 40/2009 of the publications of the Ministry of the 
Interior. The working group’s task was to issue instructions for the preparation 
of security plans; to provide schools, the police, and rescue authorities with 
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instructions on how to act in a threatening situation; and to plan how these 
instructions shall be implemented. 
− The government bill of 4 February 2010 concerning the Youth Act contains new 
provisions for a multidisciplinary co-operation network for local authorities, as 
well as youth outreach work and related disclosure of data. Additionally, a 
special grant for the extension of youth outreach services to cover some 60% of 
Finnish municipalities has been allocated in the 2010 State Budget. 
− The Church has increased the number of parsons and other Church workers in 
educational institutions, initiated a project for the development of psychological 
support, stepped up its Web activities, and provided more resources for its help 
line.  
− A two-year prospective follow-up study of the coping, support, and treatment of 
the students who were exposed to the incident is currently under way in the 
National Institute for Health and Welfare. An intermediate report was published 
in 2009. 
− The Finnish Defence Forces have reviewed and revised their instructions on the 
handling, storage, and possession of firearms and have also been developing an 
aptitude test for conscripts. 
− The Rescue Services have introduced a new situation picture system (‘Jotke’). 
− Several seminars have been organised on the topic of school shootings. 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1. The availability of firearms 
The perpetrator used a self-loading or semi-automatic small-bore pistol, for which he had 
the appropriate permits. As is usual in Finland, he had no difficulty in acquiring the 
necessary permits. The Jokela school killer was granted his gun without having been 
interviewed personally. By the time of the Kauhajoki incident, the procedure had been 
revised, and the perpetrator was interviewed by a policeman before he was given an 
acquisition permit. Additionally, the perpetrator was interviewed by the police a second 
time, because of the videos he had uploaded to the Web. In both instances, the perpetrator 
was found to meet the requirements of the rules and regulations in force at the time to 
qualify as a person who may be entrusted with a firearm.  
Attempts to identify potentially criminal intentions in an interview conducted by the police 
or a doctor have proved unreliable, as evidenced by the fact that both the Jokela and 
Kauhajoki school killers were able to behave matter-of-factly when the need arose. Neither 
does it seem possible to deem an applicant suitable or unsuitable for possessing a firearm 
on the basis of mental health diagnoses. 
Without exception, a firearm was used in all previous school shootings. Furthermore, 
studies examining school shootings in the USA have shown that school killers typically 
had easy access to a gun. A firearm firing multiple shots within a short time makes it 
possible for the gunman to kill multiple victims. In Kauhajoki, none of the 13 people in the 
classroom managed to escape during the shooting incident. 
There are many guns in Finland, and, owing to historical traditions, Finnish people have a 
positive attitude to guns. Guns are used for many purposes, mostly for hunting and 
recreational shooting. These activities have no direct relation to school shootings – or any 
other type of violent crime, for that matter – as guns, on the whole, are actually quite 
seldom used in acts of violence. The large number of guns in Finland and their easy 
availability do, however, increase the pro-gun mentality among the population, create 
opportunities for firearms’ use for destructive purposes, and thereby reduce public security. 
Some of the legally owned guns end up in illegal markets through theft, for example. Only 
the kinds of guns that do not enable their users to carry out such large-scale carnage should 
be allowed in recreational shooting. 
Recommendation 1 
The Ministry of the Interior should take steps to ensure that all handguns allowing their 
user to fire a large number of shots within a short period of time are collected – against 
payment, for example – and that no new acquisition permits are granted for such firearms. 
Handing in illegally owned guns should be made more attractive for the owners.  
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Recommendation 2 
The Ministry of the Interior should take steps to raise the age limit for the possession of 
firearms to 20 years, to make all permits fixed-term, and to set two years of recreational 
shooting on a regular basis as a necessary condition for the granting of a permit.  
One member of the Investigation Commission filed a dissenting opinion with regard to the 
availability of firearms. The dissenting opinion is presented in Appendix 1. 
7.2. The development of mental health services for young people 
The perpetrator had been suffering from various mental-health-related symptoms for some 
10 years and, on the basis of the information available for the investigation, was falling 
seriously ill. He received medical treatment for depression and anxiety. The perpetrator 
would in all likelihood have benefited from a medical examination performed by a 
psychiatry specialist. By contrast, the Jokela school killer was found not to have received 
sufficiently comprehensive and systematic treatment or sufficient follow-up monitoring for 
his mental health disorder.  
It is crucial to pay special attention to the mental health of young people referred to as 
young persons in the Youth Act, or people aged 28 or younger, in order to intervene in the 
process of marginalisation as early as possible. Medication alone, prescribed on flimsy 
grounds, cannot be considered the correct form of treatment for a young person. 
Therapeutic support is an essential element in the treatment of young people. 
The need to develop mental health services for children and young people is echoed by the 
latest recommendations, issued in 2005, of the committee monitoring the implementation 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Finland. The committee recommended 
that Finland take more effective measures for the prevention of juvenile suicide and 
enhance its mental health services.  
According to a consensus report on the well-being and ill-being of Finnish youth, 
submitted in 2010 by the Finnish medical society Duodecim, the prescription of 
psychotropic medication for young people between 13 and 22 years of age should always 
be preceded by special consideration and careful assessment of the situation. This is why a 
medical examination performed by a psychiatry specialist or another doctor specialising in 
psychotropic medication for young people is a necessary precondition for the prescription 
of such medication. 
Recommendation 3 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health should take steps to ensure that the 
prescription of psychotropic medication for young people aged 22 or younger is always 
preceded by a medical examination performed by a psychiatry or psychotropic 
medication specialist.  
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7.3. Enhancing cross-generational interaction in educational institutions 
The perpetrator had talked with other people about school shootings and his experiences of 
being the target of bullying. Some people were aware of his mental health problems, and 
even more people knew about his at times excessive use of alcohol and his aggressive 
behaviour when intoxicated. The people who were aware of his problems included his 
friends, other students, his parents, and (to some extent) health care personnel and teachers. 
These people saw that the perpetrator had some problems, but none of them actually had a 
comprehensive picture of the situation. A similar situation was behind the Jokela school 
shootings. 
Members of young people’s social communities are in an excellent position to look after 
each other’s well-being. We also need other networks capable of providing support, such 
as school communities, health care services, and youth services. Good cross-generational 
interaction is a necessary condition for successful co-operation, which in its turn will allow 
us to identify the invisible problems behind the social ill-being of young people, and to 
access the silent information concerning their everyday lives. There is need for both 
private and public discussion. 
To create meaningful dialogue, we need changes in school culture, changes that would 
allow us to build confidential relationships – that also young people would identify as such 
– between adults and young people as well as structures that support the social inclusion of 
young people. This change can be achieved on the level of individual schools but also by 
enhancing in particular teachers’ understanding of the dynamics of social groups among 
young people. This is where youth work and NGOs can make an impact. It is therefore 
vital to utilise their expertise and modes of operation in the enhancement of 
cross-generation interaction also in a school environment. The prevention and 
identification of the violence faced or committed by young people, as well as dealing 
with it, is the educational duty of all those working with young people. 
Enhancement of student health care, student associations, and the health care system in 
polytechnics would also promote the identification of students’ problems and dealing with 
these problems in a comprehensive manner. Universities and the occupational health care 
system could provide a model for this, as they offer their students and workers an initial 
medical examination and provide assistance for addressing various problems without 
delay. On the whole, there seem to be grave deficiencies in Finnish schools of all levels 
in the availability of school doctor or psychologist’s services, for example. The 
recommendations on personnel resources and health examinations have largely been 
ignored. There has also been considerable variation in how well students are able to 
participate in the planning of their own activities.  
Recommendation 4 
Working with the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
should take steps to provide additional resources for student health care, particularly 
for the mental health sector. This would imply the introduction of regular, compulsory 
health examinations, for example. 
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Recommendation 5 
The Ministry of Education should take steps to provide students with school-specific 
opportunities to express their concerns and opinions also on the Web and to discuss 
them with student welfare personnel. The system should include procedures for the 
identification and processing of problem situations. 
7.4. Comprehensive security planning in educational institutions 
Together with the announcements made over the PA system, self-rescue was an important 
factor in restricting the shooting to only one classroom in the Kauhajoki school shootings. 
Evacuation was expedited through the order to leave the building, made over the PA 
system. The school had prepared itself for various eventualities, even though a situation 
such as a school shooting had not been identified as a potential risk in the plans.  
According to rescue legislation, all educational institutions must have a valid rescue plan in 
place, with the emphasis usually on fire safety but also on other types of accidents. 
According to the National Core Curriculum for comprehensive and upper secondary 
schools, all schools must have a crisis plan and a plan for the protection of students from 
acts of violence. A corresponding obligation to draw up emergency plans currently also 
applies to polytechnics and universities. Occupational safety and health legislation 
provides for addressing safety issues pertaining to school personnel. Local security 
planning, also referred to in the Internal Security Programme, is carried out on the 
municipal level. In Kauhajoki, the police are responsible for this planning.  
From educational institutions’ viewpoint, these obligations appear not only complicated 
and organised along sector lines; they also seem to emphasise the special features of each 
sector at the expense of the overall picture. There is a risk that resources may prove 
insufficient for maintaining several separate plans or for providing the necessary training. 
Furthermore, there may be some overlap in the plans, and they may not cover all areas. 
The best model for security planning in educational institutions is probably one supervised 
by the local rescue authority in conjunction with regular fire inspections. 
An approach that emphasises a comprehensive and extensive assessment of security risks 
would yield better results in security planning. Information on accidents, dangerous 
situations, and similar events both within the school community and elsewhere could be 
utilised to identify potential risks. What we need to bear in mind is that the school 
shootings phenomenon will develop and undergo changes. The identification of potential 
risks forms a solid base for the prevention of accidents and other, similar events, which has 
previously often been overlooked in security planning, for example.  
Recommendation 6 
The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health should take steps to compile all security-related planning and 
instructions in educational institutions into a single document that is updated regularly. 
The essential elements here are the identification of potential risks; the systematic 
prevention thereof; and instructions for various security-related eventualities, 
distributed to students in pocket-sized booklets, for example.  
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7.5. Command relationships in situations involving multiple authorities 
Co-operation among the various authorities involved in the Kauhajoki incident was mainly 
carried out on field command level. Their modes of operation gradually took on similar 
features, which is something that often also happens in conjunction with smaller joint 
operations. Indeed, a useful model in emergency situations is to repeat what has previously 
been done in similar situations or drills. In a major operation, however, the crucial 
difference is the large number of operators involved and the urgent need for clear 
command relations. Owing to the nature of this particular incident, the police were deemed 
to be in charge of the situation. The various authorities involved in the operation did not 
have a sufficient joint situation picture. The co-ordination of the activities was random to 
some extent. 
According to the Rescue Act, the chief of rescue is in overall command in a rescue 
operation involving authorities from several administrative sectors. This provision has 
not been applied in conjunction with school shootings, but the authorities have not made 
joint preparations to act otherwise. It is probably most natural for the police to be in 
command in situations of this nature, but in some cases it may be difficult to draw the 
line. This could occur in the case of an explosion or a fire whose cause is initially not 
known, or in a situation such as the Nokia water crisis in 2007, for example. The nature 
of rescue activities in a school shooting incident may also be significantly different if 
there is a large-scale fire in the building or the number of evacuees or victims to be 
rescued is large. Command relationships should be clear and determined in advance to 
meet the demands of various situations in varying circumstances. 
Instructions, plans, training, and drills do not sufficiently address accidents and special 
situations wherein the participation and co-operation of multiple authorities is required. 
These shortcomings become particularly pronounced in situations where decisions on the 
co-ordination of operations, maintenance of the situation picture, and general command 
have to be made swiftly.  
Recommendation 7 
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health should take 
steps to provide the police, Rescue Services, and Emergency Medical Services with 
jointly approved co-operation plans that are adaptable to a variety of situations and 
sudden changes in operation circumstances. Sufficient training and drilling must be 
provided to ensure that the plans work in practice. 
7.6. Co-operation between authorities in prevention work 
The underlying factors behind school shootings are general ill-being and problems that 
the various operators in society have failed to identify adequately, with that failure 
having made early intervention impossible. To create a more comprehensive 
understanding of this phenomenon as well as an atmosphere of caring, the Investigation 
Commission hereby repeats recommendation 11 issued by the Investigation 
Commission for the Jokela school shootings.  
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The emphasis in the implementation of the recommendation should be on prevention in 
particular. This also involves the need to compile all studies related to preventive work 
in police training into a single study module, which would facilitate the development of 
preventive police work into part of daily police routines. 
Recommendation 8 
In co-operation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of the Interior should take steps to develop co-operation 
involving multiple authorities such that it takes a more systematic and regular direction. 
This co-operation is necessary in preparation for various eventualities, as well as to 
train for and co-ordinate preventive security work also. 
7.7. Co-ordination of psychosocial support 
The incident resulted in a large-scale need for psychosocial support in several localities. 
All the victims, their families, and many of the polytechnic students did not live in 
Kauhajoki. Psychosocial support is part of the social welfare and health care system, 
whose services are primarily provided by the municipality of residence of the person in 
need of support and, more specifically, its health centre-based crisis team. In practice, this 
support can be provided through joint municipal authorities, specialist health care services 
in hospital districts, and various NGOs or the Church. The municipalities surrounding 
Kauhajoki had for years been engaging in municipal co-operation in the provision of crisis 
relief, which facilitated the rapid commencement of crisis work there.  
It soon became apparent, however, that the resources available for crisis work in these 
municipalities were woefully inadequate for a crisis of this magnitude. Small Finnish 
municipalities, in particular, simply do not have the resources for such a large-scale 
eventuality involving several municipalities and other organisations. In this instance, the 
long-term crisis work was organised through the setting up of a special project, application 
for funding for this project, and the hiring of additional personnel. This arrangement had to 
be undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the incident, which naturally reduced the 
amount of time and the resources available for actual crisis relief. As the project was 
established, matters of responsibility and leadership were unclear, and there was no 
guarantee that the project would receive the necessary funding.  
There are a large number of qualified personnel available for the provision of psychosocial 
support, in various organisations throughout Finland. There are, however, no plans in 
existence as to how these resources may be utilised most efficiently. Accordingly, the 
provision of psychosocial support may involve delays, uncertainty about the duties of 
various organisations, overlaps, concern for the continued availability of resources, a lack 
of overall command, and inexpedient allocation of support. The need for support 
experienced by a person living far away from the scene of the accident, for example, may 
go unnoticed. The same can happen in the case of, for example, a bus accident where the 
victims or survivors come from somewhere else than the municipality where the accident 
occurred. 
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Recommendation 9 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health should take steps to ensure that the plans, 
resources, responsibilities, and competent leadership for the provision of psychosocial 
support in major crises are available regardless of where the accident takes place or 
where the people involved come from. The aim is to provide the necessary individual, 
communal, and practical support to those involved, when they need it. 
 
 
 
Helsinki, 17 February 2010 
 
 
Pekka Sauri   Pekka Aho     Mirjam Kalland 
Chairman 
 
 
Esko Kaukonen   Ullamaija Kivikuru    Pauli Niemelä 
 
 
Leena Suurpää  Kai Valonen 
 
 
Sini Järvi 
Secretary 
 
169 
 
LÄHDELUETTELO 
REFERENCES 
1. Police investigation records 2400/R/350/08, 2400/S/10526/08, and 
2400/R/363/08. 
2. Decision on investigation into the appropriateness of the treatment received by 
the perpetrator, National Supervision Authority for Welfare and Health 
(Valvira), D no. 199/05.01.03.00/2009, 1 December 2009. 
3. Students exposed to a school shooting in Kauhajoki – recovering and received 
support and care: An interim report of a controlled two-year follow-up study, 
National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) report 44/2009. 
4. Henkirikoskatsaus 1/2007, Web publications of the National Research Institute 
of Legal Policy No. 5. 
5. Henkirikoskatsaus 2008, Web reviews 8/2008, National Research Institute of 
Legal Policy. 
6. Victimisation to violence in Finland: Results from 1980–2003 National Surveys, 
National Research Institute of Legal Policy, 2005. 
7. Causes of death in the EU25 – significant differences among Member States, 
Eurostat, 96/2006 – 18 July 2006. 
8. Violence against children and adolescents in Finland, Noora Ellonen, Juha 
Kääriäinen, Venla Salmi, and Heikki Sariola, Police College of Finland and 
National Research Institute of Legal Policy, 2008. 
9. The final report and findings of the safe school initiative: Implications for the 
prevention of school attacks in the United States, United States Secret Service 
and United States Department of Education, Washington, DC, 2002. 
10. The social roots of school shootings, Katherine S. Newman, 2004. 
11. The school shooter: A threat assessment perspective, Mary Ellen O'Toole, 
Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000. 
12. Evil inside human violence and cruelty, Roy F. Baumeister, Owl Books, New 
York, 1997. 
13. Developmental psychopathology: Perspectives on adjustment, risk and disorder, 
S. Luthar, J. Burack, D. Cicchetti, and J. Weisz (eds), Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
14. Resilience and vulnerability: Adaptation in the context of childhood adversities, 
S. Luthar (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
15. Rampage: The social roots of school shootings, K. Newman, Basic Books, New 
York, 2004. 
16. The Columbine legacy: Rampage shootings as political acts, Ralph W. Larkin, 
American Behavioral Scientist 52(9), 1309–1326, 2009. 
17. Paikallistason ymmärrys tärkeää kouluammuntatapausten käsittelyssä, Pekka 
Räsänen and Atte Oksanen, Tieteessä tapahtuu 25(7), 36–39, 2008. 
170 
 
 
18. Yhteisöllisyys ja väkivalta, koulusurmien kokeminen paikallistasolla, Atte 
Oksanen and Pekka Räsänen, Yhteiskuntapolitiikka 73(6), 652–658, 2008. 
19. Lapsuus ja satuttaminen kulutusyhteiskunnassa, Atte Oksanen, in Sari Näre and 
Suvi Ronkainen (eds), Paljastettu intiimi, Sukupuolistuneen väkivallan 
dynamiikkaa, Lapland University Press, 221–257, 2008. 
20. Kuvista teoiksi, Väkivaltapelien vaikutukset lapsiin ja nuoriin [‘Violent Video 
Game Effects on Children and Adolescents’], C. A. Anderson, G. A. Douglas, 
and K Buckley, Like (Oxford University Press), 2008.  
21. The organization of attachment relationships: Maturation, culture and context, P. 
M. Crittenden and A. H. Claussen, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
22. Affect regulation, mentalization and the development of the self, P. Fonagy, G. 
Gergely, E. Jurist, and M. Target (eds), Other Press, New York, 2002. 
23. Kriminalipsykologia, Jaana Haapasalo, PS-kustannus, Jyväskylä, 2008. 
24. Koulu, syrjäytyminen ja sosiaalinen pääoma, Saija Alatupa, Krister Karppinen, 
Liisa Keltikangas-Järvinen, and Hannele Savioja, Sitra reports 75, 2007. 
25. Pyhä ja paha menevät sekaisin maallistuneessa yhteiskunnassa, Tarmo Kunnas, 
Helsingin Sanomat, 2 October 2008 (p. A2). 
26. Panssaroitu maskuliinisuus – mies, väkivalta ja kulttuuri, Arto Jokinen, Tampere 
University Press, 2000. 
27. Hyvinvoinnin ja terveyden edistäminen ammatillisissa oppilaitoksissa, 
Perusraportti kyselystä vuonna 2008, Pirjo Väyrynen, Vesa Saaristo, Kirsi Wiss, 
and Anne-Marie Rigoff, Opetushallitus, 2009. 
28. The Policy programme for the well-being of children, youth and families, 2007.  
29. Oppilas- ja opiskelijahuoltotyöryhmän toimenpide-ehdotukset, Sosiaali- ja 
terveysministeriön selvityksiä 2009:34. 
30. Opiskeluterveydenhuollon opas, Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön julkaisuja 
2006:12. 
31. Government communications in crisis situations and emergencies, Prime 
Minister’s Office Publications 20/2008. 
32. Valtionhallinnon kriisijohtamismallin toteuttaminen alue- ja 
paikallishallinnossa, Työryhmän väliraportti, Valtioneuvoston kanslian 
julkaisusarja 5/2008. 
33. Government Strategy Document 2007, Prime Minister’s Office Publications 
4/2008. 
34. The Finnish government’s mid-term policy review process, Prime Minister’s 
Office Publications 26/2009. 
35. Memorandum ‘Hallinnonaloilla käynnissä olevat ja toteutetut toimet Jokelan ja 
Kauhajoen koulusurmien johdosta’, 26 November 2009, Ministry of the Interior, 
Internal Security Secretariat. 
36. Lähipoliisitoiminnan strategia, Lähipoliisitoiminnan ja turvallisuusyhteistyön 
kehittämisen strategiset linjaukset ja tavoitteet, Poliisin ylijohdon julkaisusarja 
1/2007. 
171 
 
37. The Development Programme for Child and Youth Policy 2007–2011, Ministry 
of Education, Ministry of Education Publications 2007:41. 
38. Nuorta ei jätetä – Puhalletaan yhteen hiileen, Moniammatillista viranomaistyötä 
ja sen lakisääteistämistä selvittävän poikkihallinnollisen työryhmän muistio, 
Opetusministeriön työryhmämuistioita ja selvityksiä 2009:5.  
39. Traumaattisten tilanteiden psykososiaalinen tuki- ja palvelut, Opas kunnille ja 
kuntayhtymille, Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön julkaisuja 2009:16.  
40. Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention, Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/15/Add.272, 30 
September 2005. 
41. Tunnetut sotilaat, Varusmiehen kokemus ja terveystaju, Tommi Hoikkala, 
Mikko Salasuo, and Anni Ojajärvi, Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/ 
Nuorisotutkimusseura, 2009. 
42. Nuorten puhetta väkivallasta, Päivi Honkatukia, Leo Nyqvist, and Tarja Pösö, 
Haaste-lehti 3/2005. 
43. Lapset ja nuoret väkivallan uhreina, Lapsiin ja nuoriin kohdistuva väkivalta 
tilastojen ja kyselytutkimusten valossa, Noora Ellonen, Janne Kivivuori, and 
Juha Kääriäinen, Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu and Oikeuspoliittinen 
tutkimuslaitos, 2007. 
44. Sociological explanations of juvenile crime, Janne Kivivuori, in Juvenile Crime 
in Finland: Trends, Causes and Control, National Research Institute of Legal 
Policy, Finnish Youth Research Network/ Finnish Youth Research Society, and 
Advisory Council for Youth Affairs, 2006. 
45. Palveluiden väliin putoamisesta yhtenäisiin palvelupolkuihin?, 
Tutkimusinventaari nuorten nivelvaiheen palveluja koskevista tutkimuksista, 
Reetta Pietikäinen, Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/Nuorisotutkimusseura, 2007. 
46. Kasvuyhteisö nuorten turvana, Sosiaalisen pääoman yhteys nuorten 
masentuneisuuteen ja rikekäyttäytymiseen, Noora Ellonen, Tampere University 
Press and Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/Nuorisotutkimusseura, 2008. 
47. Kauhajoen jälkipaini, Nuorisotutkijoiden ja ammattilaisten puheenvuoroja, 
Tommi Hoikkala and Leena Suurpää (eds), Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/ 
Nuorisotutkimusseura, 2009. 
48. Väkivalta koulukodista käsin, Päivi Honkatukia, Leo Nyqvist & Tarja Pösö, 
kirjassa Markku Jahnukainen, Taru Kekoni, and Tarja Pösö (eds.), Nuoruus ja 
koulukoti, Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/Nuorisotutkimusseura, 151–188, 2004. 
49. Young men’s multicultural life course and criminality, Päivi Honkatukia and 
Leena Suurpää, National Research Institute of Legal Policy and Finnish Youth 
Research Network / Finnish Youth Research Society, 2007. 
50. Uhrit rikosprosessissa – haavoittuvuus, kohtelu ja palvelut, Päivi Honkatukia, 
forthcoming, National Research Institute of Legal Policy Publications. 
51. Viiltoja, Analyysi kouluväkivallasta Jokelassa, Tomi Kiilakoski, 
Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/Nuorisotutkimusseura, 2009. 
52. Juvenile crime in Finland: Trends, causes and control, Janne Kivivuori and Päivi 
Honkatukia (eds), National Research Institute of Legal Policy and Finnish Youth 
172 
 
 
Research Network / Finnish Youth Research Society, and Advisory Council for 
Youth Affairs, 2006. 
53. Youth Barometer 2007, Sami Myllyniemi, Advisory Council for Youth Affairs 
and Finnish Youth Research Network / Finnish Youth Research Society, 2007. 
54. Youth Barometer 2008, Sami Myllyniemi, Advisory Council for Youth Affairs 
and Finnish Youth Research Network / Finnish Youth Research Society, 2008. 
55. Youth Barometer 2009, Sami Myllyniemi, Advisory Council for Youth Affairs 
and Finnish Youth Research Network / Finnish Youth Research Society, 2009. 
56. Aika vapaalla, Nuorten vapaa-aikatutkimus 2009, Sami Myllyniemi, 
Nuorisoasiain neuvottelukunta & Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/ Nuorisotutkimus-
seura, 2009 
57. Nuoria koskeva syrjäytymistieto, Avauksia tietämisen politiikkaan, Leena 
Suurpää (eds), Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/Nuorisotutkimusseura, 2009. 
58. Journalistinen etiikka kriisissä – kiireen ja kilpailun haasteet toimittajien 
ammatilliselle itsekurille, Laura Juntunen, Media & Viestintä 2/2009. 
59. Kriisijournalismia ennen ja nyt, Pentti Raittila and Kari Koljonen, Media & 
Viestintä 2/2009. 
60. Kauhajoen koulusurmat mediassa, Pentti Raittila, Paula Haara, Laura 
Kangasluoma, Kari Koljonen, Ville Kumpu, and Jari Väliverronen, Journalismin 
tutkimusyksikkö, Tampereen yliopisto, Tiedotusopin laitos, Julkaisu A 
111/2009. 
61. Koulusurmat verkostoyhteiskunnassa, Analyysi Jokelan ja Kauhajoen kriisien 
viestinnästä, Salli Hakala, Viestinnän tutkimuskeskus CRC, Helsingin yliopisto, 
Viestinnän laitoksen tutkimusraportti 2/2009. 
62. ”Netti edellä” kuolemaan – koulusurmat kommunikatiivisena ilmiönä, Johanan 
Sumiala and Minttu Tikka, Media & Viestintä 2/2009. 
63. Symbolisen johtajuuden kriisi – koulusurmat ravisuttavat verkostoyhteiskuntaa, 
Salli Hakala, Media & viestintä 2/2009. 
 
173 
 
APPENDIX 1: Dissenting opinion on item 7.1 of the investigation report 
In its investigative report on the Kauhajoki school shootings, the Investigation 
Commission decided to propose in recommendation 1 concerning firearms that all 
handguns allowing the user to fire multiple shots within a short period of time be 
collected. The recommendation is in the following form:  
The Ministry of the Interior should take steps to ensure that all handguns allowing their 
users to fire a large number of shots within a short period of time are collected – against 
payment, for example – and that no new acquisition permits are granted for such firearms. 
Handing in illegally owned guns should be made more attractive for the owners. 
In practice, this would mean a violation of the Constitutional right of Finnish citizens to 
protection of property. Furthermore, the recommendation would mean putting an end to all 
shooting sports, even Olympic sports, where semi-automatic pistols are used. This 
recommendation would not, however, lead to the recovery of illegal semi-automatic 
pistols; instead, these would still remain in the possession of persons who hold them 
illegally. In practice, the collection would only pertain to legal firearms. 
It is my opinion that, instead of imposing the above-mentioned total ban on semi-automatic 
pistols, the recommendation should still enable citizens to engage in responsible shooting 
sports. Additionally, the recommendation should aim at enabling permitting authorities to 
investigate applicants’ background in more detail than heretofore, and at more attention 
being paid in the permit process to the applicant’s active participation in shooting sports. 
The fact is that there are many firearms in Finland. The large number of guns has led to 
misuse of firearms, as well as to firearms ending up illegally, in one way or another, in the 
hands of persons to whom a permitting authority would not grant a firearm acquisition or 
possession permit. As is mentioned in the introduction to the recommendation, a firearm 
was used, without exception, in all previous school shootings. Furthermore, studies of 
school shootings in the USA have shown that school killers typically had easy access to a 
gun. However, according to a study conducted by the FBI, the availability of guns as such 
is not a risk factor.  
The National Police Board should ensure that the police have up-to-date electronic 
databases on firearms and their possessors at their disposal. Furthermore, the Ministry of 
the Interior and the National Police Board should see to it that, in conjunction with the 
firearm acquisition process and, if necessary, for the full term of validity of the firearm 
possession permit, the police have access to a sufficiently comprehensive report on the 
background of the applicant, including the applicant’s health status, regardless of what is 
provided by law on the openness or secrecy of documents, and that, when necessary, 
certain types of firearm permits are granted for a fixed term only. Raising the age limit for 
an acquisition permit for semi-automatic pistols to 20 years should also be considered. The 
possibility of using parallel permits should also be looked into.  
It is my personal opinion that recommendation 1 should read as follows and that it should 
apply to handgun permits granted for recreational and hunting purposes. Additionally, 
recommendation 2 should be deleted.  
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The Ministry of the Interior should take steps to raise the age limit for the possession of 
firearms to 20 years, to make all permits fixed-term, and to set two years of recreational 
shooting on a regular basis as a necessary condition for the granting of a permit. 
 
Pekka Aho 
Member, Investigation Commission 
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APPENDIX 2: The implementation of measures initiated as a result of the school 
shootings  
On 26 November 2009, the ministerial management group for internal security 
discussed the follow-up reports on the implementation of the measures initiated as a 
result of the school shootings. The following measures were recorded as completed: 
1. Measures for the prevention of school shootings 
Determining the course of events and the underlying background factors 
- Investigation commissions were appointed for the Jokela and Kauhajoki school 
shootings. 
The development of services preventing school shootings 
- The working group on the development of pupil and student welfare submitted 
its memorandum in September 2009. Legislative processes have been initiated 
on the basis of the memorandum. 
- A basic report was submitted on the survey ‘The promotion of welfare and 
health in polytechnics’. 
- A seminar was held on preventive work related to substance misuse. A report 
will be drawn up on best practices. 
- The Timeout model will be extended. This model provides support for young 
men who do not participate in military or civilian service. 
Support material, instructions, and research 
- The National Institute for Health and Welfare has prepared the following 
support material: 1) ‘Children and youth and the events at the Jokela school’ and 
2) ‘The identification of children and young people’s need for help’. 
- Material on the prevention of crime and on security co-operation related to 
community policing has been prepared and distributed to the populace. 
- The curriculum of the Police College of Finland’s school police programme has 
been modified to take into account the events in Jokela and Kauhajoki. 
Controlling the harmful effects of electronic media and monitoring the Internet 
- The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) currently maintains Web monitoring 
to intervene in further school shooting threats.  
- The funding provided for this monitoring has allowed the NBI to recruit 10 
workers to perform it.  
- A working group has prepared reforms in the organisation of IT investigations, 
Web monitoring, and the utilisation of technology in search engines.  
- The NBI maintains both a hotline number for phone tip-offs and an e-mailbox 
for online tip-offs. 
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Practices, instructions, and training related to firearm permits 
- Police department personnel handling firearms matters have received 
standardisation training and training related to applicant interviews. 
- Police departments have been issued with standardisation instructions on firearm 
permit procedures. 
- A letter has been issued for administrative use on the granting and revocation of 
firearm possession permits. 
- The importance of the permit procedure is emphasised in preventive security 
work in police departments and the curriculum of the Police College of Finland. 
Military call-ups and monitoring conscripts’ fitness for service 
- Preliminary health examinations and call-up examinations are enhanced through 
improvement of the availability and up-to-dateness of register data pertaining to 
conscripts’ health status. Instructions have been issued for health care operators. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has provided mental health work 
operators with instructions on the disclosure of health data concerning conscripts 
liable for call-up to the Finnish Defence Forces. 
Assessment of the need for legislative reforms 
- An assessment of the need for legislative reforms pertaining to the media 
environment has been initiated. It seems there is no need for reforms. 
- A decree on amendment of the decree on family centres and school and student 
health care is being prepared. 
Responding to threats 
- The working group preparing measures to ensure the implementation of the state 
crisis management model has published its final report. 
- The National Council for Crime Prevention is currently compiling a list of 
measures that will facilitate the reduction of violence at the local level. The 
checklist is to be included in a guide to be sent to all municipalities. 
Internal preventive measures in the police administration 
- According to the 2008 Community Policing Strategy and the 2009 performance 
steering, schools are a special target of preventive informational work. 
- The 2009 performance steering of the police takes into account the events in 
Jokela and Kauhajoki in its key measures for crime prevention, as well as 
updating of municipal security plans to correspond to the current situation for 24 
police departments.  
2. Operational activities 
Further development of youth work 
- A crisis centre has been opened in Kauhajoki, and youth work in Ilmajoki has 
received additional support. 
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- A thesis has been written on the lessons of the Jokela school shootings for 
municipal youth work. 
- A youth researchers’ publication on the Jokela and Kauhajoki incidents has been 
published. 
External communications 
- Information services were provided for international media in conjunction with 
the Jokela incident. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has introduced a weekly 
on-call system. 
- Information services were provided for international media as well as foreign 
reporters and diplomatic missions in Finland in conjunction with the Kauhajoki 
incident. 
Police investigation of school shootings 
- The Jokela investigation was completed. 
- The investigation of the Kauhajoki events was completed. 
Instructions for application in shooting incidents 
- A recommendation is under preparation concerning how to deal with shooting 
incidents at schools. 
- A broad-based working group is being appointed to prepare measures that will 
provide support for school communities and enhance security. 
Command relationships and instructions 
- The command structure of local police field operations will be reviewed as part 
of the on-going reform of police administrative structures. 
- Review of police instructions on the use of firearms in case similar incidents 
occur is under consideration. 
Training 
- Training sessions are to be arranged for representatives of education and cultural 
services, social welfare and health services, the rescue services, the police, 
education providers, head teachers and rectors of educational institutions, 
members of pupil and student welfare teams, and other members of educational 
institutions’ emergency teams.  
- Police officers who took part in operations in conjunction with school shootings 
have given lectures at numerous training events, sharing their experiences with 
the audience. Their observations will be taken into account in a reform aimed at 
enhancing the leadership and operations of the police. 
- The activities of the police in relation to school shooting incidents will be taken 
into account in police training at least from the angles of police tactics, internal 
communications, media liaison work, and interest group co-operation. 
- A training session on the tactical challenges involved in school shooting 
incidents was held in all new police departments. 
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- School shootings were discussed in a seminar at the Police Academy of Finland, 
in an international seminar on police co-operation, in an internal training session 
for police administration, and in crisis work training. 
3. ‘After-care’ for the Jokela and Kauhajoki incidents 
After-care resources 
- State budget funds from various sub-items were earmarked for the provision of 
after-care related to the school shootings. 
- The Municipality of Tuusula employs crisis workers in Tuusula schools.  
- The Finnish Red Cross granted crisis relief funds to the Municipality of Tuusula 
from its disaster fund. 
- The Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela) provided funds for 
discretionary rehabilitation. 
Availability of services 
- Assistance was provided for the Municipality of Tuusula in the recruitment of an 
after-care co-ordination team. The team’s task is to provide assistance in the 
organisation of further measures, the assessment of individual needs, and the 
acquisition of paid services. 
- A working group was appointed to provide an overview of the situation and its 
development in Tuusula, to contact municipal operators when necessary, to 
assess the need for help in the municipality, to produce practical instructions, to 
act as a media liaison, to ensure the functionality of the area’s psychiatric 
services system, and to take steps to increase the well-being of children and 
youth. 
- A working group was appointed after the Kauhajoki incident to provide support 
for the Municipality of Kauhajoki in the organisation of support and crisis relief 
for the victims, their families, and the students and staff of the polytechnic in the 
initial stages of the crisis.  
Prevention of harmful after-effects and special consideration 
- A letter was written to Jokela Upper Secondary School, requesting special 
consideration due to the shooting incident in conjunction with the spring 2008 
matriculation examination. 
- Special consideration was given to the shooting incident in the selection of 
topics for the matriculation examination. 
- A discussion forum on school security was arranged in co-operation with 
various NGOs. 
- A discussion of school security for members of youth parliaments and student 
associations was held. 
Co-operation with the media 
- Co-operation between authorities and the media was discussed in a joint seminar 
on 3 November 2009. 
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The number of measures still in progress as recorded in the follow-up report was 67. 
After the publication of the follow-up report, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
issued new instructions on psychosocial support. Also, related training was organised.  
Local security planning has been developed such that the municipality’s management, 
the rescue services, and the police now jointly ensure that the rescue plans of all 
educational institutions in the area are up to date and the necessary drills are organised. 
Local security planning should also address other sites potentially at risk, the rescue 
plans of which are to be reviewed without undue delay. 
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APPENDIX 3: Official opinions 
 
 
1. OPINION OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 
 
The Ministry of Justice has no comments on the draft report on the Kauhajoki 
school shootings of 23 September 2008. 
 
 
Permanent Secretary Tiina Astola 
 
Head of Department Jarmo Littunen 
 
 
2. OPINION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR’S DEPARTMENT FOR 
RESCUE SERVICES 
 
Recommendations  
 
The Ministry of the Interior Department for Rescue Services considers the 
recommendations given in the investigation report to be valid from the point of 
view of the Rescue Services and has no further comments.  
 
The measures taken  
 
The department proposes that the following addenda be made under this 
heading:  
1) Security in educational institutions: Report by the working group (Ministry 
of the Interior Publications 40/2009) 
The Ministry of the Interior on 19 January 2009 appointed a working group 
whose task was to issue instructions for the preparation of security plans; to 
provide schools, the police, and rescue authorities with instructions on how to 
act in a threatening situation; and to plan how these instructions shall be 
implemented. The working group submitted its report to the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of the Interior on 19 January 2010. 
 
The measures proposed by the working group include instructions on revision 
of the rescue plans of educational institutions to take into account also incidents 
such as the Jokela and Kauhajoki school shootings. Additionally, the working 
group submitted a number of other proposals, concerning, for example, the 
structural safety of school buildings. The recommendations in the investigation 
report and the measures proposed by the working group are very similar.  
 
2) Co-operative leadership in situations involving multiple authorities  
The purpose of the reform of the Rescue Act is to provide more detailed 
specification of the duties and responsibilities of the situation commander in a 
situation involving multiple authorities. Preparedness (planning, training, drills, 
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and co-operation) for the above-mentioned situations has received a great deal 
of attention in performance steering and other instructions.  
 
3) The development of the field command system of safety authorities  
Various safety authorities are committed to development of the field command 
system through modification of the system to enable efficient availability of the 
situation picture and other shared items. The joint section is under preparation 
and is linked to the development of the Emergency Response Centre data 
system. 
 
Director of Rescue Services Janne Koivukoski  
 
Senior Rescue Officer  Tarmo Kopare 
 
 
3. OPINION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR’S POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 
 
The recommendations on the availability of firearms:  
 
Background  
 
On 26 June 2009, the Finnish government introduced bill HE106/2009 vp to 
Parliament. The bill comprises an amendment to the provisions of the Firearms 
Act on handguns – i.e., pistols, revolvers, small-bore pistols, and small-bore 
revolvers. According to the bill, in future, permits for these types of firearms 
would be granted only to persons 20 years of age or older. Furthermore, an 
acquisition permit for these types of firearms would be granted for shooting 
sports and recreational purposes only to persons belonging to an association 
referred to in Section 4 of the Associations Act. For hunting purposes, a permit 
would be granted to a person able to present a certificate issued by a local 
hunters’ association, declaring that the bearer is actively engaged in 
recreational hunting. All handgun permits would initially be issued for a fixed 
term of five years. After this, the permit-holder would be required to present a 
certificate every five years, declaring that the bearer is actively engaged in 
recreational shooting or hunting.  
 
Should the bill become law, in future, an acquisition permit for a hunting 
firearm could be granted only to persons 18 years of age or older. With the 
consent of a parent or guardian, a 15-year-old person could be granted a 
parallel permit for a shotgun, combination weapon, rifle, or small-bore rifle for 
hunting or recreational shooting purposes. A parent or guardian could be 
granted a permit for the acquisition or possession of a firearm if his or her 
minor child is engaged in hunting or recreational shooting activities.  
 
The government bill does not include a proposal for making all permits 
fixed-term. The bill does, however, include a proposal according to which a 
possession permit could be revoked if the permit-holder has otherwise than 
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temporarily stopped using the firearm for another, acceptable purpose referred 
to in the Firearms Act.  
 
The bill is currently before Parliament. This government bill is part of stage 1 
of a process aimed at a reform of firearms legislation.  
 
The second stage will be initiated with another government bill, due at the start 
of the autumn 2010 term.  
 
Having approved the above-mentioned bill, the government issued a statement 
on 25 June 2009, according to which stage 2 of the Firearms Act reform will 
aim to look into the following targets for reform: the possibility of making 
illegal individual models of semi-automatic handguns or high-calibre revolvers 
that are not suited to shooting sports, a review of old firearm permits, and the 
need to reform the legislation pertaining to the storage of firearms.  
 
Single-shot firearms (no clips) are the only type of firearm that does not enable 
the user to fire multiple shots within a short period of time. According to 
November 2008 statistics, there are approximately 1,000 single-shot pistols and 
some 3,500 small-bore, single-shot pistols in Finland. The total number of 
handguns – i.e., pistols, small-bore pistols, revolvers, and small-bore pistols – 
is in excess of 250,000. There is only one pistol event in the Olympic Games 
that does not require a handgun with a clip. There are very few such events 
outside the Olympic Games either. The implementation of the ban specified in 
recommendation 1 would mean, with minor exceptions, the end of handgun 
shooting sports as we know them.  
 
In early 2004, a one-year ‘grace period’ was introduced, in which all citizens 
had the opportunity to hand over to the police with impunity all illegally 
possessed firearms, firearm components, cartridges, and especially dangerous 
projectiles as well as explosives. The requirement for achieving impunity is 
that the possessor of the object report it to the police of his or her own volition 
and hand it over to the police. With regard to firearms, the legal possessor of 
the firearm can apply for a permit for it, disable it permanently, or hand it over 
within three months, either to a party holding a valid permit or, without 
remuneration, to the state. If the legal possessor does not apply for a permit for 
the firearm, if one is not granted, or if the firearm is not permanently disabled 
or handed over to a party holding a valid permit or to the state, the police will 
sell the firearm on behalf of the possessor in a public auction. Firearms that 
remain unsold after the auction become state property. Firearms whose owner 
is not known, as well as all illegal firearm components, gas sprays, cartridges, 
and especially dangerous projectiles become state property without an auction. 
The introduction of the grace-period system resulted in more than 20,000 
illegal firearms being handed over to the police. All told, more than 40,000 
illegal firearms have been handed over to the police since 1998, so many illegal 
firearms have already been collected.  
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Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of 
weapons became effective on 28 July 2008. Its implementation period ends on 
28 July 2010. This directive contains new provisions on the minimum age of a 
permit-holder: According to the directive, a permit-holder must be at least 18 
years of age. However, a possession permit may be granted to a person less 
than 18 years of age for hunting and target shooting purposes, provided that 
certain conditions are met. An acquisition permit may not be granted to a 
person less than 18 years of age even for these purposes, unless the acquisition 
is made through purchase. Finland’s view in conjunction with the preparation 
of the directive was that the right of persons less than 18 years of age to pursue 
hunting is to be guaranteed.   
 
Recommendation 1  
 
With its decision to introduce government bill HE 106/2009 vp to Parliament, 
the Finnish government took the line that recreational shooting using handguns 
is to be allowed, but with the tighter controls mentioned above in place. As 
stated earlier, the government obliged the Ministry of the Interior, in the second 
stage of the firearms legislation reform, to look into the possibility of making 
illegal individual models of semi-automatic handguns or high-calibre revolvers 
that are not suitable for shooting sports. When discussing the government bill, 
the Finnish Parliament in effect states its opinion on firearm regulations.  
 
Making the handing over of illegal firearms more attractive to citizens is a 
commendable recommendation. It is with this purpose in mind that the 
Ministry of the Interior will look into the possibility of enhancing the 
amnesty-period system’s efficacy in conjunction with the second stage of the 
firearms legislation reform.  
 
Recommendation 2  
 
Government bill HE 106/2009 includes a number of proposals for changing the 
minimum age of an applicant for a permit. The bill proposes that, in future, a 
handgun permit be granted only to persons 20 years of age or older. For other 
types of firearms, a permit could be granted for persons 18 years of age or 
older. With the consent of a parent or guardian, a parallel permit could be 
granted for a person 15 but not yet 18 years of age for recreational shooting or 
hunting purposes.  
 
The government bill includes a proposal concerning handgun permits 
according to which a handgun permit would initially be issued for a fixed term 
of five years. After this, the permit-holder would have to demonstrate, or face 
the threat of revocation of the permit, that he or she is actively pursuing his or 
her hobby. The bill also includes a proposal concerning all firearm permits, 
whereby a possession permit for a firearm may be revoked if the permit-holder 
otherwise than temporarily has stopped using the firearm for another, 
acceptable purpose referred to in the Firearms Act. The possibility of reviewing 
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old firearm permits will be looked into in conjunction with the second stage of 
the Firearms Act reform.  
 
Other recommendations  
 
The Police Department has no other comments on the recommendations in the 
report.  
 
 
Director General, 
Head of Department Kauko Aaltomaa  
 
Project Manager Mika Lehtonen  
 
 
4. OPINION OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND HEALTH 
 
General comments on the Investigation Commission’s report 
 
The Investigation Commission’s report on the Kauhajoki school shootings 
offers informed and in-depth insight into the act, its background, and the 
activities of various authorities and other operators. The report provides the 
reader with an overall picture of the incident as well as the activities, 
responsibilities, and duties of the various operators with regard to this act of 
violence in a school community. 
 
On the recommendations 
 
1. The availability of firearms 
 
The recommendations are in line with the new Firearms Act, on which the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has given its opinion elsewhere. We 
refer to the official opinion of the Ministry of Social Affairs on the 
government bill on the Firearms Act introduced to the Ministry of the 
Interior (STM/1252/2009), and hereby state that the ministry’s opinion on 
the disclosure of an applicant’s health data to permitting authorities remains 
the same. In other respects, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
concurs with the recommendation. 
 
2. The development of mental health services for young people 
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health does not concur with the 
Investigation Commission’s recommendation according to which 
psychiatrists are to be involved in the commencement of medical treatment 
for persons 29 years of age or younger. It is more vital to ensure preventive 
mental health work and the availability of early treatment, which are both 
supported by expertise in primary health care and multidisciplinary 
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methods. Furthermore, the treatment provided must be appropriate at all 
levels of treatment.  
 
The perpetrator had been suffering from mental health symptoms for some 
10 years. He was subjected to bullying both at school and in the army. All 
of his symptoms, as described in the school health questionnaire, patient 
records, and the army materials, were related to anxiety and depression 
disorders. On the basis of these descriptions, it seems the symptoms were of 
varying degree and moderate at most, apart from a period of unknown 
length for which his mother reported that her son refused to get out of bed, 
refused to eat, and was generally apathetic. The perpetrator made a quick 
recovery after seeing a doctor. He also had a drinking problem. He was 
diagnosed with depression and, in accordance with the Current Care 
Guidelines, received medication and psychosocial support from a 
depression nurse specialist.  
 
His health care anamnesis prior to the shooting incident indicates nothing 
else than moderate depression, simultaneous anxiety, and a substance abuse 
problem. Annually, up to 10% of young adults in Finland may suffer from 
severe depression, and 40–80% of these suffer from multiple mental health 
disorders, just as the perpetrator did. About 10–15% of Finnish youth 
harbour serious suicidal thoughts. This means there are tens of thousands of 
young adults in Finland suffering from similar symptoms. Each year, some 
0.1% of Finnish youth are diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
 
There are roughly 150 adolescent psychiatrists of working age and, in total, 
some 1,000 working-age psychiatrists in Finland. They are responsible for 
diagnosis and treatment of severe mental health disorders. Psychiatric 
treatment consists mainly of pharmacotherapy. Psychotherapeutic treatment 
services are concentrated near urban areas, and their use is restricted by the 
availability of psychotherapists and the high price. 
 
It is the opinion of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health that the 
majority of mental health disorders, such as moderate depression and the 
related anxiety and substance misuse problems, should be treated in primary 
health care. The ‘Mieli 2009’ plan of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health (STM 2009:3) recommends that all health centres in Finland utilise 
the depression nurse specialist model and substance abuse nurse model. 
Additionally, the plan emphasises the significance of psychiatric 
consultation provided by specialised health care services to mental health 
work carried out in primary health care. A brochure entitled 
‘Depressiohoitaja perusterveydenhuollossa’ (‘Depression Nurse Specialists 
in Primary Health Care’) (STM 2010:1), published by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health, highlights the responsibility of health care doctors in the 
assessment of patients, as well as the regular clinical guidance provided for 
depression nurse specialists by psychiatrists, in ensuring optimal treatment 
for patients with multiple problems, and that they are referred to the right 
type of treatment. The Mieli 2009 plan and the Government Decree on 
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Family Centres, School and Student Health Care, and Preventive Dental 
Care for Children and Adolescents (380/2009) both emphasise elimination 
of factors endangering mental health through actions such as interventions 
in school bullying and substance abuse, as well as preventive mental health 
work carried out in schools.  
 
The perpetrator’s mental health support had been neglected already in 
upper-level comprehensive school, and he started receiving treatment only 
after suffering from various symptoms for almost 10 years. It appears that 
there was not a psychiatrist available to provide support for the depression 
nurse specialist treating the perpetrator, and, despite being responsible for 
his treatment, the health-care centre doctor did not meet with the patient 
personally. The prescription of Alprox medication for the perpetrator was an 
ill-advised choice for a substance abuse patient. The significance of these 
defects in treatment where the school shootings are concerned remains 
unclear. 
 
3. Enhancing cross-generation interaction in educational institutions  
 
The title of the recommendation and the text below it are in contradiction. 
The text does not mention generations; it focuses on networks and student 
welfare instead. Another title, such as ‘Student welfare services’ or ‘The 
availability of student welfare services’ might be more in keeping with the 
text and its recommendations. 
 
Recommendation 4 lies within the area of responsibility of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. A government decree (380/2009) was issued last 
year on student health care, which entered into effect on 1 July 2009 where 
health care services and nursing services in student health care are 
concerned. All students in higher education undergo a health examination 
on the basis of a health questionnaire aimed at all students. The 
implementation of the decree is dependent on whether the personnel 
resources specified in the Handbook on Health Care during Studies are 
made available. 
 
In collaboration with the National Board of Education, the National Institute 
for Health and Welfare is currently preparing a guide for pupil and student 
welfare, which will also cover co-operation and networking. A working 
group has been appointed in the Ministry of Education to prepare 
comprehensive pupil and student welfare legislation covering the various 
administrative sectors. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is 
involved in this preparation work. 
 
4. Comprehensive security planning in educational institutions 
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health agrees with this recommendation. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health finds that there is also room for 
improvement in the flow of information between the various operators in 
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student welfare (between education welfare officers and school nurses, for 
example), which had already created a lot of discussion in conjunction with 
the Jokela school shootings. 
 
It is the opinion of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health that the 
above-mentioned comprehensive pupil and student welfare act, currently 
under preparation in the Ministry of Education, will facilitate co-operation 
between various administrative bodies. 
 
5. Co-operative leadership in situations involving multiple authorities 
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health concurs with the recommendation. 
 
6. Co-operation between authorities in preventive work 
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health concurs with the recommendation. 
 
7. Co-ordination of psychosocial support 
 
The Investigation Commission’s recommendation is necessary. At the 
moment, student welfare services are organised along the lines of the 
Handbook on Health Care during Studies (STM 2006), which steers the 
various operators toward the provision of individual psychosocial support. 
Intensive co-operation among the various student welfare operators within 
the school community is a necessary condition for the provision of 
psychosocial support – including a plan; the necessary resources; 
responsibility; and competent, expert leadership – in major crises, which the 
recommendation calls for. Student welfare personnel may not always be 
physically present at the educational institution. 
 
In 2009, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health published a working 
group memorandum entitled ‘Psychosocial Support and Services in 
Traumatic Events’ (STM 2009:41), which includes nine proposals for 
action. Some of the proposals for action put forth in the memorandum 
overlap with the measures suggested to the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health.  
 
In the same year, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health published a 
guide for municipalities and joint municipal authorities on psychosocial 
support and services in traumatic events (STM 2009:16). The areas covered 
by the guide include the operators involved in the provision of psychosocial 
support and services, activities and leadership on various levels, major 
accidents, after-care, and costs. 
 
Permanent Secretary Kari Välimäki 
 
Special Adviser Maire Kolimaa 
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5. OPINION OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 
 
The opinion of the Ministry of Education on the draft report submitted by 
the Investigation Commission for the Kauhajoki school shootings is as 
follows. 
 
General 
 
The investigation report is very thorough. The report displays great 
expertise, and, on the whole, the recommendations submitted by the 
commission are explicit and concrete.  
 
In general, the Ministry of Education has no comments on the approach, 
content, and structure of the report. 
 
Detailed comments on the recommendations 
 
The recommendations of the commission are presented in chapter 7 of the 
report. The comments of the Ministry of Education are as follows.  
 
Recommendation 4: Increased resources for student health care 
 
As such, the recommendation is justified. The recommendation must not, 
however, lead to extension of the responsibility of the educational 
administration in terms of student welfare.  
 
Student welfare is solely the domain of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, and the Ministry of Education is not competent in this matter. The 
current division of responsibility between the Ministry of Education and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health still applies.  
 
With regard to health examinations, the situation has taken a turn for the 
better. The Government Decree on Family Centres, School and Student 
Health Care, and Preventive Dental Care for Children and Adolescents 
(380/2009) enhances school health care as part of pupil welfare and 
student health care as part of student welfare. The decree entered into force 
on 1 July 2009, and Finnish municipalities are obliged to begin regular 
school health examinations as referred to in sections 9 and 10 of the decree 
as of 1 January 2011. 
 
Recommendation 5: School-specific opportunities for pupils and students 
to engage in online discussions and express their concerns and opinions on 
the Web 
 
The practical organisation of tuition and education and of the participation 
systems of educational institutions are among the basic duties of 
education-providers (municipalities, joint municipal authorities, and 
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private education providers). The Ministry of Education can, however, pay 
attention to this matter through informational guidance. 
 
Accordingly, the recommendation should read: ‘Education providers 
should take steps to…’ 
 
Education welfare officers, school psychologists, teachers of special-needs 
students, and guidance counsellors already engage in e-mail discussions 
with the students. Additionally, there already exist, or are being developed, 
various electronic tools for the provision of network counselling and 
support. Where applicable, some of these development projects could be 
linked with the student services specified in the SADe Programme. It 
should also be possible to obtain EU funding for this. 
 
In addition to the measures implemented in schools, the opportunities 
afforded by youth work could be utilised in this context. According to 
Section 7 of the Youth Act, each municipality is responsible for youth 
work in its own area. Municipal youth work includes, for example, 
educational counselling for young people, which can take the form of 
workshops, youth outreach work, information services, or support for 
various leisure activities. Youth workers and school personnel could join 
forces to improve cross-generation interaction in particular.  
 
Leisure activities for young people are an important part of prevention 
work. We need to support positive leisure activities in areas such as 
cultural activities (music, theatre, etc.), sports (skateboarding, parcour, 
snowboarding, dance, etc.), games (LARP, board games, and computer 
games), and science and nature activities (astronomy, bird-watching, etc.). 
These offer ample opportunities for cross-generation activities, open 
discussion, and trustful interaction, and they can be organised through 
co-operation between schools, youth work, and NGOs. 
 
Young people should also be involved in these activities to provide 
authorities with a picture of young people’s needs and attitudes, as well as 
their behaviour in an electronic interactive environment (social media). 
 
The proposals concerning youth work, among others, apply also in relation 
to recommendation 8. 
 
Recommendation 6: Comprehensive security planning in educational 
institutions 
 
A joint working group, appointed by the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of the Interior, and various interest groups, submitted its report on 
19 January 2010. The working group proposes that a security guide for 
schools be issued. The guide would provide schools with instructions on 
risk assessment and security planning. The working group also proposed 
that all security-related plans in educational institutions be placed in a 
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security folder where they are readily accessible. The security plans should 
be based on risk assessment carried out jointly by school staff and public 
authorities. Each school must also have a security organisation in place 
with clearly defined responsibilities for various aspects of school security.  
 
The Ministry of Education and the National Board of Education’s 
performance agreement for 2011 includes a decision to publish a security 
guide for educational institutions. Educational institutions will be able to 
utilise this guide to produce their own plans and guides.  
 
The security recommendation of the Investigation Commission emphasises 
the role of technological planning and instructions in security planning. 
Additionally, comprehensive security comprises human interaction and 
trust, which cannot be replaced by technological apparatus or instructions. 
Open interaction and an atmosphere of trust contribute to an operation 
environment where alarm messages too are relayed without delay.  
 
The text following the recommendation (p. 140) states that, according to 
the National Core Curriculum for comprehensive and upper secondary 
schools, all schools must have a crisis plan in place and a plan for the 
protection of students from acts of violence. Similar emergency 
preparedness requirements were introduced in the legislation pertaining to 
polytechnics on 1 January 2010. It should also be mentioned in the text 
that similar provisions are included in the new Universities Act. 
Furthermore, legislation pertaining to other forms of education will also be 
amended in this respect under a government decree currently in 
preparation. 
 
Recommendation 8: The development of co-operation involving multiple 
authorities 
 
The recommendation concerning the development of co-operation 
involving multiple authorities is extremely important. Local co-operation 
between various authorities creates a solid basis for preparedness for 
different eventualities and preventive work. This work at the local level 
must be supported and guided by higher levels of administration.  
 
To enhance co-operation involving multiple authorities in the 
administrative sector within the Ministry of Education, an amendment to 
the Youth Work Act is currently in preparation, with a government bill 
scheduled for spring 2010.  
 
Permanent Secretary  Harri Skog 
 
Special Adviser Iiris Patosalmi 
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6. OPINION OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
 
According to the draft report of the Investigation Commission on the 
Kauhajoki school shootings, the conduct of the media repeated the 
typical pattern of coverage of a sensational and dramatic event but was more 
discreet than in conjunction with the Jokela school shootings. The 
conclusions on the conduct of the media state that the media had learnt 
their lesson and did not repeat the excesses of Jokela either on the 
scene or in news coverage. It is suggested in the conclusions that, in 
their reliance on instant reporting, the media treat school shootings in the 
same way as any other major news event, and that in coverage of an event 
such as that in Kauhajoki, the ethical responsibility of journalism is far 
greater than in many other contexts.  
 
In the section focusing on the Web environment, the report highlights 
the cyclic nature of the Web and social media, an example of which is the 
re-emergence of old and harmful material, which is almost impossible to 
prevent. The report states that young people’s Web activities cannot 
and must not be restricted by legislative means. Instead, we should 
focus more on media literacy to make an impact on how people use the 
Web. Accordingly, the related recommendation calls for more 
extensive media literacy and the presence of grown-ups on the Web.  
 
Immediately after the Jokela school shootings, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications initiated measures aimed at increasing 
Web security through the introduction of new rules and regulations for 
Finnish service providers. The ministry also started to look into the 
possibility of enhancing the means available for administrators’ use to 
intervene in inappropriate content through effective moderation. The 
ministry has also co-operated with the police in the development of an 
online tip-off service.  
 
The draft report of the Investigation Commission on the Kauhajoki 
school shootings does not include recommendations that would directly 
involve the administrative section of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. However, the ministry considers the report itself a 
coherent whole and a step in the right direction. The ministry also 
concurs with the recommendations mentioned above that have a 
bearing on the administrative section of the ministry.  
 
 
Suvi Lindén 
Minister of Communications  
 
 
Taru Rastas 
Special Adviser  
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